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We analyze how firms from emerging markets upgrade their capabilities to improve their international competitiveness. We argue that firms use a combination methods, the four-I mechanisms, to upgrade their capabilities – imitation, integration, incorporation, and internal development – and that the underdevelopment of emerging markets affects this catching-up process. We propose that initially, as laggards in global competition, firms are more inclined to imitate products and services from more sophisticated firms, leveraging the relatively weak intellectual property protection of their home countries and aiming to serve low-income consumers. As they catch up, firms are more likely to integrate best practices through alliances to obtain technologies, or to learn by serving as suppliers of more sophisticated firms. Firms then incorporate best practices by acquiring technologies or firms that own sophisticated knowledge. Finally, as they catch up to leaders, firms focus more on internal development of capabilities. We highlight how the four-I mechanisms evolve with the development stages of firms and emerging economies.
The paper explores mobilization to reduce the deepest inequalities in the two largest democracies, those along caste lines in India and racial lines in the United States. I compare how the groups at the bottom of these ethnic hierarchies—India's former untouchable castes (Dalits) and African Americans—mobilized from the 1940s to the 1970s in pursuit of full citizenship: the franchise, representation, civil rights, and social rights. Experiences in two regions of historically high inequality (the Kaveri and Mississippi Deltas) are compared in their national contexts. Similarities in demographic patterns, group boundaries, socioeconomic relations, regimes, and enfranchisement timing facilitate comparison. Important differences in nationalist and civic discourse, official and popular social classification, and stratification patterns influenced the two groups’ mobilizations, enfranchisement, representation, alliances, and relationships with political parties. The nation was imagined to clearly include Dalits earlier in India than to encompass African Americans in the United States. Race was the primary and bipolar official and popular identity axis in the United States, unlike caste in India. African Americans responded by emphasizing racial discourses while Dalit mobilizations foregrounded more porously bordered community visions. These different circumstances enabled more widespread African American mobilization, but offered Dalits more favorable interethnic alliances, party incorporation, and policy accommodation, particularly in historically highly unequal regions. Therefore, group representation and policy benefits increased sooner and more in India than in the United States, especially in regions of historically high group inequality such as the Kaveri and other major river Deltas relative to the Deep South, including Mississippi.
This chapter specifies the methods used in the book to studying the alliances between local and intervening counterinsurgency allies. Nine wars are examined in the book. Five wars are studied using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, including the USA in Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam, as well as India in Sri Lanka and the USSR in Afghanistan. For these five wars, thousands of primary source US, Indian, and Soviet government documents describing the day-to-day workings of these alliances were examined and used to identify 460 specific policy requests, which were then incorporated in an original dataset tracking local compliance and other relevant variables. The coding rules for each variable are detailed in this chapter. The remaining four wars, namely Vietnam in Cambodia, Egypt in Yemen, Cuba in Angola, and Syria in Lebanon, rely on secondary historical accounts or primary source observations from outside actors such as US intelligence agencies.
Detailing the US intervention in Vietnam this chapter provides a list of policy requests from the USA to Vietnamese partners and the rate of Vietnamese compliance from 1964 to 1973. Providing a summary of the US-Vietnam counterinsurgency partnership, this chapter discusses several distinctive components of the Vietnamese-US alliance, including detailing how the shock of the 1968 Tet Offensive led to a sharp increase in local compliance, suggesting that significant enemy activity can motivate clients to cooperate with the demands of intervening patrons. Overall, similar to other interventions, local compliance was affected by the convergence or divergence of US and Vietnamese interests, interacting with US dependency on Saigon to implement particular reforms. There are 105 US policy requests identified and detailed, including pacification, reconciliation and development programs.
Detailing the US intervention in Afghanistan this chapter provides a list of policy requests from the USA to Afghan partners and the rate of Afghan compliance from 2001 to 2011. Providing a summary of the US-Afghan counterinsurgency partnership from the start of the US intervention to 2011, this chapter discusses several distinctive components of the Afghan-US alliance, namely the tension between US and Afghan officials, and an unusual pattern of free riding in Afghanistan not observed in other interventions examined in the book. Afghan compliance was affected by the convergence or divergence of US and Afghan interests, interacting with US dependency on Kabul to implement particular reforms. There are 148 US policy requests identified and detailed including working against corruption, expanding governance capacity, addressing counternarcotics, and aiding in development programs.
Large-scale military interventions are usually seen as foreign policy options limited to large powers. Yet, Vietnam, Egypt, Syria, and Cuba engaged in costly COIN interventions. Emerging from their own colonial histories, these smaller interveners offer a different perspective to interventions, drawing from their experiences of occupation, revolution, and insurgency. These wars reveal how alliance dynamics shift when the asymmetries in capabilities between allies are less significant than in the interventions examined previously. Smaller interveners rely less on technology and are more likely to maintain modest agendas for development. Vietnam in Cambodia and Egypt in Yemen embedded themselves into the local regimes they were aiding, thus ignoring the norm of promoting the legal sovereignty of local regimes. Syria in Lebanon aided multiple groups to assert its interests, as opposed to commandeering the government in Beirut, in part due to Israel’s efforts to constrain Damascus. Similarly, Cuban forces did not occupy the Angolan state, partly due to the USSR's influence, and partly as Castro’s anti-imperialist stance made the Cubans wary to appear as an occupying force.
Detailing the US intervention in Iraq, this chapter provides a list of policy requests from the USA to Iraqi partners and the rate of Iraqi compliance with US requests from 2004 to 2010. Providing a summary of the US-Iraqi counterinsurgency partnership (2003–11), this chapter discusses several distinctive components of the Iraqi-US alliance, namely the imperfect and awkward transition to Iraqi sovereignty and Washington negotiating with not one, but two local governments in Iraq, namely the Shi’a-dominated government in Baghdad, and the Kurdish Regional Government in Erbil. Iraqi compliance was affected by the convergence or divergence of US and Iraqi interests, interacting with US dependency on Iraq to implement particular reforms. There are 106 US policy requests identified and detailed including working against sectarianism and corruption.
Summarizing, I detail the leverage sources for “weak” local COIN proxies. As postcolonial military intervention conceptualizes local partner regime success as a fundamental component of a successful foreign military intervention, local allies have much political influence over wealthy intervening patrons. Local allies that offer political inputs necessary for the COIN effort can capitalize on their indispensable role to extract concessions and assert influence over intervening wealthy patrons. Comparing the nine wars, I find consistency in local ally compliance, with one-third of requests from intervening forces resulting in compliance, one-third partial compliance, and one-third noncompliance. Interestingly, rates of local compliance had little impact on war outcome as intervening forces did not always offer great advice to local partners, and stronger local partners, such as Sri Lanka, that were more capable of combatting insurgents, could simultaneously resist the policy prescriptions of intervening patrons. These findings show the complexity of COIN by proxy, and should temper expectations about how much local reform can (and perhaps should) be coerced by intervening patrons.
I propose a model analyzing patterns in local compliance in response to requests from intervening COIN allies. I argue four primary variables affect the likelihood of compliance with policies proposed by intervening forces: (1) the capacity of the local partner to implement the requested policy, (2) whether the respective interests of the local and intervening forces converge or diverge over the policy, (3) the dependency of the intervening ally on the local regime to implement the requested policy, and (4) acute external threats from insurgent forces. The theory contends that these are key to understanding the seemingly curious behavior of local COIN partners, who at times seem to undermine the strength of a joint COIN effort by remaining obstinate against key reforms promoted by intervening patrons. Instead of presuming local allies comply with such requests when it is in their interest to do, and refuse when their interests diverge, I argue there is a specific pattern of interaction between interests, and the reliance of foreign intervening forces on local actors to implement policy, that affects the likelihood of compliance by local partners with policy demands.
Detailing the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka this chapter provides a list of policy requests from New Delhi to Colombo and the rate of Sri Lankan compliance from 1986 to 1989. Providing a summary of the Indian-Sri Lankan counterinsurgency partnership, this chapter discusses several distinctive components of the alliance, including the unique dynamics of New Delhi initially supporting the Tamil insurgents to later sending troops into Tamil regions of Sri Lanka to fight Tamil separatists alongside representatives from the Sri Lankan regime in Colombo. An overestimation of its ability to coercively influence both the Tamil insurgents as a proxy faction and the government in Colombo as a proxy ally backfired, costing New Delhi both politically and militarily. Overall, similar to other interventions, local compliance was affected by the convergence or divergence of Indian and Sri Lanka interests, interacting with Indian dependency on Colombo to implement particular policies. There are 79 Indian policy requests to Colombo identified and detailed, including electoral, law enforcement, and governance policies as well as policies to address Tamil grievances.
Introduces the big questions asked in this book, namely: When do intervening forces have coercive leverage over local partners in large-scale counterinsurgency interventions? When can local partners coerce their powerful patrons? What makes these partnerships so notoriously problematic? This chapter specifies why local allies matter in counterinsurgency and what political dynamics have changed from the colonial to postcolonial era of intervention, including the effect of local partners exercising (nominal) legal sovereignty that provides important political opportunities for local partners. The chapter also summarizes the argument that certain structural incentives embedded within intervention motivate local counterinsurgency proxies to comply with certain requests from intervening patrons, while defying others, detailing that the record on local compliance is varied.
Detailing the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan from 1978 to 1989 this chapter provides a list of policy requests from the Soviets to the Afghans and the rate of Afghan compliance from 1978 to 1980. Providing a summary of the Soviet-Afghan counterinsurgency partnership, this chapter discusses several distinctive components of the alliance, including the Soviet takeover of the Afghan state in 1980. Instead of asking its Afghan partners for new reforms, Moscow instead chooses to use internal Soviet agents embedded in Kabul to carry out requests within the Afghan regime. The chapter identifies and details 21 policy requests from 1978 to 1980 that pre-date the Soviet takeover of the Afghan state. Afghan compliance with those requests are remarkably similar with rates of compliance in other interventions, including the US intervention in Afghanistan. Soviet requests include negotiating with local powerbrokers and expanding governance structures.
Contemporary studies of conflict have adopted approaches that minimize the importance of negotiation during war or treat it as a constant and mechanical activity. This is strongly related to the lack of systematic data that track and illustrate the complex nature of wartime diplomacy. I address these issues by creating and exploring a new daily-level data set of negotiations in all interstate wars from 1816 to the present. I find strong indications that post-1945 wars feature more frequent negotiations and that these negotiations are far less predictive of war termination. Evidence suggests that increased international pressures for peace and stability after World War II, especially emanating from nuclear weapons and international alliances, account for this trend. These original data and insights establish a dynamic research agenda that enables a more policy-relevant study of conflict management, highlights a historical angle to conflict resolution, and speaks to the utility of viewing diplomacy as an essential dimension to understanding war.
Conventional wisdom holds that great power patrons prop up client dictatorships. But this is generally assumed rather than systematically analyzed. This article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the relationship between foreign sponsorship and authoritarian regime survival, using an original data set of all autocratic client regimes in the postwar period. The results demonstrate that patronage from Western powers—the United States, France, and the United Kingdom—is not associated with client regime survival. Rather, it’s only Soviet sponsorship that reduced the risk of regime collapse. The author explains this variation by considering the effects of foreign sponsorship on the likelihood of military coups d’état. He argues that the Soviet Union directly aided its clients by imposing a series of highly effective coup prevention strategies. By contrast, the US and its allies didn’t provide such aid, leaving regimes vulnerable to military overthrow.
In America’s public–private struggle, communitarians and individualists contest the appropriate relationship between states and markets. This chapter explains how teacher unions and school administrator associations rose to prominence in the middle of the twentieth century, empowering a communitarian order that supported public schools as civic institutions and bastions of community values. Individualist groups became more adept at countering union opposition during the latter half of the century, although they still faced the politically dangerous charge that they were intent upon undermining public schools. Hence, as the individualist order grew in strength, it utilized attenuated policy forms to disguise the diversion of public dollars from public institutions. The communitarian critique of vouchers – that they transfer money from public to private schools – helps explain the surprising absence of voucher programs in conservative states controlled by Republican administrations, such as Texas, Michigan, and Missouri. There, “strange bedfellow” alliances of Democrats and rural Republican legislators prevent these state legislatures from passing voucher legislation, because public school interests play an outsized role in rural districts.
This chapter analyzes Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia, particularly in security and defense. It analyzes two case studies: Turkey’s declared intent of becoming a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the agreement signed with Russia to buy a missile defense system. It argues that Turkey’s intention to become an SCO member may be labeled as a compellent threat for alternative alliances against the West. Hence, it represents boundary challenging. Furthermore, by signing an agreement to purchase an S-400 missile defense system, Turkey signals to the West that the NATO defense shield system is not the only alternative and engages in collaborative balancing with Russia on defense. Representing boundary breaking against the West, as an S-400 missile defense system would not only be incompatible with the defense network of NATO but also risk intelligence infiltration into NATO’s networks. Turkey signals its resolve to engage in cooperative balancing with Russia, as it does not give in to the threats that its potential F-35 deal with the USA would be jeopardized, uses blackmail power, and makes compellent threats, which indicate a switch to boundary breaking.
This study examines whether (and how) parties adapt to party system saturation (PSS). A party system is oversaturated when a higher effective number of parties contests elections than predicted. Previous research has shown that parties are more likely to exit when party systems are oversaturated. This article examines whether parties will adapt by increasing the nicheness of their policy platform, by forming electoral alliances or by merging. Based on time-series analyses of 522 parties contesting 357 elections in twenty-one established Western democracies between 1945 and 2011, the study finds that parties are more likely to enter – and less likely to leave – electoral alliances if PSS increases. Additionally, a small share of older parties will merge. The results highlight parties’ limited capacity to adapt to their environments, which has important implications for the literature on party (system) change and models of electoral competition.
On the afternoon of July 25, 1927, a young shepherdess set fire to a hillside on Florentino Serrudo’s estate, launching the greatest insurrection of indigenous peasants since the Federal War of 1899 – and the first in Bolivia to be labeled “communist.” This chapter takes seriously the fears that the Chayanta (Bolivia) rebellion of 1927 generated among landlords, state officials, and the press, and examines the dynamics of mobilization, the formation of alliances among indigenous caciques, artisans, and intellectuals, and the state response. It shows that in the years before the Chayanta uprising, rural caciques from indigenous communities and radical artisans and intellectuals in the cities of Sucre and Potosí formed a political alliance based on a shared commitment to rural education, communal land ownership, and redistribution of wealth and power. This incipient alliance sought to erase ethnic and class hierarchies in order to build a more democratic society, and largely succeeded in blocking further landlord advance in the southern Bolivian countryside.
This article examines why the “history issue” continues to hinder Japanese-Korean relations after nominally successful negotiations such as the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea and the 2015 comfort women agreement. It contends that leaders put off and quite possibly sacrificed reconciliation in order to achieve treaties and agreements that addressed more immediate security, economic, and political needs. However, because agreements were not transparently negotiated, partly due to the lack of a neutral third-party mediator, Koreans believe the treaties were not fair nor final settlements. Additionally, the reconciliation process has been flawed because it haphazardly tackles disagreements and does not consider time. A third-party such as the United States should mediate a settlement between Japan and South Korea to ensure adequate confidence building measures. Such measures will lower the costs of giving and accepting an apology, increasing the chances of an enduring and legitimate treaty.