Rights are deficient. Even tinkering with them by offering a more reflexive interpretation will not do. While rights are the most discussed doctrines in achieving the values of liberty and democracy, in this chapter I elucidate contemporary theory's turn to Justification, a turn that informs a distinctive way of limiting government.

Justification entails two necessary components: one, something needs to be justified (decided, talked about, agreed upon, etc.); and such Justification takes place under some kind of justificatory constraints, limitations, or conditions. How we justify this appeal to Justification or to my particular theory of Justification (the meta-justification of Justification) is not my primary concern. Again, I put aside these foundational questions. My book seeks to convince those who already care about the values of liberty and democracy to endorse a theory of Justification. Establishing these values is not the aim of the book. The puzzle is to find the regulatory principle that best balances and realizes them.

Here I introduce my preferred solution – Justification. The following contemporary theories of Justification have not been categorized together in this way. In fact, they are usually seen as containing divergent accounts of justice. While they do differ in important ways, their common theme of Justification needs to be highlighted. Some of these authors do not even use the word “justification” in describing their accounts. Still, I group them under this banner even perhaps at the expense of passing over some of their important features for at least two reasons.