Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Foreword
- Contents
- Photographs
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Maps
- Introduction
- Part 1
- Part 2
- Chapter 3 East Timor, 1999–2000
- Chapter 4 Operations with the UN in East Timor, 2000–04
- Chapter 5 Operations in Solomon Islands from 2000
- Chapter 6 Operation Astute in Timor-Leste, 2006 and beyond
- Part 3
- Part 4
- Conclusion
- Appendix
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 4 - Operations with the UN in East Timor, 2000–04
from Part 2
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015
- Frontmatter
- Foreword
- Contents
- Photographs
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Maps
- Introduction
- Part 1
- Part 2
- Chapter 3 East Timor, 1999–2000
- Chapter 4 Operations with the UN in East Timor, 2000–04
- Chapter 5 Operations in Solomon Islands from 2000
- Chapter 6 Operation Astute in Timor-Leste, 2006 and beyond
- Part 3
- Part 4
- Conclusion
- Appendix
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The tour of the 5/7 RAR Battalion Group in East Timor straddled the change-over from INTERFET to UNTAET. Between April 2000, when it returned to Australia, and June 2004 when the UNTAET mandate expired, there were eight force rotations, each of six to seven months duration and each including supporting attachments from the Army's various corps.
Once deployments settled into a routine, preparing battalions participated in Exercise Timor Prelude (to practise AUSBATT standard operating procedures), Exercise Timor Dawn (a battalion and company headquarters exercise) and Timor Dusk (the mission rehearsal exercise). These exercises echoed the pre-deployment training familiar to those who went to Vietnam a generation earlier. Exercises were refined with repeated rotations, incorporating lessons from those preceding.
Instrumental in this process was one of Lieutenant General Hickling’s pet projects, theCombat Training Centre (CTC) established in 1999 under Lieutenant Colonel Keith Schollum and first trialled with 1 RAR that year. The CTC was prominent in preparing subsequent troop rotations, drawing on recent lessons captured and learned by those in East Timor. In addition, operational analysis and evaluation teams ensured that the training was realistic, up to date and relevant. Post-operational reports also contributed to the processes of refining and adjusting. In essence, the critical mass was being reached for the Army to become truly a learning organisation.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard , pp. 169 - 184Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013