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This paper presents the findings of a comparative statistical study examining the application and trends in the deployment and utilisation of European Union (EU) law before the Scottish and Irish courts over a 10-year period from 2009–2018. The paper poses the question, how does European integration impact on the domestic legal systems of EU Member States due to the increasing volume, and significance, of cases where EU law is raised and applied within domestic legal systems? The research presented is of particular relevance in light of Brexit. It allows prescient reflection on the significant disruption and impact the United Kingdom's exit from the EU is likely to have on areas of domestic law which are highly integrated with EU law. It highlights the potential difficulties implicit in attempting to unpick over 40 years of assimilation of EU law and principles into Scots law. These research outcomes should lead to further reflection and debate on the role of EU law and its impact on judicial decision-making in the Scottish and Irish legal systems in general.
The concept of intergenerational fairness has taken hold across Europe since the 2008 financial crisis. In the United Kingdom (UK), focus on intergenerational conflict has been further sharpened by the 2016 ‘Brexit’ vote to take the UK out of the European Union. However, current debates around intergenerational fairness are taking place among policy makers, the media and in think-tanks. In this way, they are conversations about, but not with, people. This article draws on qualitative interviews with 40 people aged 19–85 years and living in North-East England and Edinburgh, Scotland's capital city, to explore whether macro-level intergenerational equity discourses resonate in people's everyday lives. We find widespread pessimism around young people's prospects and evidence of a fracturing social contract, with little faith in the principles of intergenerational equity, equality and reciprocity upon which welfare states depend. Although often strong, the kin contract was not fully ameliorating resentment and frustration among participants observing societal-level intergenerational unfairness mirrored within families. However, blame for intergenerational inequity was placed on a remote state rather than on older generations. Despite the precariousness of the welfare state, participants of all ages strongly supported the principle of state support, rejecting a system based on family wealth and inherited privilege. Rather than increased individualism, participants desired strengthened communities that encouraged greater intergenerational mixing.
Although Brexit had its short-term roots in economic and constitutional legitimation issues, it cannot be explained without considering the European geopolitical space, the EU's contrasting political formations in the security and economic spheres, and the fault lines these produce. Seen from a long-term geopolitical perspective, there have been recurrent problems in Britain's efforts to deal with the EU and its predecessors, and persistent patterns of crisis. The geopolitical environment, especially around NATO and energy security in the Middle East, first rendered non-membership of the EEC a problem, then made entry impossible for a decade, helped make EU membership politically very difficult for British governments to sustain, and then constrained the May governments’ Article 50 negotiations. These problems have a singularly British shape, but they cannot be separated from more general fault lines in the European geopolitical space.
There has been a lively debate about the economic and cultural-based drivers of support for populism. This article argues that economic concerns matter, but that they are realized through the relative gains and losses of social groups. Using new survey items in a large representative survey administered in Britain, it shows that citizens' economic assessments of the ethnic minority out-group – in relation to the group's situation 12 months ago and to assessments of the economic conditions of the white British in-group – are a predictor of support for Brexit. The results, which are robust to prior referendum vote, immigration attitudes and cultural sentiment, extend across income groups and national identity strength. Extending the analysis to a comparison of geographic in- and out-groups between local communities and London lends additional support to the argument. The implications of relative group-based economics are important for understanding Brexit and the economic sources of support for populism more broadly.
Studies have suggested that people voting for Brexit were motivated by anti-globalization, anti-multiculturalism and anti-elite sentiments. However, little is known about how these factors are related and whether citizens in other member states share similar reasons for wanting to exit the EU. Methodologically, this question is addressed by utilizing path models on data from the European Social Survey, with respondents in 17 countries. Empirically, this article reveals considerable cross-country variation, which implies that motivations for voting Leave should be assessed on a country-by-country basis. Yet, two main pathways are identified. First, lower education is related to more negative attitudes towards multiculturalism, which increases the probability of voting Leave. Second, lower income decreases the level of trust in the political establishment, which again increases the probability of voting Leave. Theoretically, this implies that the anti-globalization model is subsumed by the anti-multiculturalism and anti-elite models, giving rise to two new mechanisms.
The role of populism in mobilising support for Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union has been well noted. But a key feature of populist politics – the use of religious discourses – has been largely overlooked. This article addresses this gap by exploring the way in which the Leave campaign framed Brexit in quasi-religious and mythological terms. Three core themes are identified: (1) that the British ‘people’ had a unique role to play in global affairs; (2) that the sanctity of this special status was threatened by elites and migrants; (3) that the referendum gave voice to the sacred ‘will of the people’. These narratives were underpinned by a strategic discourse centring on claims that EU membership was exacerbating a crisis in health and social care. This myth was encapsulated by the so-called ‘Brexit bus’ campaign.
One the basis of the decisions handed down over the last three decades, and in particular since 2008, this book has argued that the English ‘Financial Courts’ have taken a market-minded or ‘macro’ perspective when adjudicating derivatives disputes. This approach has evolved with the markets themselves, as the courts have sought to respond to the exigencies of global markets operating on standard terms containing the default choice of English law and the English courts. In this sense, the English courts coped well with the unprecedented demands of the last financial crisis, including the spike of cases relating to the collapse of Lehman Brothers and novel and complex challenges to the administration of valuation and close-out in volatile markets. This approach has, however, proved more problematic in those cases reflecting the sheer diversification of the modern derivatives markets, so that end-users now include individuals and other types of non-sophisticated customers, an issue which does not have to be factored in by cases on standardised commercial terms used in sectors such as shipping.
Chapter 2 lays out the dual thrust of immigration policy in the neoliberal era, which is to “court” high-skilled immigrants and to “fend off” all sorts of presumably (but not legally) low-skilled migrants, including family migrants. But the heart of the chapter examines the role of immigration in the populist storm. While immigration has been central to both Brexit and Trump, it has been central in different ways. Brexit, though driven by hostility to large-scale intra-EU migration, does not challenge the structure of (neo)liberal immigration policy—it will even make British policy more universalistic because cleansed of favoritism for other Europeans. By contrast, Trump`s immigration policy breaks with the “antipopulist norm” that Gary Freeman, in a classic paper (1995), held constitutive of a liberal immigration policy. Germany during and after the 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis is an interesting negative case of stubbornly holding liberal course, though inadvertently fueling populism at home and abroad.
The EU member states engage in budgeting through a set of supranational fiscal procedures outlined in EU treaties and supporting legislation. The EU itself is a suprnational government with its own budget and budgetary institutions, procedures, and programs. It enforces these macrobudgetary rules that significantly constrain the policy decisions of the individual member states.
This chapter examines the budgetary behavior of the former countries of the British Empire, now known as Commonwealth countries. Orginally created by the 1931 Statute of Westminister that recast the British Empire as a “Commonwealth of nations,” the modern Commonwealth consists of a fifty-four-country network of disparate people created in 1949. The chapter in particular examines the budgetary practices of the United Kingdom and India.
Partisanship is a powerful driver of economic perceptions. Yet we know less about whether other political divisions may lead to similar evaluative biases. In this paper, we explore how the salient divide between “Remainers” and “Leavers” in the UK in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum has given rise to biased economic perceptions. In line with the cognitive dissonance framework, we argue that salient non-partisan divisions can change economic perceptions by triggering processes of self- and in-group justification. Using both nationally-representative observational and experimental survey data, we demonstrate that the perceptions of the economy are shaped by the Brexit divide and that these biases are exacerbated when respondents are reminded of Brexit. These findings indicate that perceptual biases are not always rooted in partisanship, but can be triggered by other political divisions.
After the financial crisis of 2008, the European Union (‘EU’) not only increased its substantial legislation regarding financial services, but also built up a strong and unified system of financial market supervision. In particular, central surveillance authorities were created. These were given far-reaching competences with regard to substituting dysfunctional national authorities or players in the financial services sector. The three European Economic Area (‘EEA’) and European Free Trade Association (‘EFTA’) States—Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway—participate in the EU's internal market through their membership of the EEA. In order to continue participating on an equal footing in the internal market for financial services and to honour their duty to maintain homogeneity, the EEA EFTA States also had to incorporate the new institutional setup regarding financial services supervision. This obligation, however, in particular relating to certain intrusive powers of the new surveillance authorities, collided with some constitutional reservations, above all of the two Nordic EEA EFTA States. This article will show how these conflicting aims could be merged into a system that on the one hand guarantees the unified overall approach needed for strengthened surveillance of the internal market for financial services, and on the other hand safeguards certain constitutional reservations of the EEA EFTA States. It also looks at how third countries that do not (fully) participate in the internal market, such as the United Kingdom and Switzerland, are likely to be treated in this context by the EU.
EU citizens living in the United Kingdom and EU citizens-qua-UK nationals living in other Member States following the referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the EU on 23 June 2016 became ‘the numbered’ 'others'. Their identities were redefined overnight not by them, but by state authorities and their co-EU citizens. In this chapter, I trace the process of 'othering' of EU citizens, which had started several years before the referendum in 2016, and unravel the key moments, forces, and strategies that made it possible by utilising a discursive theoretical approach. I argue that the quest for EU citizens’ rights in the UK under Brexit, just like the quest for migrants’ rights, is a quest as much for the realisation of the fundamental status of Union citizenship as for the effectiveness of the principle of respect for human dignity.
With wavering US support and Brexit unfolding, cooperation between Germany, the EU's economic powerhouse, and the United Kingdom, Western Europe's prime military power, becomes crucial for Europe's overall ability to deal with a resurgent Russia. Does institutional and normative disintegration between states, such as the Brexit process, weaken bilateral security cooperation? This article argues that such cooperation persists if both states continue to jointly perceive a third actor as threatening while regarding each other as useful and reliable when it comes to ameliorating this shared threat. The argument is tested on a case of intrinsic theoretical, historical, and political importance: British-German cooperation towards Russia before and after the 2016 Brexit referendum. The article finds, against a wide pessimist consensus to the contrary, that cooperation strengthened during the Brexit process. As the Ukraine crisis had caused converging threat perceptions since 2014, Brexit incentivised both sides to signal ongoing reliability to each other and, consequently, to view each other as more capable allies. The article combines qualitative comparisons and congruence analysis, drawing data from British, German and Russian primary sources in their respective original languages, including foreign and security policy documents as well as interviews with stakeholders involved in policy formation.
The final Chapter 9 addresses both the substantive and institutional aspects of the process of expanding the internal market to third countries without enlarging the Union and provides a conclusion on the viability of the ambition to truly extend the internal market to third countries, either in a comprehensive or sectoral manner, by means of exporting internal market acquis by international agreements.
Chapter 2 conceptualises the phenomenon of exporting the internal market acquis and thereby expanding the internal market to non-EU Member States without membership in the Union. The Chapter explores the evolving role of the internal market acquis in the EU’s external relations by analysing the dynamics between the aims of various international instruments and the character and scope of the internal market acquis contained therein. The various functions of the acquis are identified and shown in a progression in time and across various country groups in the EU’s neighbourhood.
The book examines the twofold 'boundaries' of the concept of the European Union's internal market – the geographical and the substantive – through the prism of expanding the internal market to third countries without enlarging the Union. The book offers a comprehensive analysis of the conditions under which the internal market can effectively be extended to third countries by exporting EU acquis via international agreements without sacrificing its defining characteristics. Theoretical rather than empirical in approach, the book scrutinises and meticulously questions the required level of uniformity within flexible integration relating to the substantive scope of the internal market, the role of foundational principles in the European Union's market edifice, and the institutional framework necessary for granting third country actors full participation in the internal market while safeguarding the autonomy of the Union's legal order.
Long-term social and demographic changes - and the conflicts they create - continue to transform British politics. In this accessible and authoritative book Sobolewska and Ford show how deep the roots of this polarisation and volatility run, drawing out decades of educational expansion and rising ethnic diversity as key drivers in the emergence of new divides within the British electorate over immigration, identity and diversity. They argue that choices made by political parties from the New Labour era onwards have mobilised these divisions into politics, first through conflicts over immigration, then through conflicts over the European Union, culminating in the 2016 EU referendum. Providing a comprehensive and far-reaching view of a country in turmoil, Brexitland explains how and why this happened, for students, researchers, and anyone who wants to better understand the remarkable political times in which we live.
Since the EU treaties constitute solidarity as one of the EU’s fundamental values (Articles 2, 3 (2) TEU). In a community of law, the validity of this value depends on its capacity as a legal principle. This chapter asks what, if anything, the case law of the Court of Justice (ECJ) contributes to the discursive exegesis of solidarity as a principle of EU Constitutional Law. In order to answer this question, it offers an empirical analysis of the Court’s case law framing the notion of solidarity, providing a unique database evaluating all 122 cases elaborating on the concept. The analysis distinguishes three categorial types of solidarity (solidarity as charity, as mutual obligation and as risk mitigation) and three functional types of solidarity (embedding individual rights, embedding the Internal Market, rejecting limiting effects of national solidarity). The chapter identifies a number of missed opportunities, and a high degree of inconsistency. A more assertive and consistent approach to solidarity could, however, contribute to supporting a more inclusive constitutional discourse on European integration than the mere reliance on liberal constitutional principles.
The chapter examines the impact of Brexit on transnational solidarity. It explains how Brexit was triggered, in part, by concerns as to the impact of EU membership, both in terms of the UK’s identity as a member of the EU and the impact of migration. This negative impact on transnational solidarity will only continue post Brexit, particularly if the UK were to leave the EU with no deal concerning its future relationship. Some of these issues would be mitigated were the UK to leave under the terms of the current Withdrawal Agreement. Nevertheless, the chapter argues that some of the benefits of EU membership will continue post Brexit, particularly as concerns the impact of the UK’s membership of the EU on the UK constitution.