Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Maps
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Lloyd George at War
- 1 Setting the Stage
- Part I The Home Front
- Part II Strategy and the War
- 5 The First Attempt at a Unified Command
- 6 Facing the Submarine Menace
- 7 Prelude to Catastrophe
- 8 The Horror of Passchendaele
- 9 The Peripheral War
- 10 The Quest for a Negotiated Peace
- 11 The Creation of the Supreme War Council
- 12 The Plans for 1918
- 13 Before the Storm
- 14 Crisis on the Western Front
- 15 The Maurice Affair
- 16 The Origins of Intervention in Russia
- 17 The German Advance Halted
- 18 The Turn of the Tide
- 19 The Road to the Armistice
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- Plate section
13 - Before the Storm
from Part II - Strategy and the War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Maps
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Lloyd George at War
- 1 Setting the Stage
- Part I The Home Front
- Part II Strategy and the War
- 5 The First Attempt at a Unified Command
- 6 Facing the Submarine Menace
- 7 Prelude to Catastrophe
- 8 The Horror of Passchendaele
- 9 The Peripheral War
- 10 The Quest for a Negotiated Peace
- 11 The Creation of the Supreme War Council
- 12 The Plans for 1918
- 13 Before the Storm
- 14 Crisis on the Western Front
- 15 The Maurice Affair
- 16 The Origins of Intervention in Russia
- 17 The German Advance Halted
- 18 The Turn of the Tide
- 19 The Road to the Armistice
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- Plate section
Summary
Although Lloyd George had stated publicly on many occasions that the war would not end until Germany surrendered unconditionally, he never really foreclosed the possibility of peace talks in order to avoid prolonging the horrendous slaughter. After the Kühlmann peace feeler had raised false hopes, Lloyd George told Riddell that “the time might come when they will offer terms we can consider.” His conditions for a stable peace included restitution of territory under Germany's occupation and democratization of its government. But the moment to engage in peace talks did not appear near in view of the Entente's dismal prospects.
In November 1917 President Wilson sent House overseas to urge the Allied leaders to enunciate moderate war aims so as to counteract Bolshevik propaganda and weaken public resolve in Germany. The mission arrived in London at the most inopportune moment. On November 28 the Daily Telegraph published a letter from Lord Lansdowne, a Conservative elder statesman, who made public the case for a negotiated settlement he had initially advanced in a memorandum to the Asquith cabinet a year earlier. Appalled that the flower of the country's manhood was being sacrificed in a conflict he believed was unwinnable, he pleaded with the government to revise its war aims, making it clear that the Allies did not intend to destroy Germany as a great power or ruin its commerce. Only by offering Germany acceptable terms, he asserted, would the war end by negotiation.
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- Information
- Lloyd George at War, 1916–1918 , pp. 219 - 244Publisher: Anthem PressPrint publication year: 2009