This chapter addresses the challenge of endogeneity, testing Master Hypothesis 4. Some critics of the grievance-based literature argue that endogeneity may undermine the link between exclusion and conflict, and by implication the opposite one linking inclusion to peace. Endogeneity derives from the fact that the governments' decisions to include or exclude could be motivated by the anticipation of conflict. We counter this threat to inference by articulating a causal pathway that explains ethnic groups' access to power independently of conflict. Focusing on postcolonial states, we exploit differences in colonial empires' strategies of rule to model which ethnic groups were represented in government at the time of independence. This identification strategy allows for estimating the exogenous effect of inclusiveness on conflict. We find strong and systematic evidence that - at least for the post-colonial world - inclusion in governmental power sharing systematically reduces the likelihood that ethnic groups become involved in ethnic civil war. Our instrumental-variable analysis confirms Master Hypothesis 4, because we have found that governments tend to co-opt potential rebels rather than excluding them.

We start this conceptual and theoretical chapter by recapitulating previous work on exclusion and civil war by outlining how it connects political exclusion and grievances with the onset of conflict. Consequently, if power sharing reduces inequality and exclusion, peace becomes more likely through a grievance-reducing effect. In addition, power sharing can also bring peace through confidence building. After defining the key notion of power sharing practices, we introduce our first Master Hypothesis about linking both governmental and territorial power-sharing practices to the reduction of civil conflict. The rest of the chapter advances four additional master hypotheses that correspond to the four initial challenges confronting research on power sharing and conflict that were introduced in Chapter 1. First, we derive Master Hypothesis 2 by arguing that practices channel the main conflict-reducing effect of formal power-sharing institutions and also reduce conflict even in the absence of formal institutions. According to Master Hypothesis 3, power-sharing practices have a pacifying effect both before and after the first conflict but the risk of conflict onset is generally higher in the latter case. With Master Hypothesis 4, we address the important issue of endogeneity by showing that governments introduce power-sharing arrangements mostly as a way to co-opt potentially violent challenges to their sovereign power. Finally, under the heading of Master Hypothesis 5, we show how territorial power sharing, especially in relationships already characterized by past violence, may be insufficient to build confidence in support of stable peace. In such cases, autonomy and other territorial approaches are more effective if combined with central power-sharing practices.

Like the protestation, the petition helped to make extra-institutional opinion more visible in early modern Scotland. Petitions were a traditional tool for initiating dialogue, normally in humble terms that emphasised the pleas of the petitioner and the authority of the recipient. Buoyed by religious convictions, political petitioners in Scotland defied these norms by presenting conscientious arguments reinforced with signatures and crowds. They might even petition repeatedly when answers were unsatisfactory. Though these adversarial political activities capitalised on the conventional idea that a good prince should hear the grievances of his people, successive monarchs sought to constrain what they saw as seditious and tumultuous behaviour. This chapter traces episodes of assertive petitioning in Scotland, showing how petitioning stimulated and expressed opinions at large, especially under James VI and Charles I, and how the crown responded to these challenges with the suppression of unwelcome petitioning from the Restoration to the Revolution.

The success of Islamic-based political and economic movements is contrasted with lowerrates of political and economic activity in Muslim countries. The latter -- a significant “participation gap“ -- holds even after accounting for differences at the national-level and, within countries, across individuals. Based on these two trends, the argument is made that Islamic-based movements enjoy a comparative advantage when it comes to mobilizing individuals to participate in collective political and economic activities. This helps to clarify two key research questions: What are the obstacles to political and economic participation among individuals in the Muslim world? And how do references to Islam help to address these obstacles? Three existing explanations for the Islamic advantage are reviewed, each defined in terms of how it sees the obstacle to participation and the role of Islam in alleviating it. While grievance theory holds that Islam speaks to frustrations and resentments among the poor, the faith-based theory of transvaluation argues that religious beliefs create a sense of duty to serve God, regardless of the risks involved. A final theory suggests that individuals are better informed about what they canexpect from Islamic-based groups,.

Mutiny tells us much about threats to social order and the exercise of command. Attaining social order in so large and complex an enterprise as the Royal Navy was no small feat. Inspired by now-classic explorations of social order at sea, our study explains how order was attained in the Navy and why it sometimes broke down. In addition to correcting many misperceptions about mutiny that traditional approaches have fostered, our book explores why people commit to participate in dangerous collective action, exploring the roles of grievances, coordination, leadership and dynamic mobilization processes.

Seamen faced both grave dangers and profound uncertainty when considering rebellion. The detailed evidence that we have assembled on dozens of mutinies shows that they resulted from the convergence of long-standing structural grievances among seamen combined with incidental grievances that intensified discontent and focused it on the person of the captain. Rebellious seamen intentionally employed tactics that enhanced coordination and secured the commitment of their shipmates. The occupational culture and social capital of seamen provided them with resources that made mutiny possible.

Observable implications ofthree existing theories of the Islamic advantage -- grievances, faith, information -- are tested using a variety of data sources. Contrary to the expectations of grievance theory, individuals in the Muslim world appear to be more dissatisfied and less apathetic. Moreover, participation rates are lowest among the most aggrieved, much as they are elsewhere in the world. In contrast to what the faith-based theory expects, participation rates are significantly lower among individuals with the strongest religious beliefs. Further, the popularity of Islamic-based political and economic movements does not appear to follow trends in religiosity in the aggregate, neither across space nor across time. Instead, support for these movements appears to come from both the religious and the secular, in Turkey and across the Muslim world. Finally, there is little evidence that voters in Muslim countries are uninformed, generally, or better informed about Islamic-based parties, in particular. The lack of support for the all three existing theories reopens the puzzle of Islamic-based movements yet again.

In the Great Recession, sovereign bailouts were deemed necessary to alleviate the stress of indebted countries. These bailouts contained some of the most contentious policies, including austerity, structural reforms, and privatizations that triggered sharp bursts of protest during the Great Recession. In this chapter, we examine the impact of those particular political events on protest within this period, aiming to assess their impact and explore the mechanisms through which they operate on protest behavior. We observe that bailouts had a strong effect on protest, but in a mostly regional pattern, as they were accompanied by massive and frequent demonstrations only in southern Europe but not in eastern Europe. We also try to see whether the effect of bailouts can be explained by a deterioration of economic sentiment, but we find that their effect on protest remains even when accounting for such a decline in prospects. The chapter then shows that bailouts, ceteris paribus, were also much more contested than non-supranational austerity packages. Overall, bailouts have a strong effect on protest, but the regional pattern suggests that this is stronger where possibilities of alternative institutional political representation were available, as in the case of Greece which is examined more closely.