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After eight years of effort, the 15 Asian members involved in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) met in a virtual ceremony to sign the final document on Sunday, 15 November 2020. The final deal matches the original objective – to knit the region together and allow firms to build supply chains across the region to deliver goods, services, and investment to Asian markets more seamlessly. Getting this free trade agreement (FTA) to this point involved repeated missed deadlines, the loss of one important negotiating partner, and thousands of miles of travel for a rotating cast of officials, trade ministers, and leaders. RCEP began in late 2012 as an effort to unravel what has often been called the ‘spaghetti or noodle bowl’ of overlapping and inconsistent rules that can impede trade. While most of the countries in the region have extensive experience in trade and are outward oriented, trade in Asia has been bedeviled with challenges. This includes a range of both tariff and non-tariff obstacles that have made it more difficult than might be expected to trade, especially for final products, within the region.
This article introduces a special issue that examines the effects of strategic competition on the future of the global trade regime. We argue that traditional work in economics and the current set-up of global economic regimes ignores economic statecraft as a key element in understanding trade conflict. Specifically, we outline three examples of contemporary economic statecraft – industrial policy, trade restrictions, and new investment rules – that have been used to block foreign direct investment on the basis of national security claims. Based on this analysis, we explore how the WTO and other economic regimes might address the global economic governance of economic statecraft. In concluding, we outline the theoretical and empirical work in the subsequent case studies that examine the use of economic statecraft in the United States, China, India, Japan, and South Korea.
With the future of liberal internationalism in question, how will China's growing power and influence reshape world politics? We argue that views of the Liberal International Order (LIO) as integrative and resilient have been too optimistic for two reasons. First, China's ability to profit from within the system has shaken the domestic consensus in the United States on preserving the existing LIO. Second, features of Chinese Communist Party rule chafe against many of the fundamental principles of the LIO, but could coexist with a return to Westphalian principles and markets that are embedded in domestic systems of control. How, then, do authoritarian states like China pick and choose how to engage with key institutions and norms within the LIO? We propose a framework that highlights two domestic variables—centrality and heterogeneity—and their implications for China's international behavior. We illustrate the framework with examples from China's approach to climate change, trade and exchange rates, Internet governance, territorial sovereignty, arms control, and humanitarian intervention. Finally, we conclude by considering what alternative versions of international order might emerge as China's influence grows.
Current explanations of demand for anti-dumping protections focus on the role of the business cycle, and fluctuations in real exchange rates. However, empirical evidence supporting these explanations is based primarily on the experience of industrialized countries. Here, we examine anti-dumping petitions in a broader sample of thirty-four industrialized and middle income countries from 1978–2015. We also propose a new determinant of demand for anti-dumping petitions—changes in the pattern of industrial production between developed and developing economies over this period have contributed to deindustrialization in advanced economies and premature industrialization some developing countries. These changes threaten established industries and motivate them to demand protection.
The first chapter draws on Ladakhi and trans-Himalayan sources to examine precolonial understandings of space, boundaries, and frontiers in Ladakh and the broader northwestern Himalayan region. Sources surveyed range from the earliest available records of the tenth and eleventh centuries to the beginning of British rule in 1846. This chapter provides both a historical background to the region and an exploration of four major facets of indigenous Himalayan space: cosmology, politics, language, and matter. In illustrating multiple historical modes of seeing by indigenous historical actors, I suggest that the single, bounded entity called Ladakh was primarily a product of imperial possession in the nineteenth century. I am not arguing that there was not an earlier political entity known as Ladakh but rather that indigenous conceptions of its space were more pluralistic than the subsequent territory envisioned by its imperial rulers. The commingling of cosmological, political, linguistic, and material ways of seeing, I argue, produced identities that failed to map neatly. This chapter draws not only on the limited extant precolonial Ladakhi sources but also on an array of anthropological, linguistic, and archeological sources.
Africa has seen progress and setbacks with regard to the economic and socio-economic development after decolonization until ca. 2000. These are linked to historical and structural challenges, including the economic infrastructure the colonial powers left behind and the unfavourable geography of vast parts of the continent. In the post-colonial phase there has been much economic and trade dependence on the former colonial powers – giving rise to the dependency theory and the notion of neo-colonialism. There was often an unwillingness of the post-colonial leadership to set the course for the economies of their countries. And rentier states developed. Several initiatives – from Africa and beyond – have been proposed to deal with the economic misery, with those of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund being the dominant ones, pushing African initiatives aside.
Building on Chapter 5 and embedded in a discussion of two competing paradigms – Africa as “hopeless” and “hopeful” continent – this chapter deals with the economic and socioeconomic situation after 2000. It discusses various geopolitical and economic changes that took place since then, including the rise of China and efforts to give the continent a “big push”, which culminated in the “Year for Africa” 2005. It shows that there have been more trading partners, more consumption, more foreign direct investment, more private economic activities, more efforts against corruption, and leapfrogging. The chapter also discusses the shape and importance of the informal sector and turns to the socioeconomic development, providing facts and figures. The Millennium Development Goals and their successors, the Sustainable Development Goals as well as to what extent African states have achieved them are analysed as is the effectiveness of development aid.
This article examines how Japan has adapted economic statecraft to serve changing strategic aims through case studies of trade arrangements, official development assistance, and dual-use technology. After World War II, Japan continuously adapted these economic tools to pursue shifting non-economic goals related to international reintegration, comprehensive security, human security, and traditional security. More recently, in response to escalating US–China strategic competition, Japan has employed economic statecraft to simultaneously reduce international instability and to counter China in targeted ways as part of a broader hedging approach. First, Japan has attempted to bolster multilateral trade arrangements amid a volatile policy environment, while also using them to both engage and counter China. Second, Japan has used official development assistance to stabilize and build defense capacity in Asian countries facing pressure from China. Third, Japan has increasingly militarized its dual-use technologies to enhance its ability to respond to Chinese activity in outer space.
Whereas scholars have typically modeled climate change as a global collective action challenge, we offer a dynamic theory of climate politics based on the present and future revaluation of assets. Climate politics can be understood as a contest between owners of assets that accelerate climate change, such as fossil fuel plants, and owners of assets vulnerable to climate change, such as coastal property. To date, obstruction by “climate-forcing” asset holders has been a large barrier to effective climate policy. But as climate change and decarbonization policies proceed, holders of both climate-forcing and “climate-vulnerable” assets stand to lose some or even all of their assets' value over time, and with them, the basis of their political power. This dynamic contest between opposing interests is likely to intensify in many sites of political contestation, from the subnational to transnational levels. As it does so, climate politics will become increasingly existential, potentially reshaping political alignments within and across countries. Such shifts may further undermine the Liberal International Order (LIO); as countries develop pro-climate policies at different speeds and magnitudes, they will have incentives to diverge from existing arrangements over trade and economic integration.
This chapter attempts to trace and connect the current economic structure, patterns of trade and the significance of the informal sector in Ghana and Tanzania to socio-economic and historical factors. The chapter then compares and contrasts both countries based on key economic indicators, arguing that colonization and the economic recovery programme (ERP) and the structural adjustment programme (SAP) are the two main factors that have defined the economic structures in both economies.
In this book, Aaron A. Burke explores the evolution of Amorite identity in the Near East from ca. 2500–1500 BC. He sets the emergence of a collective identity for the Amorites, one of the most famous groups in Ancient Near Eastern history, against the backdrop of both Akkadian imperial intervention and declining environmental conditions during this period. Tracing the migration of Amorite refugees from agropastoral communities into nearby regions, he shows how mercenarism in both Mesopotamia and Egypt played a central role in the acquisition of economic and political power between 2100 and 1900 BC. Burke also examines how the establishment of Amorite kingdoms throughout the Near East relied on traditional means of legitimation, and how trade, warfare, and the exchange of personnel contributed to the establishment of an Amorite koiné. Offering a fresh approach to identity at different levels of social hierarchy over time and space, this volume contributes to broader questions related to identity for other ancient societies.
Foreign knowledge and technology enhance the technological capability of local firms. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are key channels through which foreign knowledge flows and is transferred. This chapter reviews different types of foreign knowledge sources and the factors that ensure success in the adaption of foreign know-how to the local context. The results show that formal firms tend to have higher local technological capability are more likely to adopt and adapt foreign knowledge and technologies. Interaction with foreign firms through imports and collaboration are important sources of knowledge. The managerial localisation strategies in Chinese firms is also identified in our case study to offer an essential learning potential for local firms.
During the final decades of the 1600s, French and Spanish residents in Hispaniola had developed a deeply ambivalent yet fluid relationship that ranged from the open violence to collaboration in their daily dealings. By the end of the century, however, Spanish residents on the island, especially in the north, came to rely on French merchants and settlers, who provided Hispaniola residents with a certain level of economic prosperity that legal (and illegal) Spanish traders operating in Santo Domingo could only provide at much higher prices and limited quantities. This rise of the intercolonial trade between both sides of the island happened as the efforts of the Spanish crown to eliminate French settlements from Hispaniola also increased. The participation of Spanish local residents in the war effort allowed them to manipulate the Spanish offensive and foil the imperial objective of consolidating Spanish control over all of Hispaniola, thus choosing the commercial benefits of accommodation to the neighboring French presence, despite the risks, instead of a safe reunification under Spanish control that would once again commercially isolate them.
This chapter describes the three purposes the book serves. The first is to introduce readers to certain core questions in the philosophy of law, by way of engagement with international legal skepticism. The book’s second aim is to acquaint readers with recent work by legal and political philosophers on conceptual and moral questions specific to particular domains of international law. These include the nature of human rights, and of a crime against humanity, as well as the moral justifiability of certain core features of the law of war, international trade law, and international law’s stance on unilateral secession. Finally, the book aims to advance the debate on many of the topics it discusses. Examples include novel readings of both H.L.A. Hart’s and Ronald Dworkin’s reflections on international law, as well as new arguments regarding the existence of an international rule of law, the possible bases of a moral duty to obey international law, and the moral grounds of universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. A brief chapter-by-chapter outline is also included.
Islanders and Empire examines the role smuggling played in the cultural, economic, and socio-political transformation of Hispaniola from the late sixteenth to seventeenth centuries. With a rare focus on local peoples and communities, the book analyzes how residents of Hispaniola actively negotiated and transformed the meaning and reach of imperial bureaucracies and institutions for their own benefit. By co-opting the governing and judicial powers of local and imperial institutions on the island, residents could take advantage of, and even dominate, the contraband trade that reached the island's shores. In doing so, they altered the course of the European inter-imperial struggles in the Caribbean by limiting, redirecting, or suppressing the Spanish crown's policies, thus taking control of their destinies and that of their neighbors in Hispaniola, other Spanish Caribbean territories, and the Spanish empire in the region.
This chapter shows how conflict between the American hegemon and a rising China led to the collapse of the Doha Round (2001–11) and the breakdown of the WTO’s core negotiation function. At the center of the Doha standoff, I argue, is a dispute between the US and China centered on how China should be treated in the multilateral trading system. China has maintained that, as a developing country, it should be entitled to the special and differential treatment (SDT) promised to developing countries. The US, however, is unwilling to extend such treatment to its chief rival, and therefore refused to conclude the round without greater market opening from China. China rejected American demands that it undertake additional liberalization concessions, and, in doing so, showed that it has sufficient power to refuse to concede to US demands that it views as fundamentally against its own development interests. The US has a long track record of successfully overpowering opposition in multilateral trade negotiations and securing assent for its desired outcomes. Yet, in contrast with the past, the US has been unable to overpower China, and this deep and lasting impasse between the two powers resulted in the collapse of the Doha Round.
This chapter examines efforts to establish new global rules to restrict export subsidies for coal-fired power plants, which are highly polluting and a major contributor to climate change. Government-backed export credit for coal power plants acts as a form of export subsidy, and thus promotes the expansion of such plants abroad. The US spearheaded multilateral negotiations within the context of the OECD Arrangement to prohibit the use of export credit for coal power plants. However, since China is not part of the Arrangement, it was not a participant in the negotiations or bound by the new disciplines created. China’s absence, I argue, weighed heavily over the negotiations and undermined efforts to construct an ambitious agreement. OECD exporters were extremely resistant to agree to restrict their use of export credit when China—the world’s largest supplier of export credit for overseas coal plants, accounting for nearly half of all export credit in this sector—would face no similar restraints on supporting its exports. Without China’s participation, the impact of the resulting agreement is severely limited. This case thus highlights the difficulty of building effective global trade rules today without the participation of China.
The American hegemon’s ability to exercise power in and through international institutions has been sharply constrained by the rise of China. China has consistently thwarted US efforts to construct new global trade rules, producing a recurrent deadlock across a wide range of different areas of global trade governance. The rise of China and its resulting clash with the US is blocking global rule-making in trade and undermining the institutions designed to prevent global trade wars. The China paradox—the fact that China is both a developing country and an economic powerhouse—has created significant challenges for global trade governance. The issue of whether, and how, the rules of the multilateral trading system will apply to China is proving to be a difficult and intractable source of conflict. While China demands exemptions from global trade disciplines as a developing country, the US refuses to extend special treatment to China and insists on universal rules and reciprocal concessions. This fundamental conflict over how China should be treated in the multilateral trading system, which has paralyzed global rule-making in trade, has profound implications—not only for the governance of global trade, but also for pressing issues related to global development and environment.
China’s rise has transformed the global politics of agricultural subsidies, which is among the most controversial issues in the trading system. China has emerged as the world’s largest subsidizer, upending the entrenched understanding of agricultural subsidies as a harm perpetrated by the Global North upon the Global South. From a North-South battle, WTO negotiations on agricultural subsidies have been transformed into a conflict centered on the US and China. The US, as the world’s largest agricultural exporter, is eager to restrain China’s subsidies and insists that it will only agree to stricter rules on its own subsidies if they also apply to China. But China has refused, insisting that as a developing country, it should be exempt from any new restrictions on subsidies. The US has been unable to force China to accept disciplines on its subsidies, leading to a stalemate. While reducing trade-distorting subsidies remains a pressing concern for developing countries, efforts to negotiate new and strengthened disciplines at the WTO have been paralyzed by an impasse between the two dominant powers, heavily shaped by the hegemonic rivalry between the two states. China, along with the US, is now blocking pro-development reform of the trading system at the WTO.
This chapter analyzes China’s impact on the global governance of export credit. For decades, the OECD Arrangement has been held up as a successful example of liberal trade governance, with its system of disciplines proving highly effective in preventing a destructive, competitive spiral of state subsidization via export credit. I show, however, that the rise of China has profoundly altered the landscape of export credit and disrupted its governance arrangements. China has emerged as the world’s largest provider of export credit, but China has refused to join the Arrangement and it has persistently thwarted efforts to negotiate a new set of international rules. China has little incentive to agree to disciplines on its use of export credit, which plays a central role in its development strategy. Despite considerable US pressure, China has refused to capitulate and subject itself to international disciplines that it views as fundamentally against its interests. China has shown that it has sufficient power to stand up to the US in defending its development interests. Yet the result, I argue, is that China’s rise is undermining the liberal regime for governing export credit by eroding the efficacy of existing disciplines and blocking efforts to construct new ones.