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15 - Collusion in the Oocyte Market

from Part IV - Buyer Cartels

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 November 2022

Roger D. Blair ,
Christine Piette Durrance  and
Tirza J. Angerhofer
Roger D. Blair
Affiliation:
University of Florida
Christine Piette Durrance
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin
Tirza J. Angerhofer
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
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Summary

Collusion among buyers is every bit as objectionable on social welfare grounds as collusion among sellers. In this chapter, we focus on the antitrust claims in Kamakahi v. American Society of Reproductive Medicine, which arose from collusion among buyers of human eggs (oocytes), which were comprised of fertility clinics and donor agencies. Two closely related trade associations organized and orchestrated a price-fixing conspiracy aimed at depressing the fees paid to egg donors. The antitrust victims were women who were underpaid for the eggs that they donated to fertility clinics or donor agencies. The collusion among fertility clinics would seem to warrant harsh treatment under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. While this case raises important issues in medicine, public health, eugenics, and ethics, we focus our analysis on the merits of the antitrust claim and the effect on the competitive process.

Keywords

collusive monopsonyoocyte price fixingKamakahi v. American Society of Reproductive Medicine, buyer cartel
Type
Chapter
Information
Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets , pp. 345 - 367
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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References

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