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8 - Does Trade Comply?

The Economic Effect(iveness) of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process

from Part III - General Trends and Patterns in WTO Dispute Settlement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2017

Manfred Elsig
Affiliation:
World Trade Institute, Universität Bern, Switzerland
Bernard Hoekman
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Florence
Joost Pauwelyn
Affiliation:
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
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Assessing the World Trade Organization
Fit for Purpose?
, pp. 175 - 200
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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