Until the 2003 election, students of Russian politics were deeply divided in their assessments of Russian democracy. The outcome of this election, and the subsequent emergence of a dominant political party in Russia, United Russia (UR), led a majority of scholars and policy analysts to conclude that Russia's nascent democracy was in crisis. As Vladimir Putin strengthened executive control over all aspects of governance in the wake of terrorist attacks in Moscow and in the Caucuses, there was growing concern that Russia's democratic experiment was over. Reflecting these concerns, in late 2004 Freedom House downgraded its assessment of Russian democracy.

The arguments presented here suggest that these changes were neither sudden nor should they have been unexpected. The imposition of proportional representation, the appointment of regional governors, and the abolition of term limits are consistent with, but not the inevitable consequence of, the actions of individual politicians taken in response to competitive elections, and were shaped by the political, social, and economic context of the Russian transition.

Recent scholarship sums up the paradox that marks Russia's political process: recurring competitive elections that propel the regime away from democracy by diminishing the capacity for organized opposition to a ruling party (Colton and Hale 2004; Colton and McFaul 2003a, b; Rose and Munro 2003). This puzzle is not only relevant for Russia.