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A case-study approach of two Irish cases in the mid-1850s drew popular attention to the vulnerability of women under the existing gendered law of divorce and the need for its reform. The 1856 divorce of John Talbot of Co. Roscommon and Mary Anne (néeMacCausland) of Co. Londonderry was highly publicised. The case also raised popular criticism of Talbot for conspiring to be rid of his wife, the ecclesiastical courts and parliamentary divorce. The case coincided with a lunacy panic regarding the incarceration of sane women in asylums; however, in the Talbot case, Mary Anne never regained her sanity after being detained and subjected to a physical and likely sexual attack to allow her spouse to divorce her on the grounds of adultery. This divorce attracted considerable legal attention and prompted calls for divorce to be removed from the parliamentary arena. The Westmeaths, even after decades of litigation, never secured a divorce. A re-reading of Emily, Marchioness of Westmeath, is presented here to restore her to the historical narrative as a divorce law reformer and challenge Stone’s earlier sexist portrayal of her as petty, vindictive and obsessed with women’s rights.
Although the sexual double standard endured in the divorce court, parliamentary divorce remained lengthier, costlier and more socially and gender-biased. This chapter examines the profile of Irish parliamentary divorce petitioners and legal critics of the system. Successive attempts to reform Irish divorce provision failed. The personal trials that the lack of legislative uniformity in the UK caused was underscored by the Yelverton case which invoked Scottish, Irish and English law and partially inspired a royal commission to consider extending the jurisdiction of the divorce court in 1861. The commission recommended the unification of divorce provision throughout the UK, but this was never implemented. A further royal commission considered the laws of marriage from 1865 and recommended that divorce laws should be unified throughout the UK, but like the earlier calls for Irish divorce reform, this was never enacted: Ireland remained legislatively stranded. The O’Shea divorce in 1891, citing Irish nationalist leader Parnell as co-respondent, also drew the association between morality and divorce ever tighter and the full force of moral Catholicism was unleashed for the first time.
This chapter explores Irish bills for divorce brought to Westminster from 1701 and to the Irish parliament until the Act of Union in 1800. The moral, reputational and financial impact of divorce is considered from a gendered and class-based perspective and noteworthy cases such as that of Sir John Dillon and Lord Abercorn are examined. The profile of the first Irish divorcees in terms of gender, religion, class and grounds for divorce is determined. Moreover, themes of female agency, illegitimacy, collusion, adultery, false testimony (procured in particular from servants) as well as the association between the availability of divorce as an incentive to adultery which became a recurring theme in both clerical and lay debates are also explored in both jurisdictions. The impact of the Act of Union on the rate and profile of Irish divorces is analysed. In addition, the popular criticism and press reportage of Irish divorce allow the tropes of immorality and moral superiority to be defined and considered.
Those of Irish domicile or lacking a permanent home in England or Wales were barred from the divorce court, but parliamentary divorce’s noxious reputation encouraged some Irish petitioners to develop means to circumvent its expense and publicity. Various strategies such as renting a house and paying rates in England were deployed to access the divorce court. This chapter samples Irish petitioners who divorced in court both legally and surreptitiously. A covert court divorce could invalidate second marriages, bastardise issue and contest marriage settlements. The late-nineteenth-century court-based divorces of domiciled Irishmen Colonel Sinclair and Colonel Malone were the most widely publicised of these cases. The legitimacy of their divorces was questioned, and problems arose regarding marriage settlements. The court was therefore increasingly rigorous about testing domicile; a rule that all divorce court petitioners would have to swear English domicile and falsification would bar the proceedings was introduced. However, although domicile was more stringently tested, Irish cases were presented to the divorce court with an increased regularity in the early twentieth century.
The historiography of the Greek civil war has made significant progress during the past decade, but the origins, role and activities of paramilitaries remain under-researched. Most studies have focused on the period of the ‘white terror’ and explored the collusion between the state and the paramilitary groups. Although such studies have advanced our understanding of this turbulent period, they have not discussed important issues such as the motivation of the rank and file members, the sociopolitical networks used to recruit and mobilize support and the diverse conditions under which militias emerge. The article will address this lacuna and provide new insights into the origins, development and legacies of paramilitarism.
Collusion is a largely unconscious, dynamic bond, which may occur between patients and clinicians, between patients and family members, or between different health professionals. It is widely prevalent in the palliative care setting and provokes intense emotions, unreflective behavior, and negative impact on care. However, research on collusion is limited due to a lack of conceptual clarity and robust instruments to investigate this complex phenomenon. We have therefore developed the Collusion Classification Grid (CCG), which we aimed to evaluate with regard to its potential utility to analyze instances of collusion, be it for the purpose of supervision in the clinical setting or research.
Situations of difficult interactions with patients with advanced disease (N = 10), presented by clinicians in supervision with a liaison psychiatrist were retrospectively analyzed by means of the CCG.
1) All items constituting the grid were mobilized at least once; 2) one new item had to be added; and 3) the CCG identified different types of collusion.
Significance of results
This case series of collusions assessed with the CCG is a first step before the investigation of larger samples with the CCG. Such studies could search and identify setting-dependent and recurrent types of collusions, and patterns emerging between the items of the CCG. A better grasp of collusion could ultimately lead to a better understanding of the impact of collusion on the patient encounter and clinical decision-making.
In conventional studies, cryptographic techniques are used to ensure the security of transaction between a seller and buyer in a fingerprinting system. However, the tracing protocol from a pirated copy has not been studied from the security point of view though the collusion resistance is considered by employing a collusion secure fingerprinting code. In this paper, we consider the secrecy of parameters for a fingerprinting code and burdens at a trusted center, and propose a secure tracing protocol jointly executed by a seller and a delegated server. Our main idea is to delegate authority to a server so that the center is required to operate only at the initialization phase in the system. When a pirated copy is found, a seller calculates a correlation score for each user's codeword in an encrypted domain, and identifies illegal users by sending the ciphertexts of scores as queries to the server. The information leakage from the server can be managed at the restriction of response from the server to check the maliciousness of the queries.
Advanced care plans (ACPs) are designed to convey the wishes of patients with regards to their care in the event of incapacity. There are a number of prerequisites for creation of an effective ACP. First, the patient must be aware of their condition, their prognosis, the likely trajectory of the illness, and the potential treatment options available to them. Second, patient input into ACP must be free of any coercive factors. Third, the patient must be able to remain involved in adapting their ACP as their condition evolves. Continued use of familial determination and collusion within the local healthcare system, however, has raised concerns that the basic requirements for effective ACP cannot be met.
To assess the credibility of these concerns, we employed a video vignette approach depicting a family of three adult children discussing whether or not to reveal a cancer diagnosis to their mother. Semistructured interviews with 72 oncology patients and 60 of their caregivers were conducted afterwards to explore the views of the participants on the different positions taken by the children.
Collusion, family-centric decision making, adulteration of information provided to patients, and circumnavigation of patient involvement appear to be context-dependent. Patients and families alike believe that patients should be told of their conditions. However, the incidence of collusion and familial determination increases with determinations of a poor prognosis, a poor anticipated response to chemotherapy, and a poor premorbid health status. Financial considerations with respect to care determinations remain secondary considerations.
Significance of results:
Our data suggest that ACPs can be effectively constructed in family-centric societies so long as healthcare professionals continue to update and educate families on the patient's situation. Collusion and familial intervention in the decision-making process are part of efforts to protect the patient from distress and are neither solely dependent on cultural nor an “all-or-nothing” phenomenon. The response of families are context-dependent and patient-specific, weighing the patient's right to know and prepare and the potential distress it is likely to cause. In most cases, the news is broken gently over time to allow the patient to digest the information and for the family to assess how well they cope with the news. Furthermore, the actions of families are dependent upon their understanding of the situation, highlighting the need for continued engagement with healthcare professionals.
The aim of this paper is to analyse the evolution of the Italian public funding regime, in the light of the assumptions of the cartel party thesis. In the mid-1990s, the debate on party and party system change was revitalised by R. Katz and P. Mair (1995), who introduced the concept of the ‘cartel party’ as a means to study the increasing influence of the state on party politics. Among the main analytical dimensions of the cartel party argument, the system-level variables have received little attention with respect to the Italian case. In what follows I try to find out empirical evidence for the hypothesised changes in the relationship between parties and the state and in the patterns of inter-party competition. I will analyse the trends of the law-making process in the domain of party funding (1948–2014), by combining these observations with data on parties’ reliance on state funds and party collusive behaviour.
We highlight conditions under which R&D agreements may harm consumers by increasing final prices. This occurs although members of the R&D agreement increase their R&D efforts. We focus on cases where firms compete both on the final market and to buy an input necessary for R&D. The market is composed of a competitive fringe and two strategic firms that enjoy a first mover advantage on both markets. By increasing its R&D input purchase, a strategic firm increases the cost of all its rivals and in particular deters entry in the fringe. This reduces downstream competition and increases the final price. Therefore, an R&D agreement may induce strategic overbuying of R&D input by members of the agreement at the expense of rival firms and consumers.
Interpersonal dynamics are a recurring impediment to effective clinical supervision and can lead to phenomena like collusion between the supervisor and supervisee. Collusion involves both supervisor and supervisee engaging in safety behaviours that serve to conveniently avoid and escape from difficult topics and challenging methods. Whilst minimizing the short-term threat to supervisor and supervisee, collusion will tend to undermine the effectiveness of supervision and limit significantly its long-term value to patients. In order to consider how best to address collusion, we review the cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) and related literature on collusion, focusing on how it has been formulated and managed. We then provide a case study featuring a supervisor who was colluding with the supervisee's avoidance behaviours (i.e. filling supervision sessions with superficial reflections on his casework) by not challenging these reflections or moving to another learning mode (e.g. experimenting). We develop a CBT formulation of this pattern of supervision as part of the self-reflection process, led by a consultant. Self-reflection appeared to be a useful tool for improving the supervisor's understanding of this dysfunctional process, and strengthened the supervisor's confidence in utilizing relevant skills in the future.
Dans des modèles où les syndicats ne sont pas présents, le lien entre la collusion sur le marché des biens et son impact sur le marché du travail est ambigu. Considérer un marché dual du travail où se côtoient des ouvriers qualifiés et non qualifiés, en tenant compte de l'accroissement d'efficacité due à la présence d'ouvriers qualifiés dans la firme, permet d'éclairer ce lien et de tirer quelques conclusions. Le cadre d'analyse est composé de deux firmes qui sont en concurrence sur le marché du travail pour le recrutement d'employés, et qui sont en concurrence (ou en collusion) sur le marché des biens pour vendre leur production. Les employés qualifiés sont hétérogènes dans leur spécialisation. Les biens vendus sur le marché final sont imparfaitement substituables. Un premier résultat est que la collusion sur le marché des biens aboutit à un salaire d'équilibre symétrique plus élevé sur le marché du travail (en l'absence de syndicats). Deuxièmement, la collusion favorise le recrutement d'employés qualifiés : les firmes sont incitées à recruter des ouvriers qualifiés pour accroître leur productivité et bénéficier d'économies sur les coûts. Enfin, la collusion sur le marché des biens se fait aux dépens des travailleurs non qualifiés et de l'emploi total ; elle peut cependant augmenter la masse salariale.
Selon Arrow (1962), face à une innovation de procédé (réductrice de coût) une firme monopolistique subit l'effet de remplacement à savoir que la valeur qu'elle lui accorde est sous optimale et inférieure à la valeur de compétition technologique du brevet qui lui correspond. Nous transposons cette problématique dans le cadre d'une économie exploitant une ressource épuisable. En considérant les incitations à innover immédiatement, on peut alors montrer que le résultat de sous-incitation du monopole n'est pas toujours vérifié et parfois même se renverse : le monopole minier exhibe une propension à ne pas « s'endormir sur ses lauriers » lorsque la demande de la ressource présente une élasticité « fortement » croissante. En élargissant le résultat au cas des incitations dynamiques, nous montrons que le monopole adopte parfois plus vite l'innovation que la firme en concurrence.
Cet article étudie les interactions entre le choix technologique de flexibilité des firmes et la collusion tacite dans un duopole. On montre que l'émergence des technologies flexibles facilite la collusion tacite lorsque les firmes se livrent une concurrence en prix ; en revanche, si la concurrence est en quantités, les technologies flexibles rendent la mise en oeuvre d'un accord de collusion tacite plus difficile. On caractérise les configurations technologiques qui émergent dans ce contexte de jeux répétés. On en déduit que les accords de semi-collusion encouragent l'adoption des technologies flexibles.
People with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) typically experience their relationships with others with a high level of trepidation and bring their anxieties into their work with professionals. We have written this paper to describe experiences of working with people with diagnoses of OCD and the impression that we have formed about the kinds of relationship that builds up in the early stages of this work. We believe that it is important to consider the quality of these professional relationships because of their impact on the patient's ability to benefit from whatever intervention we propose. Here, we place particular attention on the roles of magical thinking, disturbed relationships and the fear of rejection. The perspective presented here is designed to complement those of other approaches to OCD – including the neurological, behavioural and cognitive-behavioural. The following themes relating to the social and interpersonal experiences of people with OCD are examined here: (a) their general tentativeness and uncertainty in social interactions, (b) their fear of being damaged by others in social interactions, (c) their magical thinking relating to damaging others.
This article analyzes anomalous patterns of agent, adjuster, and producer claim outcomes and determines the most likely pattern of collusion that is suggestive of fraud, waste, and abuse in the federal crop insurance program. Log–linear analysis of Poisson-distributed counts of anomalous entities is used to examine potential patterns of collusion. The most likely pattern of collusion present in the crop insurance program is where agents, adjusters, and producers nonrecursively interact with each other to coordinate their behavior. However, if a priori an intermediary is known to initiate and coordinate the collusion, a pattern where the producer acts as the intermediary is the most likely pattern of collusion evidenced in the data. These results have important implications for insurance program design and compliance.
Cet article étudie l'efficacité d'une politique antitrust combattant la collusion horizontale sous différents régimes de mise en oeuvre. Nous considérons deux régimes : un régime avec agence publique, où une authorité antitrust se charge de la politique de concurrence, et un régime de « délégation », où la politique est choisie par les consommateurs. Sous les deux régimes, la politique est mise en oeuvre à discrétion. L'analyse montre que la délégation domine l'agence publique, dans le cas d'une information complète comme imparfaite sur les coûts de production, parce que les consommateurs mettent en place une activité d'investigation d'un plus haut niveau. Ce résultat implique que l'agence publique va combattre des cas « importants » d'activités anti-concurrencielle, alors que les consommateurs vont aussi agir face à des cas plus « mineurs ». La combinaison des deux régimes mène à un meilleurs bien-être que si une agence publique seule est en charge de la politique concurrentielle, parce que les consommateurs peuvent partiellement relacher la contrainte des ressources limitées de l'agence.
This paper deals with bid-rigging in a first price auction when bidders face the risk of a prosecution following a denunciation. In this paper, we analyze how cartel bidders react when they face the risk of a denunciaition. In particular, we define the cartel equilibrium size level considering two situations. At first, we retain d’Aspremont and al. (1983) equilibrium criterion where a bidder decides to enter the collusion if and only if his cartel expected profit is higher than his outsider profit. In this situation, we prove that no collusion is possible when the risk of an individual denunciation is high. Finally, we relax this criterion and consider that any bidder decides to enter the collusion if his expected profit is higher than his profit without any collusion. We prove here it is necessary that collusion be large enough to be stable when the risk of an individual denunciation is high.
Cet article propose une évaluation quantitative du modèle de collusion implicite de Rotemberg et Woodford (1992), en s’appuyant sur une version totalement spécifiéé qui permet notamment une détermination analytique de l’élasticité du taux de marge face aux variations de la demande agrégée. Dans ce cadre, on montre qu’un tel mécanisme ne parvient pas à générer des effets réels suffisants pour reproduire un certain nombre de faits stylisés importants associés aux chocs de demande, tels que la réaction procyclique de la production, de l’emploi et du salaire réel. Comparé à des mécanismes concurrents de fluctuations des marges évalués dans un cadre analytique similaire, le mécanisme de collusion implicite semble donc avoir des difficultés à s’imposer à lui seul comme une explication dominante de la transmission des chocs de demande à l’activité économique.
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