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8 - Efficient Anarchy*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2015

Peter T. Leeson
Affiliation:
George Mason University, Virginia
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Summary

Can anarchy be efficient? Conventional wisdom unequivocally answers no. By providing monopolized social-rule creation and enforcement, government enables individuals to realize gains from cooperation they couldn't capture without it. Given the choice, welfare-maximizing persons therefore choose to form government. As Nobel Prize–winning economist Douglass North (1981: 24) puts it: “Throughout history, individuals given a choice between a state – no matter how exploitative it might be – and anarchy, have decided for the former.”

The ubiquity of government today makes it easy to forget that numerous societies were stateless for most of their histories and that some remained so well into the twentieth century. Several of these societies encompassed many people. Consider, for instance, African groups such as the Tiv, which included more than one million individuals, the Nuer whose population has been estimated at 400,000, or the Lugbara with more than 300,000 members. More striking yet is the fact that, globally, the world has always been, and continues to be, in international anarchy.

Type
Chapter
Information
Anarchy Unbound
Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think
, pp. 155 - 169
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

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  • Efficient Anarchy*
  • Peter T. Leeson, George Mason University, Virginia
  • Book: Anarchy Unbound
  • Online publication: 05 February 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139198813.012
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To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Efficient Anarchy*
  • Peter T. Leeson, George Mason University, Virginia
  • Book: Anarchy Unbound
  • Online publication: 05 February 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139198813.012
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Efficient Anarchy*
  • Peter T. Leeson, George Mason University, Virginia
  • Book: Anarchy Unbound
  • Online publication: 05 February 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139198813.012
Available formats
×