Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction: the strange thing
- 2 A sketch of Kantian will: desire and the human subject
- 3 A sketch continued: the structure of practical reason
- 4 A sketch completed: freedom
- 5 Against nature: Kant's argumentative strategy
- 6 The categorical imperative: free will willing itself
- 7 What's so good about the good Kantian will? The appeals of the strange thing
- 8 Conclusion: Kant and the goodness of the good will
- Bibliography
- Index
5 - Against nature: Kant's argumentative strategy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction: the strange thing
- 2 A sketch of Kantian will: desire and the human subject
- 3 A sketch continued: the structure of practical reason
- 4 A sketch completed: freedom
- 5 Against nature: Kant's argumentative strategy
- 6 The categorical imperative: free will willing itself
- 7 What's so good about the good Kantian will? The appeals of the strange thing
- 8 Conclusion: Kant and the goodness of the good will
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
THE PROBLEM
The problem is a problem of long standing. In the Presidential Address to the December 2001 Eastern Division American Philosophical Association Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, for instance, Virginia Held raised doubts about research programs in ethics that insist on naturalism. Held targeted recent efforts in sociobiology and evolutionary psychology to ground ethics in natural facts about human beings, and argued against philosophical projects – like those of Daniel Dennett, Paul Churchland, and Allan Gibbard – that seek to give ethics psychobiological foundations. She cautioned fellow feminist thinkers against embracing naturalism, congenial as embracing nature might seem, especially to thinkers – Held names Annette Baier – eager to revalue the ‘natural’ moral practices of care, and to generally reclaim the denigrated natural sphere – home to bodies, emotions, and the mundane, messy, as well as ‘sinful’ facts of reproduction – to which women have often been consigned. Held's argument, roughly, was that nature, by its very nature, cannot be turned to for answers about what is morally good, what evil, what called for, what forbidden. We rebel, as we should, against systems of gender hierarchy, no matter how rooted in ‘nature.’ We reject, as we should, callous selfishness, again no matter how natural. The normative, Held argued, cannot come from the natural; we should not try to ground moral oughts, her thought goes, in what ‘by nature’ is.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- An Introduction to Kant's Moral Philosophy , pp. 75 - 110Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010