In 1997, a domestic financial crisis broke out with mass chaebol bankruptcy, and then a currency crisis broke out as Japanese banks suddenly pulled short-term loans out with a liquidity crisis at home. Japan was willing to provide the liquidity to cope with the situation; however, the United States brought the case to the IMF to open up South Korea’s capital market and realize its broader national interests in East Asia after the Cold War. South Koreans yet accepted the IMF conditionality willingly to utilize it as a momentum for the reforms they thought desirable. The country carried out thoroughgoing reforms while failing to consider the complementarities between the new and existing institutions. The reforms improved corporate governance and purged the system producing non-performing loans, but they undermined the mechanism of the high economic growth. They also led to the massive layoff of workers and the sale of assets to foreigners.

South Korea has become the only country to make the transition from a developing to a developed country after the Second World War; however, its development process has been a tortuous one. This book first explains how Korea failed earlier in history to become a colony and how its economy changed during the colonial period. The book then describes the provision of the conditions for future growth in 1945–1960 and explains the launching of the high economic growth in the 1960s. The book next discusses the development process after the high economic growth began until the 1997 crisis, examining the three conditions for sustaining growth: macroeconomic management, structural transformation, and social conflict management. After discussing the 1997 crisis and the ensuing reform, the book explains how economic development proceeded subsequently until today, again by examining those three conditions for sustaining growth. Finally, it briefly discusses questions for the future.

This chapter focuses on the interplay of health policy and politics at a national level, and:

• explores the process by which health policy is created and the context in which it is developed and influenced;

• considers the interplay between policy and its implementation; and

• offers a narrative of the evolution of national health policy and politics in England over the last 30 years.

This chapter looks at the impact of the American Revolution and its war on both Britain and Ireland. Its central concern is to explore whether Britain and Ireland can be incorporated in the Atlantic Revolution thesis, first advanced by Robert Palmer, which suggests the migration of revolutionary impulses eastwards. The argument developed here lays less emphasis on the inspiration provided by the democratic ideas associated with the American Revolution than on the importance of British military setbacks and ultimate defeat in the War of American Independence. It also highlights domestic and wider imperial influences on reform within Britain and Ireland, which also seem to have played a more significant role than the democratic tendencies of the American Revolution. By no means all the different reform programs and proposals in Britain and Ireland envisaged movement in a democratic direction. Indeed, the chapter makes the case for our considering most of the calls for reform in this period as attempts to turn the clock back, and recover lost or declining safeguards against misrule, or remedy long-standing grievances, rather than as forward-looking attempts to embrace democracy.

Whig and revisionist historians alike have argued that the efforts of Samuel Romilly and James Mackintosh to reform criminal law between 1808 and 1821 were easily thwarted by a resolute Tory ministry and an ambivalent public opinion. The cause of reform was in fact more powerful than either perspective allows. Urbane public opinion lamented England’s increasingly unique adherence to a wide-ranging death penalty and viewed its victims in more compassionate terms than ever before. Conservatives clung to William Paley’s arguments that a selectively enforced “Bloody Code” was both genuinely deterrent and preferable to either preventive policing or the wider use of secondary punishments. There were limits to the logic of the positions espoused by reformers and conservatives alike. By the 1820s, however, there was good reason to believe that the reform cause was already won in the House of Commons and that victory in the Lords was at least conceivable.

Recent historians usually see Home Secretary Robert Peel as a committed opponent of real criminal law reforms, content to hang large numbers of people. He did indeed enter office determined to diffuse reform momentum in parliament and succeeded in doing so, but only for a time. In fact, in pursuing the two reforms that William Paley deemed crucial to relinquishing the “Bloody Code” – preventive policing and more deterrent secondary punishments – Peel behaved like someone who believed his concessions might not hold back the tide of urbane public opinion for long. This was also apparent in his alterations to sentencing practices at assizes and his increasingly careful attention to execution levels in London. Even his consolidation measures were of more genuinely humane consequence than is usually recognized. Indeed, so adaptable to urbane opinion did Peel seem to his older, more determinedly conservative colleagues that by 1830 he inspired their distrust.

Chapter 6 concludes this book by spelling out the implications of the preceding analysis for how we should best understand the coming into being of the international realm as the default setting of world politics, and how we should bested understand the corresponding universalization of the nation-state as the predominant locus of political authority in the modern world. I end this chapter by discussing some contemporary proposals to overcome or reform the modern international system cum empire by invoking the concepts of globality and the planetary in search of viable alternatives and a normative ground from which to contest the many excesses of the modern international world.

Although the execution crowd is a common mind’s-eye image of Victorian England, we still have much to learn or to reconsider about nineteenth-century executions. The Whig governments of the 1830s are rightly seen as far more restrained in using the gallows than their Tory predecessors, but they in fact sustained a surprisingly vigorous, residual “Bloody Code” – centred on violent crimes against property – until 1837. The prevailing conviction amongst historians that the removal of executions within prison walls in 1868 averted a move towards the complete abolition of execution is not supported by the actual character of the attempts to achieve this in parliament. The change of 1868 really did stem from concerns about the execution crowd and the complicity of urbane elites in their extent. To an under-appreciated degree, however, journalists kept the work of the gallows before the public eye through the turn of the twentieth century.

This final chapter follows the journey of Jerban student Sālim Bin Yaʿqūb (d. 1991) from Tunisia to Egypt, where he lived at the Buffalo Agency in the twilight years of its existence in the 1930s. The chapter draws on a diverse body of materials including manuscripts from his private library, his research notes, and a recorded interview from the 1980s with him about his time in Cairo. He spent much of his life in the decades following his return from Egypt to Tunisia preparing materials for a book just like this one. Bin Yaʿqūb’s story is thus at once that of the gradual disintegration of the Agency and its library and the earliest attempt to preserve the memory of the Ibadi community in Cairo and the Buffalo Agency before it disappeared. Although he died before writing it, the idea for his book both inspired and laid the foundation for this one.

Chapter 7 summarises the book’s findings and explains their implications for advocacy and law reform. It argues that recognition of the indivisibility of human rights is important to ensure that targeted services are provided for people with disability to address their disproportionate levels of socio-economic disadvantage. It decries the privileging of civil and political rights especially the right to legal capacity over all other rights, for encouraging the ‘lazy state’ that erroneously justifies its neglect of marginalised people in the name of upholding their human rights. It provides the example of personalised or individualised services premised on simplistic notions of choice and control, which often fail to uphold the rights of people with cognitive disabilities. It stresses the importance for the state and community of acknowledging difference to promote services that ensure civil, economic, political, social and cultural inclusion in all cases.

In this introductory chapter to Part III, we examine the context of EU international investment regulation. We will analyse the objectives of EU trade and investment strategy, and shifts between multilateralism, bilateralism and unilateralism, effectively endorsing pragmatic-lateralism. First, EU values, objectives and principles are briefly introduced, to the extent to which they shape and define the EU’s international action. This is followed by the examination of EU strategy for its integration with the wider world through trade and investment agreements, and the consideration of circumstances which led to the EU’s international investment policy reform. The aim of this chapter is to provide the political background of EU international investment regulatory framework, which is analysed in Chapters 8 and 9.

Chapter 7 explores how looking at the history of participatory democracy in Indian history can help illuminate the shortcomings of contemporary representative governments.

This chapter concludes with thoughts about how democratic activists might be able to remove crony capitalism from institutions. The chapter argues that transparency about the depth of corruption is a necessary first step, especially in terms of understanding who controls rents in the regime. Only when these networks of influence are mapped can democratic accountability start to lead to lasting change.

In this chapter Chris Meckstroth explains how Immanuel Kant responded to the urgent political question of the 1780s and 1790s, how to understand the collective agency of the people or nation, with a novel conception of history. Kant thought we must believe progress is possible if we are to sustain a commitment to acting justly. To this end he re-worked arguments of Leibniz and Pope, who had tried to show that we live in the best of all possible worlds, thereby absolving God of responsibility for evil and saving the coherence of moral duty from scepticism. Kant, however, did not pitch his argument to the religious conscience of individuals. He aimed at political rulers whose authority derived from representing the general will of an entire people. His political thought focussed on principles a ruler must respect to count as that sort of representative. To these his philosophy of history added a concern for improvement over time, which he made plausible by drawing on a mechanism of unsocial sociability familiar in authors such as Pope. The result was a new, secular theodicy of progress favouring peace and republican politics, and designed to contain conflict in an age of democratic reform.

The Epilogue addresses the legacies of wartime neutrality and collaboration in Macau. The war period provided a peculiar blueprint for later developments in terms of bilateral Sino–Portuguese relations and of local practices in the enclave, including towards new waves of refugees. The Epilogue also covers recent written and visual representations of wartime neutrality and collaboration in Macau.

In our 2011 paper on Police Science (Weisburd & Neyroud, 2011) we set our belief that a radical reformation of the role of science in policing will be necessary if policing is to become an arena of evidence-based policies. In this revised and updated version of our paper, we reinforce our argument that the advancement of science in policing is essential if police are to retain public support and legitimacy, cope with recessionary budget reductions, and deal with the myriad of problems that encompass modern police responsibilities. We outline a proposal for a new paradigm that changes the relationship between science and policing. This paradigm demands that the police adopt and advance evidence-based policy and that universities become active participants in the everyday world of police practice. But it also calls for a shift in ownership of police science from the universities to police agencies. Such ownership would facilitate the implementation of evidence-based practices and policies in policing and would change the fundamental relationship between research and practice. We add in this paper a new emphasis to our model that focuses attention to moral and ethical elements of research and practice that are an essential part of science in universities and must become a key element of EBP.