This chapter discusses psychic contemplation as our participation in the contemplation of the World Soul, who creates the sensible world and time. As a result, we see the world as becoming alive and we transcend time by finding in ourselves the peace and rest of Nature, the lower power of the World Soul. The main faculty in ourselves which participates in Nature is imagination (and memory), although Nature herself doesn’t entertain perception, imagination, or memory. When we ascend to this level, we begin to live in the present, mindfully awake to our sensible experience, but also having a sense that we are something different from it. Sensible experience no longer deceives us because we see the sensible world in and through its archetypes, which are the logoi in Nature. Like a geometer who sees the intelligible structure of the square in squared sensible shapes, we intuitively see the essence of things (“what it is”) revealed to us through their qualities (“what it is like”).

The Introduction proposes that a microhistorical lens on the departure of over 40,000 Italians from Egypt after the Second World War helps us to understand how historical temporalities and political membership shape migrant departures. It takes as its starting point the question of the memory of Italian departures from Egypt among Egyptian migrants in contemporary Italy. It frames the book’s argument in relation to ideas about historical time and conflicting notions of the Italian population in Egypt as ’out of time’, demonstrating that a history of temporalities which focuses on the future, present, and past can shed new light on processes of migration in the Mediterranean. It then articulates how political membership, as an encompassing concept functioning within these temporal frameworks, illustrates the construction of the categories normally ascribed to migrants and migrant communities in and beyond the Mediterranean. Finally, it draws these theoretical and methodological threads together to rethink periodisations of European and Mediterranean empires and decolonisation.

This chapter considers techniques of musical development through the lens of solo monodic (i.e. single line) musical works. It explores a range of approaches to melody, development, vertical-horizontal relationships, and expression, suggesting ways to unfold and expand musical ideas that are rooted in sonority and dramaturgy.

Boethius, like his Neoplatonic predecessors, poses a challenge to contemporary readers of the Consolation seeking to understand the world he thinks we occupy. That world involves a timeless, simple, but all-knowing creator god and a time-bound, infinite creation that is patterned from the ideas in the divine mind. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a modest illumination into the world as it is conceived in the Consolation by examining two fundamental Boethian categories and their relationship: the eternal and the temporal. The chapter examines the extent to which we should see these categories providing guidance as to the nature of beings rather than expressing the epistemic perspectives those beings have. By noting the limits, we will draw conclusions about the persistence of temporal beings; the ontological status possessed by future, present, and past states of affairs; and what characterizes eternal existence.

Gary Jacobsohn’s theory of constitutional identity speaks to normative questions about the exercise of constituent power in constitution making. To gain purchase on these questions, this article applies Rousseau’s description of three "moments" of citizenship to the creation and maintenance of constitutional orders. Jacobsohn’s understanding of constitutional identity as something that emerges over time as opposed to an episodic expression enriches the Rousseauian model’s response to the paradoxes of democracy. Ultimately, Jacobsohn’s model implies that true constituent power is exercised only in the form of a dialogue within a shared understanding of democratic legitimacy, raising the possibility that moments of violent disruptive constitutional change cannot be accommodated to the requirements of democratic legitimacy at all – a return to Rousseau’s paradox of founding.

Farmers, herders, and the practitioners of diversified economies are interesting to human behavioral ecologists because they encounter similar trade-offs of energy, time, and risk that characterized ancestral populations of humans. Studies of agriculture, herding, and mixed economies also examine choices about how much labor and other inputs to invest in order to increase yields and diminish variability, whether to consume, share, or sell products in markets, and how to manage resources through social institutions. This chapter reviews research and key studies on the five themes of risk, time, investment and intensification, markets, and institutions. The chapter discusses the tricky issue of commensurability, of comparatively evaluating dissimilar forms of value such as calories and cash, certainty and unpredictability, and immediacy and delay. The conclusion proposes avenues for future research, involving niche construction, embodied capital, cooperation and competition, culture, and applied evolutionary anthropology.

There are a number of ways in which time affects treaty interpretation. This chapter examines how a text can be understood, in Roland Barthes’s famous expression, as a ‘weapon against time’ (i.e. a device of stability). In international law, such understanding of a text as a safeguard against change is rooted in the principle of contemporaneity, according to which the terms of a treaty shall be interpreted according to the meaning prevailing at the time of its conclusion. Nevertheless, an exception to this principle has emerged in the form of the doctrine of evolutionary interpretation. This chapter thus looks at the ways in which lawyers navigate the tensions between stability and the perceived need for law to respond and adapt to changing social circumstances and present-day conditions. The chapter then turns to the question of subsequent practice and, more precisely, what should be meant by ‘practice’. It also seeks to illuminate the stakes of the debate about the ultimately rejected draft Article 38 of the Vienna Convention, which provided for the possibility of the modification of a treaty by subsequent practice. Finally, the chapter also broaches the question of the boundary between interpretation, law-making, and the emergence of a new rule of customary international law.

Chapter 2 introduces the concept of construal and explains how identical objects or real-world events can be perceived and described differently by multiple speakers, due to differences in individual speakers’ perspectives, the impact of culture as a lens on cognition, and the linguistic options available in a language. For instance, although Chinese shares similar concepts of time as English, associating time and space so that front and back can refer to temporal relationships, Chinese also exhibits a tendency to construct time vertically, in which the past is up and the future is down. Systematic crosslinguistic differences can also be found in descriptions of motion events across world languages. Learning to express time and motion in L2 Chinese often entails adjustment to new perspectives that are not articulated in a learner’s native language. L2 Chinese speakers therefore need ample opportunities to use the L2 functionally before they can develop L2-specific ways of thinking-for-speaking patterns.

Chapter 4 lays out the book’s adaptive, reflexive capability view of socially embedded individuals. An important reason we ought to see people as adaptive is that this provides a basis for explaining how they make choices and act in changing, often highly uncertain environments – large worlds rather than small Bayesian ones. When we accept that choice is context-dependent, we need to be able to explain individuals’ behavior in the most demanding circumstances they can face. An implication of this framing is that, as in Simon’s procedural rationality view, behaviorally speaking there is really no maximization – only continual adjustment over time. To capture all this, I use a stock flow, state description/process description characterization of adaptive individuals, and then model their behavior more specifically as a capability choice/action capability pattern of behavioral adjustment that works via a reflexive feedback loop. Given that this individual conception also needs to satisfy the two identity criteria I used in Part I to evaluate the standard Homo economicus individual conception, I then show how an adaptive, capability individual conception successfully individuates people as distinct and independent. In light of how undemocratic economic and social institutions limit people’s capability development, I also discuss the circumstances under which they can be reidentified as the same individuals over time.

Criticism is often made that the WTO Agreement has the potential to undermine human rights and accentuates the disruptive effects of globalization. Nevertheless, justice in sovereign terms is different from justice in human terms. This difference is perhaps best illustrated by means of a theory. This book puts forward such a theory. The theory posits that law does justice in order to sustain the good of the community. Justice in relation to the good can be thought about either according to the good’s distribution ex ante or its correction ex post after injury. The metric of distributive justice is equality, whereas the metric of corrective justice is fairness, or what is appropriate. This dualism is exhibited in thinking about WTO arrangements and is replicated in WTO law. In one mode WTO law is about the attainment of equality by means of obligations. In a second mode WTO law is about the attainment of fairness by means of rights. The two modes of law interact over time. Ultimately, they depend upon each other to generate a third, overarching structure in the form of interdependent obligations and rights manifested in a sui generis legal system.

This chapter draws out implications for a defining element of a positivist approach – prediction. Prediction is the primary way positivist scholarship engages the future as well as one of the elements of analysis that define it as “scientific” rather than historical or critical. Presentism demonstrates that while those who do not study history may be doomed to repeat it, those who do study the past are not guaranteed to predict it. The chapter lays out how the presentist move implicates what I call “Disciplinary Prediction,” the predominant way that IR approaches and imagines the future. This chapter evaluates what happens if we divorce the concept of prediction from temporal assumptions that presume continuity and regularity. Once prediction’s temporal scope is allowed to be more limited, contingent, and indeterminate, projects that de-emphasize linearity, actively theorize temporal recurrences, incorporate cycles, and allow for contingency, emergence, and flexibility become increasingly viable. Predictions based on critically informed scholarship also become much more imaginable, enabling a better theorization of the politics of critique as action.

Making America Great Again, Again and Again focuses on a recent example of state behavior—US foreign policy during the Trump administration—to illustrate how these tools and concepts can enrich our understanding of the present moment. The Trump administration was viewed by many as historically novel and one whose actions might radically reorder the world, while others saw it as merely an extension of deep historical processes. How one positioned this present largely turned on their conception of past and future. By placing emergence and change as ontological constants, and centering this heterotemporality and discontinuity, we can better identify the temporal dynamics that characterized the Trump administration’s—and thus American—foreign policy. This chapter identifies four temporal dynamics that characterized the Trump administration—temporal othering, the production of simultaneity in a heterotemporal political environment, the accelerated pace and tempo of political action, and the (re)production of an indefinite present.

Chapter five, “The Time of War,” shifts the level of analysis from the system to interstate relations, focusing on the issue that arguably produced the discipline itself – war. It establishes that war is an intrinsically temporal concept, an event, and requires a number of contestable ideas to be resolved in a specific way in order to cohere in its contemporary form. It shows how ideas like heterotemporal coherence, temporal fluidity, and the production of temporal borders are constitutive elements of war that must be theorized. War requires a collective imaginary to even exist – otherwise, it is just a group of individuals engaged in lethal force. Attending to the temporal levels of analysis within and among these imaginaries as well as resisting the epistemological privileging of generalizability is vital to a better understanding of it. Our understanding of war is largely dependent on which presents are being analyzed, rather than the produce of timeless, objective mechanisms or objectively analogous situations.

This chapter contains four parts. To some, questions of time and politics may appear extraneous – they may be valid issues to study but not a central concern for contemporary IR, much less a necessary one. For them, it is just another area of study and deciding whether to pursue it is a matter of personal choice. The first section shows how international politics and time are already intertwined and argues that time impacts the main issues of concern for IR. The second shows how IR is “stuck in the past” – even as it furiously gestures toward the future – because it theorizes temporality and time as universal and linear, privileging the past, all while resisting thinking about the present. The third section briefly introduces what I call presentism, an alternative temporal imaginary for IR that explicitly values the present, thinks in time, and resists naturalizing the contemporary political dominance of universal, linear time. The final section outlines the rest of the book, identifying theoretical and conceptual implications, concretizing both by showing how it enables a different perspective on war, American foreign policy during the Trump administration, and IR’s primary theoretical architectures.

This chapter articulates the stakes involved for mainstream scholars and those interested in traditional international political concerns by using a presentist approach to critique the “theoretical programmes” that historically have dominated IR – realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism. Doing so provides a widely intelligible example that others can use to guide their own work, even if they have no interest in the particular theoretical architectures used here. Employing these tools makes new things visible, exposes different questions to ask and answer, and enables different ways of understanding what we believe we already know. Each of these examples illustrates how presentism’s approach is not an external critique but one that – if taken seriously – alters key assumptions and conclusions for concepts already considered central to IR’s systemic understanding of global politics. The chapter also draws out implications at the epistemological and ontological levels, defending ideas like temporally contingent epistemologies, ontological nonconsecutivity, and an ontology that fully embraces the present

This chapter concretizes the present as an ethos and sketches out elements of a future research agenda. It further develops the idea of the present as an analytical orientation, conceptual approach, and set of assumptions as well as offers a glimpse of a future where we take the present seriously when theorizing global politics.