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7 - The Logistic Influence: Planning the Invasion of Burma, 1944–5

from Part III

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Summary

The end of 1944 ushered in the final stages of the Burma campaign: the destruction of the Japanese Army in Burma and the recapture of Rangoon. At that time, although keeping pace with current operations, the strategic logistic build-up was still behind its planned schedule. Resources earmarked to be reassigned from Europe were still being withheld because of slower than anticipated progress in the war with Germany, and preparations to accommodate and support them when they finally arrived in India were not yet complete. The eventual allied force levels, for which India was to provide the base, had been increased again to 27⅔ divisions, 215 combat air squadrons and some 600 transport aircraft. In addition the LofC for a further 91 USAAF squadrons based in China would pass through India. The facilities to support these forces were still only 65 to 75 per cent complete, and they were not expected to be finished until late 1945. Although SEAC's current strength of 17 divisions and 119 air squadrons was being maintained adequately, resource constraints and India's capacity as a base continued to set limits on the force levels and logistic support that could be committed to operations and, consequently, the scope of strategic intentions and operational plans.

At the operational level, however, the position on the Assam and east Bengal LofC improved dramatically as 1944 progressed, and, by the end of the year, many of the problems identified earlier appeared to have been solved by the resources then being committed and the experience gained (see Map 3). The capacity of the northern line was expected to reach nearly 11,000 tons per day by the end of 1944, exceeding the estimated requirement at that time by some 500 tons. That of the southern line would be nearly 7,500 tons per day, some 800 tons above the anticipated demand. The rail-head and base depots at Dimapur were expected to be able to handle 3,200 tons per day, exclusive of POL, easily matching the estimated needs of the 14th Army and its supporting 221 Group of the Eastern Air Command on the Assam front.

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Publisher: Pickering & Chatto
First published in: 2014

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