Introduction

This chapter proposes that affective polarisation, as outlined throughout this volume, is fundamentally steeped in historicity. The crises and tribulations that have destabilised Britain's long-standing political systems and traditions in the early 21st century are broadly consequences of sweeping transformations that have disproportionately impacted upon specific demographics and regions. Indeed, since Britain's voters took the unprecedented and seismic decision to leave the EU in 2016, there has been significant academic interest in the Eurosceptic demographic of ‘older, white, socially conservative voters in economically marginal neighbourhoods’ that Ford and Goodwin have termed the ‘left-behind’ (2014a, pp 151–9). They recognised these voters as being ‘on the wrong side of social change … and feeling threatened by the way their communities and country are changing’ (Ford and Goodwin, 2014b, np). The left behind saw the referendum as an opportunity to rally against a ‘political class’, perceived to be ‘dominated by socially liberal university graduates with values fundamentally opposed to theirs’ (Ford, 2016, np). The left behind are characterised as a collective of unskilled workers surviving on stagnant incomes in towns where globalisation has extenuated inequality (O’Rourke, 2018, pp 175–83). These voters are now furious at the ‘establishment in London’ for allowing their communities and country to decay (Ainsley, 2018, pp 139–51). More nuanced analysis has also enriched our understanding of left-behind values and culture. By correlating support for Brexit with personal principles, Kaufmann found that the referendum is best understood as a dichotomous choice between ‘order’ and ‘openness’, with Leave voters proving overwhelmingly in favour of measures such as surveillance and capital punishment (2020, np). Kaufmann's study found that left-behind voters opposed ‘modern liberal’ values including forgiveness and diversity, and voiced ‘a feeling that they don't belong to the present’ (2020, np). This formative analysis is undoubtedly insightful, and collectively provides a definitive impression of an elusive, reticent demographic – but is steeped in contemporaneity, with only partial consideration given to the historical changes that have facilitated the formation of the left-behind voting bloc. These ‘top-down’ examinations pay inadequate attention to the gradual, subtle transformations that have influenced disenfranchised voters; after all, the left behind were once the ‘lagging behind’, and, before then, the ‘keeping up’.