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21 - The Principal’s Decision

Exit, Voice and Loyalty

from Part IV - Persons and Organizations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 April 2021

Stefan Grundmann
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Florence
Hans-W. Micklitz
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Florence
Moritz Renner
Affiliation:
Universität Mannheim, Germany
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Summary

This chapter is the third of a series on the concept and conceptualization of the corporation and the role that core actors play in it. It discusses the power and the limitations that can be observed in the player that, in mainstream doctrinal and economic conceptualization, is seen as the ultimate risk and decision taker. It deals with the power and the limitations that apply to the shareholder in their various decisions, most notably in the decision to invest or disinvest and decisions in the general meetings. While the texts discussed both refer directly to corporations as organizations, one of them decidedly takes a more general view and equally includes and refers to other types of organizations, also of the political sphere – types to which the second text could at least be related.

Type
Chapter
Information
New Private Law Theory
A Pluralist Approach
, pp. 391 - 413
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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References

Hirschman, Albert, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, MA / London: Harvard University Press, 1970)Google Scholar
Manne, Henry, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’, 73 Journal of Political Economy 110–20 (1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alchian, Armen / Demsetz, Harold, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’, 62 The American Economic Review 777–95 (1972)Google Scholar
Aoki, Masahiko, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis (Cambridge MA / London: MIT Press, 2001) (especially chapter 11)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, Sanford / Hart, Oliver, ‘One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control’, 20 Journal of Financial Economics 175202 (1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weiler, Joseph H. H, ‘The Transformation of Europe, 8 Yale Law Journal 2403–83 (1991)Google Scholar

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