I argue that while a given interaction between people is deceptive, i.e., is an example of interpersonal or other-deception, only if one of the parties in the interaction engages in some essentially intentional activity, such as lying or pretending, intentionality is not necessary for a given activity to be self-deceptive, i.e., to be an example of self-deception.

The literature on self-deception is divided between those who argue, as I do, that self-deception is non-intentional and those who insist that self-deception must be intentional. Difficulties, however, await proponents on either side of this particular divide.

The common consensus has been that if self-deception must be intentional, then self-deception cannot be explained without introducing some sort of division. One who insists, as I do, that self-deception need not be intentional can find it tempting to suppose that self-deception can be explained only by assimilating it to wishful thinking. But if, as I believe, no satisfactory account of the requisite division can be given, and reducing self-deception to wishful thinking does injustice to self-deception, is any satisfactory explanation of self-deception possible?

A satisfactory explanation might be possible if self-deception were not intentional but could, nonetheless, be explained without assimilating it to wishful thinking, that is, without making all self-deceivers wishful believers, believing what they wish were true. While some would not be initially optimistic regarding the prospects for such a strategy, I argue that this strategy can be pursued successfully and should, therefore, be adopted.