Japan is (in)famous for its clientelistic politics, for which the country's electoral institutions are frequently blamed. Indeed, this chapter's analysis of clientelism in Japan is more sympathetic than the other chapters in this volume to institutional explanations for voter–politician linkages. In Japan, electoral rules have helped protect the clientelistic system, as societal pressures to reduce the country's particularistic arrangements run through institutions that privilege those favoring clientelism's maintenance. The most popular institutional arguments surrounding Japanese clientelism tend to focus on the now-defunct but long-used single non-transferable vote in multimember district (SNTV/MMD) electoral systems. SNTV/MMD was useful in helping to organize clientelistic linkages. Nevertheless, just as Müller in this volume argues that no electoral system is likely to determine the nature of voter-politician linkages, I argue that SNTV/MMD was neither necessary nor sufficient for clientelism in Japan.

SNTV/MMD was important in reinforcing clientelistic linkages, but clientelism in Japan was originally due to other factors, especially the internal mobilization of the country's first parties and the organization of landholding. In the postwar period, SNTV/MMD created incentives for new political arrangements that held clientelism at their core, but SNTV/MMD was hardly a sufficient reason for clientelism. The electoral system was utilized throughout the country, but the levels of clientelism varied with differences in social structure, local governmental financial autonomy, and political economy.

This chapter offers support for the principal arguments laid out in the Introduction, and the Müller, and Kitschelt contributions to this volume.