Against the background of this brief survey of the classical theories of emotion in philosophy and psychology I want to introduce and outline a version of the cognitive theory of emotion which, for obvious reasons, owes a good deal to the work of the key figures in the long history of the cognitive theory. This version, for reasons which will become clear, I call the ‘causal–evaluative theory of emotion’. This theory will be discussed in relation to the following propositions:

1. (1) That this account is of occurrent emotional states rather than of emotions considered dispositionally;

2. (2) That the concept of emotion as occurrent state involves reference to an evaluation which causes abnormal physiological changes in the subject of the evaluation;

3. (3) That it is by means of the evaluative aspect that we differentiate the emotions;

4. (4) That the concept of particular emotional states may include desires as well as evaluations and physiological changes;

5. (5) That the central evaluative aspect gives rise to emotional behaviour via a rational, and causal, link with desires;

6. (6) That making evaluation to be central to emotion does not mean that emotions are intangible and non-objective.

Occurrent emotional states vs. emotions considered dispositionally

It will have become clear, during my survey of the four classical theories of emotion, that theories of emotion are generally couched as theories of occurrent emotional states rather than as theories about emotions considered dispositionally, though the distinction is in fact rarely alluded to.