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10 - Law

Anti-regulatory Statutory Interpretations and Reshaping the Judiciary

from Part IV - America’s Regulatory Process

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 January 2022

Shanti Gamper-Rabindran
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
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Summary

Trump and his administration brazenly interpreted laws to expand the president’s powers to open public lands and seas to drilling, to limit states’ powers to protect their waters from oil and gas infrastructure, and to advance deregulation in the oil and gas sector. The district courts ruled against the Trump administration and federal agencies in several (but not all) instances, and with the Biden administration in power, many of these cases will not proceed to the higher courts. The more long-lasting legacy of the Trump administration is his reshaping of the federal judiciary, made possible with the support of the Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell, congressional Republicans and an array of conservative and corporate stakeholders. Judges’ views of the administrative state, i.e., as an ally in protecting individuals against powerful corporations or as a foe to personal liberty and property rights, often color their decisions. Trump nominated judges who are skeptical of the administrative state and who lean towards legal interpretations that limit Congress’s ability to enact expansive environmental laws and that limit agencies’ statutory powers. Trump’s appointments – three Supreme Court judges and more than a quarter of active federal court judges – shifted the courts toward deregulation.

Type
Chapter
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America's Energy Gamble
People, Economy and Planet
, pp. 369 - 412
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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  • Law
  • Shanti Gamper-Rabindran, University of Pittsburgh
  • Book: America's Energy Gamble
  • Online publication: 06 January 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009039567.010
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  • Law
  • Shanti Gamper-Rabindran, University of Pittsburgh
  • Book: America's Energy Gamble
  • Online publication: 06 January 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009039567.010
Available formats
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  • Law
  • Shanti Gamper-Rabindran, University of Pittsburgh
  • Book: America's Energy Gamble
  • Online publication: 06 January 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009039567.010
Available formats
×