Book contents
- Anti-Constitutional Populism
- Cambridge Studies in Law and Society
- Anti-Constitutional Populism
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction: Anti-Constitutional Populism
- I Populisms
- Chapter 1 Populist Constitutionalism – Between Democracy and Authoritarianism
- Chapter 2 Anti-elitism and the Constitution – Some Reflections on Populist Constitutionalism
- Chapter 3 Constitutional Populism in South Africa
- Chapter 4 Subaltern Populism – Dutertismo and the War on Constitutional Democracy
- II Courts
- III Anti-Constitutionalism After Post-Communism
- IV Eu Responses
- V Concluding Reflections
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in Law and Society
- References
Chapter 2 - Anti-elitism and the Constitution – Some Reflections on Populist Constitutionalism
from I - Populisms
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 March 2022
By
Book contents
- Anti-Constitutional Populism
- Cambridge Studies in Law and Society
- Anti-Constitutional Populism
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction: Anti-Constitutional Populism
- I Populisms
- Chapter 1 Populist Constitutionalism – Between Democracy and Authoritarianism
- Chapter 2 Anti-elitism and the Constitution – Some Reflections on Populist Constitutionalism
- Chapter 3 Constitutional Populism in South Africa
- Chapter 4 Subaltern Populism – Dutertismo and the War on Constitutional Democracy
- II Courts
- III Anti-Constitutionalism After Post-Communism
- IV Eu Responses
- V Concluding Reflections
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in Law and Society
- References
Summary
In this chapter I want to discuss the relationship between anti-elitism and liberal constitutionalism. Although anti-elitism is often defined as one of the two prongs of populist thin ideology,1 to define any possible attitude of populism towards constitutional democracy most, if not exclusive, attention has been paid to populism’s second prong, that is the appeal to a monolithic will of the people. The result has often been to end up in a vicious circle. Populist constitutionalism is usually described as proposing an institutional setting whereby populist governments entrench their power and privileges and weaken the media and the opposition by claiming to be morally backed by massive popular support. Populists are seen as betraying the core elements of liberal constitutionalism because they hold a perverted idea of popular sovereignty, which rejects most constitutional limitations that characterise liberal democracies.2 There is surely something appropriate in this reasoning and it is not my intention to question the conclusions of scholars who have followed this approach.3 My more limited aim is to enquire whether, and if so to what extent, the fundamental antagonism supported by populist ideology, and thus anti-elitism, can tell us something more about the attitude of populism towards constitutionalism.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Anti-Constitutional Populism , pp. 67 - 98Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022
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