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3 - Economics and Private Law Institutions

from Part I - Methods and Disciplines

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 April 2021

Stefan Grundmann
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Florence
Hans-W. Micklitz
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Florence
Moritz Renner
Affiliation:
Universität Mannheim, Germany
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Summary

Is it possible to reduce the topic of ‘Economics and Private Law Institutions’ to three core ideas? This chapter cannot even summarize, let alone substitute for a treatise on law and economics or on new institutional economics (see fn. 16). Three developments – and their founding texts as well as their contexts – stand out, however, as the foundations of the relationship between economics and private law (theory).

Type
Chapter
Information
New Private Law Theory
A Pluralist Approach
, pp. 71 - 94
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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References

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Kahneman, Daniel / Tversky, Amos, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk’, 47 Econometrica 263–91 (1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mestmäcker, Ernst-Joachim, A Legal Theory without Law: Posner v. Hayek on Economic Analysis of Law (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Tversky, Amos / Kahneman, Daniel, ‘Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions’, 59 The Journal of Business 251–78 (1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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