Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-7f7b94f6bd-745jg Total loading time: 0.504 Render date: 2022-06-29T02:56:33.506Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "useRatesEcommerce": false, "useNewApi": true } hasContentIssue true

6 - Self-Enforcing Patronage Contracts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2021

Virginia Oliveros
Affiliation:
Tulane University, Louisiana
Get access

Summary

Why do public sector employees provide political services? Since the exchange of political support for jobs is sequenced and the law cannot be used to enforce the exchange, patronage contracts leave ample opportunity for deception and betrayal (see Chapter 2). When the political support is expected after the benefit has been received, individuals who receive public sector jobs can always opt to renege on their side of the agreement by refusing to provide the promised support (e.g., Calvo and Ujhelyi 2012; James 2006; Robinson and Verdier 2013).1 Most of the literature argues that clients comply with their side of the agreement – by providing electoral support or broader political support –because of either the threat of punishment or norms of reciprocity. The theory of self-enforcing patronage set forth in this book posits that public employees under patronage contracts provide political services because their incentives are aligned with those of the politician who hired them. Using two survey experiments embedded in the survey of public employees described in Chapter 3, as well as interviews with political brokers, politicians, and public sector employees, this chapter tests this claim – the main empirical implication of the theory.

Type
Chapter
Information
Patronage at Work
Public Jobs and Political Services in Argentina
, pp. 130 - 161
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×