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4 - On the Misalignment of Monetary, Economic, and Political Integration in European Economic and Monetary Union

from Part I - The Economic and Monetary Union

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2023

By
Fabian Amtenbrink
Edited by
Dariusz Adamski ,
Fabian Amtenbrink  and
Jakob de Haan
Dariusz Adamski
Affiliation:
University of Wroclaw
Fabian Amtenbrink
Affiliation:
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Jakob de Haan
Affiliation:
University of Groningen
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Summary

This chapter argues that EMU is characterized by a misalignment of legal, economic, and political integration that is mainly rooted in the asymmetric incorporation of monetary and economic policy in the euro area. The legalization of monetary policy and economic policy coordination has produced a governance framework that cannot achieve monetary dominance as envisaged by the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty. At the same time, this framework also stands for a juridification of politics and the politization of law that has planted the seed for constitutional conflicts between the EU and its Member States regarding the legality and legitimacy of supranational meddling with these policy fields. It is argued that the key to addressing the root cause of the problems lies in a substantive reorientation of EMU that entails a substantive realignment of economic policy with monetary policy in the euro area and the reinforcement of the democratic legitimacy of supranational policy-making in both policy fields.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of European Monetary, Economic and Financial Integration , pp. 69 - 86
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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