To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
A growing number of states have started pointing to the customary doctrine of countermeasures as the most feasible unilateral remedy in the case of a malicious cyber operation carried out by an adversarial actor. Thus, the legal requirements of successfully invoking a right to resort to countermeasures are analysed in depth. In particular, the chapter deals with state policies such as 'active cyber defences' and 'hacking back' as reactions to cybersecurity incidents, and their lawfulness as countermeasures. After examining the pervasive problem of attribution in cyberspace, the states' duty to prevent malicious cyber operations emanating from their territory and the standard of due diligence in this regard are investigated. The chapter concludes with considering the invocation of countermeasures for the purpose of guarantees of non-repetition and reparation in the aftermath of a cybersecurity incident.
This chapter explains how both the attribution problem and the doctrine of necessity as an emergency rule that creates an exception weaken the rule of law in cyberspace. Therefore, necessity is not capable of serving as a stable legal basis for frequently recurring incidents.
As serious cybersecurity incidents will likely not remain isolated and rare instances in the foreseeable future, this chapter advocates for a special emergency regime for cyberspace and proposes a number of elements such a treaty should comprise. A particular focus is on the question of ex post facto factual assessment and possibilities for multilateral, neutral, and institutionalised fact-finding mechanisms. Moreover, the question of vulnerabilities equities processes is addressed.
This chapter analyses the preconditions of invoking self-defence against a malicious cyber operation. After examining the notion of 'armed attack' and under what circumstances a cybersecurity incident may reach the critical threshold, the study focuses on the question of attributing the malicious conduct to a state actor. Depending first on identifying the acting individual whose hacking then needs to be linked to a state via the rules enshrined in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, the question of the applicable standard of evidence is analysed in detail. Concluding that the technical peculiarities of cyberspace will often prevent states from presenting a sufficient amount of proof of adversarial state involvement in a timely manner, the chapter exposes the inherent difficulties in connection with the doctrine of self-defence in cyberspace.
This chapter focuses on attribution from an international law perspective, that is to say the attribution of a conduct to a State or another subject of international law. The attribution, also referred to as the imputation, is the legal operation aiming at determining whether an act or omission is to be characterised as an act of the State under international law. The present chapter deals with the attribution of cyber operations to States. Its structure is mainly articulated around the Articles on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001, which reflect the norms of customary international law on State Responsibility.
The perpetration of a cyber operation implies the involvement of one or more human perpetrators and computer systems. On the one hand, computer systems may be used for the creation, launch or transit of cyber operations. On the other, there is always a human involved in the perpetration of cyber operations, even when they imply a large level of automation. This observation is also true for state-conducted or state-sponsored cyber operations. As an abstract entity, a State must rely on human perpetrators to act on its behalf. This chapter, dedicated to the question of attribution, thus focuses on attribution to computer systems and to the individuals involved in the creation, launch or transit of cyber operations. These attribution processes are mainly technical and based on forensic analysis.
The evidence collected to identify the computers and individuals involved in a cyber operation may also be used to determine whether they were acting on behalf of a State. This leads to the question of how such evidence may be used and considered admissible in a judicial proceeding, or more generally in an international dispute, related to a cyber operation. The development of State activities in cyberspace, notably offensive cyber operations, has led to international disputes between States. To date, a State has neither disputed a cyber operation before an international court or tribunal nor raised the issue before the UN Security Council. Generally, victim States have chosen to respond through extra-juridical measures, such as cyber countermeasures or measures of retorsion. However, there is the possibility that a State, in future, may bring a charge of harmful cyber operations before an international court or tribunal or before the UN Security Council.
The principle of due diligence is an obligation on States not to knowingly allow the use of their territory for the perpetration of acts contrary to the rights of other States. The duty of diligence was referred to by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case: every State has the 'obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States'. The duty of diligence can be transposed to cyber activities. This would mean that it imposes a duty on States not to allow their territory to be used for the launch or transit of cyber operations targeting another State. In that perspective, due diligence may constitute an interesting palliative to the problem of attribution. The principle of due diligence in international law is particularly relevant regarding the behaviour of non-state actors, since the principle subjects this behaviour to some limitations imposed by international law by creating a bridge between them and State responsibility.
Austen has long been celebrated for her skill in writing dialogue and for its dramatic qualities. This chapter analyzes her dialogue by drawing attention to the way she attributes speech to speakers. There are few extant comments by Jane Austen on her own novels, but she did write of Pride and Prejudice that “a ‘said he’ or a ‘said she’ would sometimes make the dialogue more immediately clear”. This chapter examines this statement closely and it points to the significance of “free direct speech” – unattributed direct speech – within her fiction. By minimizing attribution in this way, Austen cultivated dramatic dialogue and the depiction of speech across a group, but she also accepted the possibilities of ambiguity and error. Free direct speech is an underexplored speech category that is closely related to free indirect discourse, which is arguably Austen’s greatest technical contribution to the novel. As well as examining free direct speech in its own right, this chapter argues for its significance in the development of representing consciousness.
Meta-analyses suggest that clinical psychopathology is preceded by dimensional behavioral and cognitive phenotypes such as psychotic experiences, executive functioning, working memory and affective dysregulation that are determined by the interplay between genetic and nongenetic factors contributing to the severity of psychopathology. The liability to mental ill health can be psychometrically measured using experimental paradigms that assess neurocognitive processes such as salience attribution, sensitivity to social defeat and reward sensitivity. Here, we describe the TwinssCan, a longitudinal general population twin cohort, which comprises 1202 individuals (796 adolescent/young adult twins, 43 siblings and 363 parents) at baseline. The TwinssCan is part of the European Network of National Networks studying Gene-Environment Interactions in Schizophrenia project and recruited from the East Flanders Prospective Twin Survey. The main objective of this project is to understand psychopathology by evaluating the contribution of genetic and nongenetic factors on subclinical expressions of dimensional phenotypes at a young age before the onset of disorder and their association with neurocognitive processes, such as salience attribution, sensitivity to social defeat and reward sensitivity.
Since the end of the Cold War, international law has increasingly been challenged by states and other actors. Specific norms have also been challenged in their application by new realities and obstacles. This article focuses on these challenges as they arise from the development of cyberspace and cyber operations, and offers an overview of the main questions arising with regard to the application of international law to cyber operations. By analysing the application of the existing norms of international law to cyber operations as well as identifying their limits, the article offers an accurate lens through which to study the contestation or process of reinterpretation of some norms of international law. The objective of the article is not to deliver a comprehensive analysis of how the norms of international law apply to cyber operations but to provide an overview of the key points and issues linked to the applicability and application of the norms as well as elements of contextualisation, notably after the failure of the 2016–17 United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. The article comprises three parts. The first part focuses on the applicability of international law to cyber operations. The second part identifies challenges that affect the applicability and application of international law in general, while the third part analyses challenges that affect specific norms of international law, highlighting their limits in dealing with cyber threats.
In French ditransitive sentences, certain person combinations of the two internal arguments cannot be expressed with two co-occurring clitics (a phenomenon referred to as the Person Case Constraint or PCC). To fill the interpretational gap created by this restriction, there is an alternative construction characterized as a “repair”, where the goal is realized as an independent phrase. The fact that the double-clitic construction and the repair construction are in complementary distribution led to a proposal of an interface algorithm that provides a way to repair a non-convergent structure. This article proposes an alternative account of the PCC, and claims that the complementarity between the PCC and its repair is instead accidental and is an artefact of the feature structure of arguments. The proposed account explains the unavailability of certain clitic combinations and some repairs independently, without resorting to a trans-derivational device like the previously proposed algorithm.
"Chapter II critically analyses the application of secondary rules of international law in the context of member State participation in international financial institutions. It begins by looking into the evolution of discussions on member State responsibility, culminating in the regime devised by the ILC in Part V of the ARIO. In this exercise, it sheds light on how -member States’ governance role was acknowledged all along. Based on identified insufficiencies in the ARIO in that respect, the Chapter subsequently examines whether member State governance may rather lead to member State responsibility for their own wrongful acts performed in an institutional setting. It thus concentrates on attribution rules. Inspired by contexts where member States act as implementers of institutional decisions and as troop contributors, the focus is placed on their participation in the representative organs of international financial institutions. Firstly, the international legal status of Executive Directors is explored, to demonstrate that, despite the duality inherent in their role, they can be considered State organs. Secondly, attention is brought to the dynamics of decision-making, which attest to the notion that voting emerges as a corollary of the power of sovereign representation, and should therefore be deemed conduct attributable to the State.
Increasing Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) awareness and decreasing stigmatic beliefs among the general public are core goals of National Dementia Strategy programs. College students are one of the most important targeted populations for achieving this goal. The aim of the current study was to examine AD public stigma among Israeli and Greek college students.
A cross-sectional survey was conducted among college students in Israel and Greece using vignette methodology.
Seven hundred and fifty three college students – 213 Israeli and 540 Greek – participated in the study.
Three dimensions of stigma were assessed (cognitive, emotional, and behavioral) together with health beliefs regarding AD and socio-demographic characteristics.
Low levels of stigma were found in both samples, with Israeli students reporting statistically significant higher levels of stigmatic beliefs than Greek students in all the dimensions, except with willingness to help. Similar to stigma in the area of mental illness, the findings in both countries supported an attributional model for AD public stigma, i.e. positive correlations were found among cognitive attributions, negative emotions, and discriminatory behaviors in both countries. Differences between the countries emerged as a significant determinant of cognitive, as well as of negative emotions and willingness to help.
Our findings might help researchers and clinicians to apply the knowledge gained in the area of mental illness to the development of effective ways of reducing AD public stigma. Moreover, they allowed us to frame the understanding of AD public stigma within a socio-cultural context.
An exploration of a formal feature in the Arthaśāstra called "citation" (apadeśa), in which various authorities on statecraft are cited. These citations are usually presented in the form of dialogic exchanges, and the triumphant position as attributed to Kauṭilya, the individual to whom the text is ascribed in two (late) verses. This chapter shows that, like the chapters and verses, the citations are also a later addition dating to the same redaction of the text. Finally, this chapter argues that "Kauṭilya" must be the name not of the original composer of the text, but of the redactor who brought it to its present form.
Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) infections pose a substantial health and economic burden worldwide. To target interventions to prevent foodborne infections, it is important to determine the types of foods leading to illness. Our objective was to determine the food sources of STEC globally and for the six World Health Organization regions. We used data from STEC outbreaks that have occurred globally to estimate source attribution fractions. We categorised foods according to their ingredients and applied a probabilistic model that used information on implicated foods for source attribution. Data were received from 27 countries covering the period between 1998 and 2017 and three regions: the Americas (AMR), Europe (EUR) and Western-Pacific (WPR). Results showed that the top foods varied across regions. The most important sources in AMR were beef (40%; 95% Uncertainty Interval 39–41%) and produce (35%; 95% UI 34–36%). In EUR, the ranking was similar though with less marked differences between sources (beef 31%; 95% UI 28–34% and produce 30%; 95% UI 27–33%). In contrast, the most common source of STEC in WPR was produce (43%; 95% UI 36–46%), followed by dairy (27%; 95% UI 27–27%). Possible explanations for regional variability include differences in food consumption and preparation, frequency of STEC contamination, the potential of regionally predominant STEC strains to cause severe illness and differences in outbreak investigation and reporting. Despite data gaps, these results provide important information to inform the development of strategies for lowering the global burden of STEC infections.
This chapter offers an original study of the translation and circulation of the World Health Organisation Drinking Water Quality Guidelines (DWQG) (Third Edition) first published in 2004 by the Japanese Water Works Association. The translation of the principles and the suggestions put forward by authoritative, international health organisations in national contexts requires not only high quality translations, but also relies on the existence of an effective society-wide transmission network able to link together the main sources of information: governmental agencies, industrial and business sources, on the one hand, and the end users of the information distributed, on the other, that is, a wide range of industrial sectors associated with water. Using quantitative corpus linguistic methods and political discourse analysis frameworks, this study identifies and constructs a formalised empirical model of the social dissemination and adaptation of translated international drinking water health guidelines in Japan. This study illustrates, through the use of structural equation modelling, firstly, the main sources of information in Japan that drive and facilitate the distribution of translated health concepts, standards and regulatory approaches originally suggested in the WHO document; secondly, the mediating effect of the mass media, especially newspapers and magazines, on the transmission of translated information to industrial sectors; and thirdly, the differences in the attribution by direct and mediating sources of information of social accountability among industrial sectors in regard to the materialisation of four key aspects of the WHO drinking water quality guidelines: targets, standards, approaches, and actions.
Solar geoengineering holds the potential for both benefit and harm. Actors such as states could ask ex ante for assurances of compensation, possibly as a precondition for not opposing the activity, or demand ex post compensation for actual or claimed harm. Legal rules could indicate that those who conducted or approved an activity would be liable to pay damages. There could be a basis – at least in principle – in customary international law for state liability for transboundary harm caused by solar geoengineering that was contrary to international law. Although space-based solar geoengineering is presently prohibitively expensive, states would be strictly liable for harm arising from it. Compensation for other potential harm would face substantial political, institutional, and theoretical challenges, including what damages to compensate, the injurers’ and victims’ identities, and mechanisms and reasons for securing compensation. While recognizing states’ strong resistance to compensation, the chapter suggests an international compensation fund for harm from large-scale outdoor solar geoengineering research and offers initial thoughts regarding that from deployment.
To date, cyber security research is built on observational studies involving macro-level attributes as causal factors that account for state behaviour in cyberspace. While this tradition resulted in significant findings, it abstracts the importance of individual decision-makers. Specifically, these studies have yet to provide an account as to why states fail to integrate available information resulting in suboptimal judgements such as the misattribution of cyber operations. Using a series of vignette experiments, the study demonstrates that cognitive heuristics and motivated reasoning play a crucial role in the formation of judgements vis-à-vis cyberspace. While this phenomenon is frequently studied relative to the physical domain, it remains relatively unexplored in the context of cyberspace. Consequently, this study extends the existing literature by highlighting the importance of micro-level attributes in interstate cyber interactions.
The right to self-defence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter is increasingly being invoked in response to armed attacks conducted by armed groups located in a territory of another state, with or without the (direct) assistance of such a state. This article examines the implications of the invocation of the right to self-defence under these circumstances for the principles of attribution within the jus ad bellum paradigm. First, it illuminates how the threshold requirements for indirect armed attacks (that is, the state acting through a private actor) have been lowered since the 1986 Nicaragua decision of the International Court of Justice. In so doing, the article suggests that in order to prevent a complete erosion of the benchmarks of an indirect armed attack, the notions of ‘substantial involvement’ in an armed attack, ‘harbouring’, and ‘unwillingness’ should be interpreted as manifestations of due diligence. Thereafter, the article illustrates that there is also an increasing attribution of armed attacks directly to non-state actors, notably those located in areas over which territorial states have lost control. Such states could be depicted as being ‘unable’ to counter the activities of non-state actors. The article further submits that particularly in these instances, the principle of necessity within the self-defence paradigm can play an important role in curbing the potential for abuse inherent in the vague notion of ‘inability’, if interpreted in light of Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts.