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This chapter examines the wartime population policy, the balanced distribution of population that became deliberated in the process of creating policies for “national land planning.” It analyzes the debates relating to population distribution policies as well as policy-oriented research activities mobilized for national land planning, the wartime government’s “sacred mission” to construct the new order in East Asia by establishing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. By focusing on the population technocrat Tachi Minoru, the chapter describes how Tachi’s research reflected the political agenda of the wartime government, which primarily viewed the population as an invaluable resource to be deployed for the nation at war. It details how the research carried out with this understanding came to create the knowledge about gendered and racialized demographic subjects that were categorized around the notion of economic production and biological reproduction. The chapter also analyzes the technocrat’s research to illustrate the fragile nature of demographic knowledge produced for policymaking and concludes that the role of policy-oriented scientific investigation in wartime statecraft was by no means as stable as has been claimed.
‘Follow the money’ is currently the central principle of international financial security, although money itself is probably one of the most unlikely objects to make traceable. Two recent scandals around a security unit and the payment processor Wirecard show how existing systems of financial surveillance that seek to capture ‘flows’ of money for security purposes are either enabled or frustrated. While this current regime of financial surveillance adheres to demanding the free flow of money through financial infrastructures and various actors and intermediaries, new digital currencies build on a set type of ledger(s) in which money is stored as data. Hence, what we understand as money does not ‘flow’, but is rather updated. This change in the underlying infrastructure means that traceability does not need to be enacted; it is an intrinsic feature of digital currencies. With new central bank digital currencies (CBDC), the regime of financial security thus changes from the monitoring of financial flows and flagging of (potentially) illicit transactions towards the storage of financial data in (de)centralised ledgers. This form of transactional governance is engendered by shifting geopolitical agendas that increasingly rely on fractured instead of globalised financial infrastructures, thus making CBDCs themselves subject to security efforts.
This Element discusses the global role of the RMB. After recapitulating its economic and trade growth experiences, we recount China's evolving exchange rate policy in the post-reform era, review the debate over whether the RMB is overvalued or undervalued, present China's policies to globalize the RMB, describe offshore RMB trading, assess the current global status of the RMB, and discuss geopolitical tensions in the last few years. Since 2009, the process of globalizing RMB has not been smooth sailing and progressed quite unevenly over time. Despite the strong performance in the early 2010s, the RMB is under-represented in the global market and its global role does not match China's economic might. The path of RMB internationalization is affected by both China's economic performance and geopolitical factors.
To a hard-nosed “realist” reader, the scenarios of growing international coordination and pragmatic institution-building described in the preceding chapters will no doubt seem like an idealistic fantasy. From such a reader’s perspective, we are likely to see a very different sort of future unfold in the second half of the twenty-first century – a geopolitics based on continued rivalry, arms races, and frantic competition for dominance among China, the United States, and Russia, alongside the restless jockeying of new powers like India, Brazil, Japan, and perhaps a more tightly consolidated EU. Some prominent scholars of international relations subscribe to this view, and this chapter summarizes their arguments about the prospects of geo-strategic affairs over the coming decades. In such a scenario of “business as usual,” unfortunately, the planet-level instruments for managing our four mega-dangers would be distressingly weak, and the opportunities for large coalitions of nations to come together successfully in coordinated, long-range projects will be rare.
The ‘rivalry’ between India and China on the global stage is much ado about nothing. India and China both have huge potential to play a bigger role in global business than they do today. Both countries have experienced major growth domestically, which is not yet matched by their role in global business. MNEs from the two countries have been internationalizing along very different pathways, with few overlaps. Their ability to realize their potential depends on policies and institutions as well as entrepreneurial business leadership in their own country. Their future internationalization depends only to a small degree on the other of the two countries
This article analyses how the first circumnavigation of the world, from 1519 to 1522, introduced South America as a key space in the formation of the ‘global’, thus producing a historical point of inflection. We examine the commercial and political plans and networks that began to function as a result of this new connectivity, which turned the American continent into a major global axis. The analysis focuses on the way in which this voyage gave new prominence to an unexplored region of the world, namely the southernmost tip of America, thus changing the notion of habitability that had prevailed for centuries in Europe. These changes questioned the authority of ‘ancient’ Greek thinkers and strengthened a European historical narrative that appropriated the discovered territories and distinguished the extreme southern part of America from other southern regions, as symbolized through figures such as the Patagonian giants. I consider these changes based on evidence from Spanish sources.
Chapter 9 reviews the attempt by Iranian local government to engage with the international municipal cooperation movement as a way to advance the goal of democratic local government inside Iran and highlights the geopolitical factors that pose sharp limits to that goal. For four years before Iranian security services terminated it, I was co-director of a pioneering “city diplomacy” project involving a multi-year collaboration between mayors and civil society groups from the Netherlands and Iran. The project included exchange visits between Iran and the Netherlands by city councilors, mayors, local civil society groups, and central government officials. It also included collaborative funded neighborhood projects inside Iran. The chapter traces the reasons for the failure of the city diplomacy project to geopolitical factors rooted in Iran’s rejectionist foreign policy and anti-Western and anti-liberal ideology. The international geopolitical factors compounded the antidemocratic ideological commitments of the regime that defeated domestic attempts at reform. Despite its abrupt curtailment, the four-year project made some valuable contributions to the discourse/project/ideal of local democracy in Iran, although its impact on the practice of local democracy is not clear. On the other hand, the Iranian state resolutely moved into the space of international municipal cooperation work in a way that negates and neutralizes democratization and imposed its own terms of Islamization on the interchange with the international community around the theme of urbanization and cities. This shows that the Iranian regime is extremely skilled at managing risk rather than eliminating it.
The Strategic Value Framework developed in this book explicates the dominant sectoral patterns of market governance in Russia today. Historical process tracing from sectoral origins of labor-intensive textiles and capital-intensive telecommunication in this chapter shows how Russian state leaders intersubjectively respond to objective economic and political pressures. The political basis and evolution of the perceived strategic value of national security and resource management took root in the Soviet era through Soviet collapse and transition to and away from democratic rule. In the context of macro-liberalization and mass privatization at the founding of the Russian Federation, interacting perceived strategic value and sectoral structures and organization of institutions have shaped the centralized role of the state in market coordination and variegated property rights arrangements of centralized governance in defense-origin dual use telecommunications reenforced by the rise of Vladimir Putin aided by economic and political crises. The less strategic value of non-defense sectors, such as textiles, is governed by the decentralized coordination and dominant private property of private governance and decentralized governance since Gorbachev’s perestroika. The rise of bifurcated oligarchy in Russian-style capitalism are shaped by the joined imperatives of resource security nationalism and path-dependent sectoral organization of institutions.
The Strategic Value Framework introduced in this chapter offers a unified explanation, linking macro- and micro-sectoral-level changes and continuities, of what appears to be contradictory and irreconcilable forces at work within globalizing countries. It first identifies historically and institutionally rooted values, objective and intersubjective in nature, which arise from state elite responses to political and economic pressures internal and external in nature experienced during significant moments of national consolidation. The perceived strategic value orientation evolves and transforms overtime; and interacts with sectoral structures and organization of institutions. The resultant dominant patterns of market governance vary by country and sector within country and filter the relative impacts of an open economy, global norms and international organizations, resource and factor endowments, regime type and political institutions, and national characteristics and domestic structures. The Strategic Value Framework is tested and substantiated with a multilevel comparative case research design, which systematically conducts across case and within case analysis at (time, country, sector, and company). The case studies leverage historical process-tracing and triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data, including in-depth interviews with state, subnational government, business, and industry stakeholders and primary and secondary documentation collected during extensive fieldwork.
This chapter exposes how the perceived strategic value of capital-intensive, value-added sectors, represented by telecommunications, for national security and resource management, interacts with sectoral structures and organization of institutions. The centralized governanceby the Russian state since the collapse of the Soviet Union and further reenforced during the Putin era witnessed in these sectors shows the federal government consolidating in one corporate entity the ownership and management of civilian and dedicated landlines of the Soviet military industrial complex. Centralized market coordination presides over the predominantly privately owned mobile and value-added service providers operating in fiercely competitive markets deregulated in the 1990s. The cross-time sector and company cases further show various lower-level bureaucracies and non-sector-specific economywide rules regulate telecommunications equipment privatized after Soviet collapse, perceived less strategic than the state-owned and managed backbone infrastructure. Similar interacting strategic value and sectoral logics apply to Information Technology (IT) Software, a sector which has benefitted from former science and technology personnel of the Soviet defense industry. In the face of perceived security threats from within and without after economic crises and conflicts with neighboring countries, however, the state has reenforced its control of the information communications infrastructure, including RuNet and cybersecurity, designated strategic assets.
World War I dramatically transformed Germans’ subject position regardless of whether or not they participated in the war or supported Imperial Germany. In addition to exposing Imperial Germany’s dependence on commodities from abroad for its industry and its residents’ well-being, it witnessed a kind of economic warfare that was just as unprecedented as the military conflict that took place in Europe. Around the globe, the Allied powers targeted Germans—citizens of Imperial German as well as ethnic Germans who were not that. That led to internments and confiscations; but the Allies applied pressure outside their territories as well. Latin America, in particular, became a site of extreme pressure as first the British and then the United States used the war to increase their economic and political power in the region at the expense of the German networks that had long competed against them. Facing a shared set of challenges actually served to bind many of these disparate German communities in the Americas together even as they radically reduced the size of many German communities in other European states and the colonial territories.
While the founder of international law was long considered to be Hugo Grotius, attempts were made in the late 1920s and early 1930s to dethrone him in favour of the Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria. This took place as the professionalization of the field of international law was reaching its golden age both in Europe and the Americas. Leading this case were the prominent US jurist James Brown Scott, one of the founders of the American Society of International Law, and the Spanish jurist Camilo Barcia Trelles. But why did they decide to revive Vitoria then, and why would they couch him specifically as the founder of international law? This article focuses on the intellectual history of the canonization of Vitoria in the context of the formation and consolidation of a continental Pan-American ideal and network of American international law in the Americas. Particular attention is paid to the American Institute of International Law, presided by Scott, and the formation of a Spanish Americanist cultural tradition in Spain. The latter deeply influenced Barcia, who developed a profound interest in Latin American questions, notably around the Monroe Doctrine. The article argues that these geopolitical Pan-American and Spanish-Americanist anxieties of re-unifying the Americas and Spain/America strongly influenced the depiction of Vitoria as a new founding father of international law and allowed Scott and Barcia to elevate themselves as Vitoria’s heirs.
Climate change has become significantly pronounced in the Arctic over recent decades. In addition to these climate effects, the environment has experienced severe anthropogenic pressure connected to increased human activities, including the exploitation of natural resources and tourism. The opportunity to exploit some of the natural riches of Svalbard was promptly grasped by the Soviet Union well before the 1940s. In this paper, we present the story of Pyramiden, a mining settlement in central Svalbard. The Soviet town experienced its golden age in the 1970–1980s but fell into decline in the late 1990s which corresponds well with the overall economic and geopolitical situation of the Soviet Union. The impacts of past mining activities and related urban infrastructure development are illustrated with the use of historic aerial photographs. The most pronounced changes in the terrain configuration were connected to adjustments of the river network, construction of roads, water reservoirs, and obviously mining-related activities. The natural processes overwhelmed the city infrastructure rather quickly after the abandonment of the town in 1998, though some traces of human activities may persist for decades or centuries. Nowadays, Russia has been attempting to recover the settlement especially through support of tourism and research activities.
China is now the lender of first resort for much of the developing world, but Beijing has fueled speculation among policymakers, scholars, and journalists by shrouding its grant-giving and lending activities in secrecy. Introducing a systematic and transparent method of tracking Chinese development projects around the world, this book explains Beijing's motives and analyzes the intended and unintended effects of its overseas investments. Whereas China almost exclusively provided aid during the twentieth century, its twenty-first century transition from 'benefactor' to 'banker' has had far-reaching impacts in low-income and middle-income countries that are not widely understood. Its use of debt rather than aid to bankroll big-ticket infrastructure projects creates new opportunities for developing countries to achieve rapid socio-economic gains, but it has also introduced major risks, such as corruption, political capture, and conflict. This book will be of interest to policymakers, students and scholars of international political economy, Chinese politics and foreign policy, economic development, and international relations.
Scandinavian countries have gone from mostly importing crime fiction to being, in the twenty-first century, the genre’s lead exporters. The chapter considers this transnationalization from three perspectives, showing how Scandinavian crime writing adapts international genres to local concerns, how notable examples of the genre engage with the wider world, and how novels and TV series circulate within transnational networks. It argues that Scandinavian crime fiction is bound up with transnational and transmedial networks of influence, appropriation and innovation. Sjöwall and Wahlöö’s procedurals reflect popular geopolitics while their proto-typical Scandinavian cop longs for a Swedish welfare utopia. Cross-border crimes in works by Henning Mankell, Anne Holt and Peter Høeg critique global structures of social and racial inequality and challenge the demarcation between the local and the global. More recent global bestsellers by Stieg Larsson and Jo Nesbø employ hybrid genres to tell stories of a globalizing world where the relationship between the welfare state and global neoliberalism, and between the bounded nation and an increasingly transnational world are key ingredients.
The Introduction presents an overview of why diaspora mobilization matters, why the existing literature has not satisfactorily explained its causes and dynamics, and previews the author's key arguments. This chapter justifies the book's comparative framework and details the data collection strategies used to investigate the Arab Spring abroad.
The Arab Spring revolutions of 2011 sent shockwaves across the globe, mobilizing diaspora communities to organize forcefully against authoritarian regimes. Despite the important role that diasporas can play in influencing affairs in their countries of origin, little is known about when diaspora actors mobilize, how they intervene, or what makes them effective. This book addresses these questions, drawing on over 230 original interviews, fieldwork, and comparative analysis. Examining Libyan, Syrian, and Yemeni mobilization from the US and Great Britain before and during the revolutions, Dana M. Moss presents a new framework for understanding the transnational dynamics of contention and the social forces that either enable or suppress transnational activism. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This article provides a systematic examination of the role of security considerations in shaping mass preferences over international economic exchange. The authors employ multiple survey experiments conducted in the United States and India, along with observational and case study evidence, to investigate how geopolitics affects voters’ views of international trade. Their research shows that respondents consistently—and by large margins—prefer trading with allies over adversaries. Negative prior beliefs about adversaries, amplified by concerns that trade will bolster the partner's military, account for this preference. Yet the authors also find that a significant proportion of the public believes that trade can lead to peace and that the peace-inducing aspects of trade can cause voters to overcome their aversion to trade with adversaries. This article helps explain when and why governments constrained by public opinion pursue economic cooperation in the shadow of conflict.
We discuss the important – but rarely scrutinized – role of archaeology in the constitution of Greece and Israel as contemporary crypto-colonized states, defined by Herzfeld as countries with a strong national sentiment that serve as buffer zones and whose political independence is accompanied by massive economic dependency. We elaborate on what this crypto-colonizing process means for the two societies.
This chapter provides a general, comprehensive introduction to the entire book. It includes an overview of the theme of the book and its scope while outlining the main questions and the methodology used. The chapter also introduces the case studies and provides a synopsis of the chapters to follow.