Book contents
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Part I Agenda
- Part II The Main Argument
- 3 Adaptation Costs in One Dimension
- 4 Adaptation Costs in Three Dimensions
- 5 All Adaptations Are Not the Same
- 6 Resources and the Scope of the Firm
- Part III Implications
- Part IV Empirical Tests
- Part V Foundations
- Part VI Postscript
- Index
- References
3 - Adaptation Costs in One Dimension
Firms, Contracts, and Price Lists
from Part II - The Main Argument
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 November 2016
Book contents
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Part I Agenda
- Part II The Main Argument
- 3 Adaptation Costs in One Dimension
- 4 Adaptation Costs in Three Dimensions
- 5 All Adaptations Are Not the Same
- 6 Resources and the Scope of the Firm
- Part III Implications
- Part IV Empirical Tests
- Part V Foundations
- Part VI Postscript
- Index
- References
Summary
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- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the FirmFoundations of the Resource-Based View, pp. 33 - 57Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016
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