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Assessing the Lawfulness of Nonmilitary Enforcement: The Case of Economic Sanctions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2017

W. Michael Reisman
W. Michael Reisman*
Affiliation:
Yale Law School
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Abstract

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Type
The Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions: The Bottom Line
Information
Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting , Volume 89 , 1995 , pp. 350 - 360
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1995

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References

1 The “or else” may also be an "and": a promise of a reward as well as the threat of a deprivation.

2 For the sanctioner, the direct costs are incurred in mobilizing and pre-positioning the various assets to be used in the sanction program; opportunity costs, which are lost once those assets have been diverted to the sanctions, are also incurred.

3 See Reisman, W. M., The Raid on Baghdad: Some Reflections on its Lawfulness and Implications , 5:1 E.J.I.L. 120 (1994)Google Scholar.

4 W. Michael Reisman & Christos Antoniou, The Laws Of War: Basic Documents On The Law Of International Armed Conflicts (1994); Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law And Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation Of International Coercion (1961), reprinted with new introduction and title, The International Law Of War: Transnational Coercion And World Public Order (1994).

5 In fact, the then Soviet Union promptly agreed to become the major purchaser of Cuban sugar, rendering the U.S. action retorsive, whatever its original intention may have been.

6 29 ILM 1330 (1990).