I set aside the buck-passing argument for the next three chapters. WP requires an alternative source of warrant for Q when transmission fails. In this chapter I consider the proposal that S’s warrant for P itself suffices also as a warrant for Q. The advocate of this view must claim that S’s warrant for P so suffices only when transmission fails. For, otherwise, it will imply the untenable closure principle that S, warranted in believing P, has a warrant for Q whether or not she recognizes that P implies Q. But there is no obvious reason why S’s warrant for P would only warrant Q when transmission fails; typical putative reasons to think that S’s warrant for P suffices for Q apply whether or not she recognizes the inferential relation. Moreover, Q does not, on its own, ground any empirical prediction whatsoever, and certainly not B, S’s basis for believing P. In fact, ~Q does predict B. So, if anything, B supports ~Q. Moreover, direct appeal to B as warranting Q violates NIFN. So if NIFN demonstrates that transmission fails, it also demonstrates that S’s warrant for P itself does not suffice as a warrant for Q.