It has become common practice for informed commentators upon Antarctic Treaty Party negotiations for a minerals regime to deny the economic viability and technological feasibility of exploitation of Antarctic minerals. It is also customary for them to adopt a conservative stance when detailing the extent of mineral deposits and when making geological comparisons between the Antarctic continent and shelf and other resourcerich landmasses. The need to tell so cautionary a tale has been prompted by extravagant assertions of a minerals boom in Antarctica and by fears of an international scramble to share in the benefits of exploitation. It remains, nonetheless, difficult for interest groups outside the Antarctic Treaty system, most particularly conservationists, to accept these assurances when minerals negotiations are proceeding. Do these commentators protest too much? Why is it necessary to negotiate a minerals regime if exploration and exploitation are so unlikely? Surely the negotiation of a legal structure to manage resource exploitation implies acceptance by the Antarctic Treaty system of minerals exploitation? Will the existence of a regulatory mechanism encourage mineral exploitation and create a presumption in favour of exploitation?

Each of these questions was discussed at the British Institute's Conference. These questions pose the dilemma for international lawyers, government negotiators and interest groups as to the most appropriate stage at which to plan measures in advance of needs and problems. Indeed, it has been a signal feature of CCAMLR that it was negotiated well before irreparable damage to stocks was inflicted by over-fishing. It may be perfectly reasonable to initiate negotiations to regulate minerals exploitation in an atmosphere in which exploitation is a distant possibility.