Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction: the strange thing
- 2 A sketch of Kantian will: desire and the human subject
- 3 A sketch continued: the structure of practical reason
- 4 A sketch completed: freedom
- 5 Against nature: Kant's argumentative strategy
- 6 The categorical imperative: free will willing itself
- 7 What's so good about the good Kantian will? The appeals of the strange thing
- 8 Conclusion: Kant and the goodness of the good will
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - A sketch completed: freedom
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction: the strange thing
- 2 A sketch of Kantian will: desire and the human subject
- 3 A sketch continued: the structure of practical reason
- 4 A sketch completed: freedom
- 5 Against nature: Kant's argumentative strategy
- 6 The categorical imperative: free will willing itself
- 7 What's so good about the good Kantian will? The appeals of the strange thing
- 8 Conclusion: Kant and the goodness of the good will
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
AN OVERVIEW OF THE FREE KANTIAN WILL
The third and final stage in this initial sketch of Kantian will is focused on the will's freedom. For Kant, freedom in the most central sense consists in being self-determining, that is, in being a kind of causality whose determining ground is internal and not external (see, e.g., A444–6/B472–4). Given the ground we have already covered, we can easily see that, for Kant, a will determinable by reason itself, that is, a will that can give itself an end and a corresponding law of action, is also for this reason and at the same time a free will. The aim of this short final chapter on the will is to say this again, in greater detail, and to show how it is related to some of Kant's more famous discussions of freedom and the good will.
Despite the brief gloss just given, freedom is a complicated business for Kant. Just as there is for Kant a sense of rationality according to which rationality pervades all action and a sense of rationality according to which rationality is something to achieve, and can be achieved more or less, so there is a sense of freedom according to which freedom pervades all choice and all action, and a sense of freedom according to which freedom is something to achieve, and can be achieved more or less.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- An Introduction to Kant's Moral Philosophy , pp. 63 - 74Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010