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People often predict that they, and others, will be biased by sunk costs—they think that investing in an object or goal increases how much one values or wants it. In this article, we use sunk cost predictions to look at people’s theory of mind and their conceptions of mental life. More specifically, we ask which mental states and motivations are seen as underlying the bias. To investigate this, participants in two preregistered experiments predicted whether different kinds of agents would be biased by sunk costs, and also assessed the agents’ mental abilities. Participants predicted that some kinds of agents (e.g., human adults and children, robots) would show the sunk cost bias and that others would not (e.g., raccoons and human babies). These predictions were strongly related to the participants’ assessments of whether the different kinds of agents are capable of seeing actions as wasteful, but also related to their assessments of the agents’ capacities to feel regret and frustration.
Adult patients with the genetic disease neurofibromatosis type 1 (NF1) frequently report social difficulties. To date, however, only two studies have explored whether these difficulties are caused by social cognition deficits, and these yielded contradictory data. The aim of the present study was to exhaustively assess social cognition abilities (emotion, theory of mind, moral reasoning, and social information processing) in adults with NF1, compared with a control group, and to explore links between social cognition and disease characteristics (mode of inheritance, severity, and visibility).
Method:
We administered a social cognition battery to 20 adults with NF1 (mean age = 26.5 years, SD = 7.4) and 20 healthy adults matched for sociodemographic variables.
Results:
Patients scored significantly lower than controls on emotion, theory of mind, moral reasoning, and social information processing tasks. No effects of disease characteristics were found.
Conclusions:
These results appear to confirm that adults with NF1 have a social cognition weaknesses that could explain, at least in part, their social difficulties, although social abilities are not all impaired to the same extent. Regarding the impact of the disease characteristics, the patient sample seemed slightly insufficient for the power analyses performed. Thus, this exploratory study should form the basis of further research, with the objective of replicating these results with larger and more appropriately matched samples.
Previous studies have found deficits in imaginative elaboration and social inference to be associated with agenesis of the corpus callosum (ACC; Renteria-Vasquez et al., 2022; Turk et al., 2009). In the current study, Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) responses from a neurotypical control group and a group of individuals with ACC were used to further study the capacity for imaginative elaboration and story coherence.
Method:
Topic modeling was employed utilizing Latent Diritchlet Allocation to characterize the narrative responses to the pictures used in the TAT. A measure of the difference between models (perplexity) was used to compare the topics of the responses of individual participants to the common core model derived from the responses of the control group. Story coherence was tested using sentence-to-sentence Latent Semantic Analysis.
Results:
Group differences in perplexity were statistically significant overall, and for each card individually (p < .001). There were no differences between the groups in story coherence.
Conclusions:
TAT narratives from persons with ACC were normally coherent, but more conventional (i.e., more similar to the core text) compared to those of neurotypical controls. Individuals with ACC can make conventional social inferences about socially ambiguous stimuli, but are restricted in their imaginative elaborations, resulting in less topical variability (lower perplexity values) compared to neurotypical controls.
In this chapter, we explore the intricate relationship between early social interactions and the development of social cognition in humans. We address how imitation lays the foundation for subsequent social learning and how humans process information about themselves and others. Beginning with a discussion of our innate social nature, we emphasize the bidirectional influence of social and cognitive processes from birth, highlighting the pivotal role of social interaction in shaping childrens understanding of actions and interpersonal attention. Key topics covered include early biases supporting social cognition, such as contingency awareness and the progression toward understanding physical and psychological causation. The chapter also examines the development of mental state reasoning in individuals, exploring the significance of interest in faces, eyes, biological motion perception, and the differentiation between animate and inanimate objects. Finally, we discuss the impact of atypical social cognition in neurodevelopmental disorders like Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), exploring diagnostic and intervention techniques, contributing to a deeper understanding of the developmental underpinnings of social cognition in humans.
Recent decades have seen a revival of interest in the study of the self, self-awareness and various changes in self-awareness, especially in the context of mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia. This chapter outlines the psychopathology of various disturbances of awareness of self-activity, including depersonalisation, loss of emotional resonance, disturbances in the immediate awareness of self-unity, disturbances in the continuity of the self and disturbances of the boundaries of the self. It also explores theory of mind, consciousness and schizophrenia, which represent areas of growing research interest. The chapter concludes with suggested questions for eliciting specific symptoms in clinical practice, in addition to standard history-taking and mental state examination.
Children with Down syndrome (DS) show marked differences in their early development when compared to typically developing (TD) peers. Major domains of challenge include intellectual abilities, executive functioning, and structural language. Children with DS have a unique profile of strengths and weaknesses that must be considered when comparing them to TD children, especially in terms of Theory of Mind (ToM). ToM encompasses the developmental milestones reached early in childhood when children develop the ability to conceptualize and understand others' thoughts, emotions, perspectives, and intentions. In TD children, these abilities typically begin to mature around 4-6 years of age, while in children with DS, delays are observed relative to chronological age expectations. Evidence shows that children with DS have impaired ToM abilities; however, these deficits might be more related to underlying delays in structural language, rather than a fundamental misunderstanding of social cues. The present study seeks to fill gaps in the literature by using a nonverbal assessment (The Penny Hiding Game; PHG) to evaluate a) ToM abilities in children with DS relative to younger TD peers of a similar mental ability level and b) relationships between ToM performance and structural language skills.
Participants and Methods:
25 children with DS (60% F, M=11.39 years) and 25 TD children (40% F, M = 5.37, range = 3 to 7) participated. Participants' structural language abilities were briefly assessed using the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test- III Listening Comprehension Test (Oral Discourse Comprehension subcomponent). ToM was assessed using the PHG.
Results:
Univariate analysis of covariance was used to explore differences in ToM performance between groups while controlling for mental ability level. Children with DS (M= 2.79, SD= 2.23) performed significantly worse than TD peers (M= 4.28, SD= 1.87) on the ToM task (F(1, 60)= 4.5, p= .038). Linear regression was used to assess associations between ToM and structural language abilities. When both groups were lumped together, there was a modest association between ToM and Listening Comprehension scores (R2 = .12, F (1, 55) = 7.29, p= .009). However, when groups were considered separately, significant associations were not observed (p>.1).
Conclusions:
The DS group showed markedly diminished ToM performance compared to TD controls, as expected based on the literature. However, data did not suggest a clear association between ToM and structural language skills. While an association was observed when groups were lumped, this relationship was likely driven by group differences in both ToM and structural language skills. Future research should examine the relationship between ToM performance, different aspects of language functioning, and the cooccurrence of autistic traits among children with DS in order to augment our understanding of linguistic and social correlates of ToM performance in young children with DS.
Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a persistent neuroinflammatory disease of the central nervous system that affects young adults, and is pathologically characterized by multiple and distributed focal white matter lesions, although they are characteristically located in periventricular regions. Cognitive impairment occurs in all clinical forms of the disease, with great variability and great impact on the quality of life of patients. Recent research indicates that in addition to cognitive and physical deficits, they also have deficits in social cognition, such as Theory of Mind. Although social cognition in patients with multiple sclerosis has begun to be studied in recent years, there is still little knowledge about its impact in the early stages of the disease, when the load of injuries is low and physical disability is not yet present. A series of 7 cases of patients diagnosed with MS in follow-up by the Multiple Sclerosis polyclinic of the Institute of Neurology of the Hospital de Clínicas is presented.
Participants and Methods:
Clinically stable patients with no recent urges and no cognitive complaint were included. They were evaluated with the ACE-R screening test and Theory of Mind tests: Reading the mind in the eyes and Faux Pas tests.
Results:
All patients presented normal ACE results, without indicators of cognitive impairment and poor performance in the emotion reading test. In two cases, poor yields in Faux Pas were also found.
Conclusions:
Social cognition has a great impact on quality of life, and there are indicators of involvement in early stages of the disease in which other typical cognitive deficits are not yet evident, and may constitute the first indicator of deterioration. The evaluation and early detection of deficits in social cognition could contribute to the treatment and quality of life of patients.
Theory of mind (ToM) deficits have been reported in patients with multiple sclerosis (pwMS). However, most studies have used pictures or written scenarios as stimuli without distinguishing between cognitive and affective ToM, and no studies have investigated older pwMS. The aims of this study were to determine the impact of MS and age on cognitive and affective ToM using a more ecological video-based task. We also aimed to investigate the relationships between ToM, cognition and emotion reading to understand the nature of ToM deficits in pwMS.
Participants and Methods:
We recruited 13 young healthy controls (HC), 14 young pwMS, 14 elderly HC and 15 elderly pwMS. ToM was measured using an adaptation of the Conversations and Insinuations task (Ouellet et al. 2010). In this task, participants watch four 2-minutes videos of social interactions, which are interrupted by multiple choice questions about either the emotional state (affective ToM; 14 questions) or the intention (cognitive ToM; 14 questions) of the characters. They also underwent a short neuropsychological battery including cognitive tasks (Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA), DKEFS Color-Word Interference Test) and an experimental multimodal emotion recognition task.
Results:
We found significant effects of group (pwMS < HC), age (older < younger) and condition (cognitive ToM < affective ToM) on the ToM task. Although no interaction effect was found, the elderly pwMS group showed the largest discrepancy between their cognitive and affective ToM, the cognitive subtask being significantly more affected. ToM significantly correlated with general cognition (MoCA) in all participants, while cognitive inhibition (DKEFS Color-Word Interference Test) correlated with ToM only in elderly pwMS. No significant correlation was observed between ToM and emotion reading.
Conclusions:
This study highlights both cognitive and affective ToM deficits in pwMS, and particularly in cognitive ToM in elderly pwMS. These impairments could be underlied by cognitive and executive difficulties, but not by core social cognitive impairments, as observed in the correlation analyses. Future studies should investigate the relationships between ToM impairments and impairments in real-life empathy and social behavior in pwMS.
Previous research suggests that individuals with isolated Agenesis of the Corpus Callosum (AgCC) have cognitive and psychosocial deficits including that of complex processing of emotions (Anderson et al., 2017) and their ability to verbally express emotional experiences (Paul et al., 2021). Additionally, research suggests individuals with AgCC show impaired recognition of the emotions of others (Symington et al., 2010), as well as diminished ability to infer and describe the emotions of others (Renteria-Vazquez et al., 2022; Turk et al., 2010). However, the nature of the empathic abilities of individuals with AgCC remains unclear in empirical research. Capacity for empathetic feelings and situational recognition in persons with AgCC were tested using the Multifaceted Empathy Test [MET] (Foell et al., 2018). We hypothesized that individuals with AgCC would have lower abilities for both cognitive and affective empathy than neurotypical controls.
Participants and Methods:
Results from 50 neurotypical control participants recruited from MTurk Cloud were compared to responses from 19 AgCC participants with normal-range FSIQ (>80) drawn from the individuals with AgCC involved with the Human Brain and Cognition Lab at the Travis Research Institute. The research was completed through an online version of the MET. The MET uses a series of photographs of individuals displaying an emotion. To measure cognitive empathy, the participants are asked to pick the correct emotion being displayed with three distractors for each item. To measure affective empathy, they are then asked on a sliding scale, “how much do you empathize with the person shown” (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much).
Results:
Results of a MANOVA showed a trend for a significant overall difference between individuals with AgCC and controls for empathic abilities F(1, 67) = 2.59, p-value = .082, with persons with AgCC showing less empathy overall. Follow-up one-way ANOVAs showed that individuals with AgCC scored significantly lower in cognitive empathy F(1, 67) = 4.63, p-value = .035, ηp2 = .065; however, affective empathy was not significantly different between groups F(1, 67) = .537, p-value = .466, ηp2 = .008.
Conclusions:
Results suggest that adults with AgCC have a diminished ability to give cognitive labels to the emotional states of others compared to neurotypical controls. However, contrary to our hypothesis, participants with AgCC had affective responses to the pictures of the emotional states of others which were similar to neurotypical controls. Recent research has shown that individuals with AgCC have difficulty inferring and elaborating on the more complex cognitive, social, and emotional aspects of simple animations (Renteria-Vazquez et al., 2022; Turk et al., 2010). Cognitive empathy would require this form of elaborative thinking, even when affective empathy is normal. Similarly, Paul et al. (2021) described alexithymia in persons with AgCC as difficulty in expressing emotions linguistically, but found similar endorsements of emotional experience when compared to neurotypical controls. This study provides further evidence to suggest the corpus callosum facilitates the ability to cognitively label emotions but not necessarily the ability to experience emotions affectively.
This chapter describes how children learn to produce and understand irony. Children do not usually understand irony very well until age 6 or so, a developmental process that continues to unfold throughout childhood. Pexman explores how children’s developing cognitive and linguistic skills (e.g., theory of mind abilities, specific language skills, executive functions related to metarepresentaitonal reasoning, emotion recognition, and epistemic vigilance) are critical to their becoming competent in understanding irony. Research on adults’ irony understanding suggests that part of children’s irony abilities may be explained via the parallel-constraint-satisfaction (PCS) theory that demonstrates how language, quite generally, is comprehended via the online integration of multiple discourse and sociocultural cues. Pexman discusses new findings from studies that may offer greater precision in detailing exactly how both children and adults detect and combine various cues in a predictive manner to quickly infer the complexities of ironic messages. She also sketches out several concrete directions for future experimental studies to better understand when and how children understand irony.
Although our ultimate goal is an analysis and theory of perspective taking in literature, an important insight is that perspective taking in reading literature is subject to the same factors and constraints and may depend on the same types of processes as perspective taking in real life. In Chapter 3, we review research in social and personality psychology that is applicable to literary perspective taking and that can help us advance our understanding of how readers make sense of fictional minds. Under the general umbrella term of “mind reading,” theory of mind, theory theory, and simulation theories offer competing explanations of how individuals make sense of other minds. We argue that interpreting these ideas in terms of analogy provides the basis for a more coherent analysis. We also consider the problem of empathy and how it is related to mind reading. Our analysis is that empathy should be thought of as emotional perspective taking, and we apply our analogical inference approach here as well. Finally, we consider the neural bases of perspective taking and discuss how different brain networks may be related to the components of perspective taking by analogy.
Individuals with schizophrenia spectrum and related psychotic disorders (SSD) experience significant impairments in social cognition that impede functioning. Social cognition is a multidimensional construct consisting of four domains: 1. theory of mind, 2. emotion processing, 3. attributional style and 4. social perception. Metacognitive training (MCT) is an intervention designed to target cognitive biases in psychosis containing two modules addressing social cognition.
Methods
A systematic review and meta-analysis was conducted to investigate the effects of MCT on social cognition and two of its domains: theory of mind and emotion processing. Ten electronic databases were scoured from 2007 to 1 February 2022 for MCT studies reporting social cognition outcomes for people with SSD (1050 identified, 282 assessed). Effect sizes were calculated using Cohen's d in R.
Results
Nine studies were included in the meta-analysis (nMCT = 212, ncontrol = 194). MCT had a small but positive effect on global social cognition (d = 0.28 [95% CI 0.07–0.49]) and theory of mind (d = 0.27 [95% CI 0.01–0.52]). MCT showed no evidence of an effect on emotion processing (d = 0.03 [95% CI –0.26 to 0.32]).
Conclusion
MCT has a small but significant effect on social cognition for people with SSD. Our results add to other recent meta-analyses showing significant effects of MCT on clinically relevant outcomes such as positive symptoms, cognitive biases and cognitive insight. We recommend that future studies on MCT report outcomes on all four domains of social cognition.
Social cognition impairments are a common feature of alcohol use disorders (AUD). However, it remains unclear whether these impairments are solely the consequence of chronic alcohol consumption or whether they could be a marker of vulnerability.
Methods
The present study implemented a family history approach to address this question for a key process of social cognition: theory of mind (ToM). Thirty healthy adults with a family history of AUD (FH+) and 30 healthy adults with a negative family history of AUD (FH−), matched for age, sex, and education level, underwent an fMRI cartoon-vignette paradigm assessing cognitive and affective ToM. Participants also completed questionnaires evaluating anxiety, depressive symptoms, childhood trauma, and alexithymia.
Results
Results indicated that FH+ individuals differed from FH− individuals on affective but not cognitive ToM processing, at both the behavioral and neural levels. At the behavioral level, the FH+ group had lower response accuracy for affective ToM compared with the FH− group. At the neural level, the FH+ group had higher brain activations in the left insula and inferior frontal cortex during affective ToM processing. These activations remained significant when controlling for depressive symptoms, anxiety, and childhood trauma.
Conclusions
These findings highlight difficulties during affective ToM processing among first-degree relatives of AUD patients, supporting the idea that some of the impairments exhibited by these patients may already be present before the onset of AUD and may be considered a marker of vulnerability.
Previous studies that contrasting bilinguals with monolinguals on Theory of Mind (ToM) have shown mixed results. We present a relatively large (N = 102) study comparing Polish–English sequential bilinguals living in the UK with Polish monolinguals living in Poland. Going beyond a simple group comparison, we explored the role of language proficiency and input in ToM abilities. A battery of eight tasks was used to measure ToM, and the groups were matched on age, gender, SES, IQ and L1 word comprehension. Although bilinguals did not differ from monolinguals in accuracy in ToM tasks, they demonstrated better reasoning abilities when providing justification for ToM responses. ToM accuracy scores were best predicted by L1 proficiency, but the justification scores were best predicted by both L1 and L2 proficiency. The findings suggest that the nuances of bilingual experience provide an important scaffolding context for ToM development.
Previous developmental studies reported bilinguals’ Theory of Mind (ToM; the ability to take on another's perspective) develops differently than monolinguals. We conducted a scoping review to evaluate how researchers assess bilinguals’ ToM and whether they characterize bilinguals’ lived experiences. We analyzed 53 publications examining ToM in bilinguals, with most papers studying children (n = 42; 79%). We identified 96 different tasks used across these 53 papers. The most common are 46 (48%) cases of the false-belief task, a cognitive-focused task using story vignettes. Few tasks target other types of ToM, such as ToM in social settings or taking others’ emotional perspectives. Furthermore, only half of the papers reported language history (n = 28, 53%) and exposure (n = 25, 47%), limiting the inferrability of ToM and language experiences. Expanding how we study ToM in bilinguals will improve our understanding of the intersection of bilingualism and ToM.
Childhood maltreatment (CM) has been related to social functioning and social cognition impairment in people with psychotic disorders (PD); however, evidence across different CM subtypes and social domains remains less clear. We conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis to quantify associations between CM, overall and its different subtypes (physical/emotional/sexual abuse, physical/emotional neglect), and domains of social functioning and social cognition in adults with PD. We also examined moderators and mediators of these associations. A PRISMA-compliant systematic search was performed on 24 November 2022 (PROSPERO CRD42020175244). Fifty-three studies (N = 13 635 individuals with PD) were included in qualitative synthesis, of which 51 studies (N = 13 260) with 125 effects sizes were pooled in meta-analyses. We found that CM was negatively associated with global social functioning and interpersonal relations, and positively associated with aggressive behaviour, but unrelated to independent living or occupational functioning. There was no meta-analytic evidence of associations between CM and social cognition. Meta-regression analyses did not identify any consistent moderation pattern. Narrative synthesis identified sex and timing of CM as potential moderators, and depressive symptoms and maladaptive personality traits as possible mediators between CM and social outcomes. Associations were of small magnitude and limited number of studies assessing CM subtypes and social cognition are available. Nevertheless, adults with PD are at risk of social functioning problems after CM exposure, an effect observed across multiple CM subtypes, social domains, diagnoses and illness stages. Maltreated adults with PD may thus benefit from trauma-related and psychosocial interventions targeting social relationships and functioning.
Mentalizing or “mind-wondering” is central to social interaction, culture, and morality. In our everyday life we are all philosophers of the mind, wondering what is going on in other people’s heads, and tracking our own thoughts and feelings. Several terms have been used to cover this territory of thinking about thoughts—they include, among others, Theory of Mind, intentionality, and mentalizing. This chapter provides a brief historical account of the emergence and development of the term “mentalizing” from research on Theory of Mind, and its application in clinical practice as mentalization-based treatment (MBT), initially in the context of patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD). The chapter also discusses how, in MBT, the focus is on mentalizing as a way of making sense of mental health problems.
Perhaps the most prominent cognitivist concept in recent narratology is the Theory of Mind. Alan Palmer, Lisa Zunshine and others have been highly influential with their claim that mind reading is at the core of our engagement with narrative in general. However, these scholars have not only ignored how controversial the idea of the Theory of Mind is in psychology – ancient literature, I believe, also belies their argument about narrative at large. Mind reading is certainly central to our responses to modern realist novels, but ancient narratives, as my test case, Heliodorus’ Ethiopica, illustrates, were more invested in the reconfiguration of time than in individualized minds. Plot was crucial for the experiential quality of narrative hailed by critics, as shown in Chapter 2. This prominence of plot is reflected in Aristotle’s Poetics and other critical works. In order not to play off plot against character, I propose experience as a category that integrates cognitive processes as well as matters of plot.
Loneliness is a concern for patients with schizophrenia. However, the correlates of loneliness in patients with schizophrenia are unclear; thus, the aim of the study is to investigate neuro- and social cognitive mechanisms associated with loneliness in individuals with schizophrenia.
Method:
Data from clinical, neurocognitive, and social cognitive assessments were pooled from two cross-national samples (Poland/USA) to examine potential predictors of loneliness in 147 patients with schizophrenia and 103 healthy controls overall. Furthermore, the relationship between social cognition and loneliness was explored in clusters of patients with schizophrenia differing in social cognitive capacity.
Results:
Patients reported higher levels of loneliness than healthy controls. Loneliness was linked to increased negative and affective symptoms in patients. A negative association between loneliness and mentalizing and emotion recognition abilities was found in the patients with social-cognitive impairments, but not in those who performed at normative levels.
Conclusions:
We have elucidated a novel mechanism which may explain previous inconsistent findings regarding the correlates of loneliness in individuals with schizophrenia.
Psycholinguistic research on pragmatics in the neurotypical population has increasingly framed pragmatic competence and related cognitive skills in terms of individual differences, co-constructed discourse, and meaning negotiation. However, research on pragmatics in the Autism Spectrum has risen from a wide and biased view of autistic communication as fundamentally compromised and autistic pragmatic abilities as impaired. Mostly due to the impactful theory of a deficit in Theory of Mind, early research on autistic communication presumed a unitary pragmatic impairment, only to find that several pragmatic abilities seem to be “preserved.” However, the interpretation of these findings usually takes an ableist turn, as most studies subsequently suggest that surface-level performance should not be interpreted as competence, but rather as a result of “compensatory” strategies. The raising number of contributions from autistic academics and participatory research enriched the field with new perspectives focusing on differences rather than impairments and drawing hypotheses on communication difficulties between neurotypes rather than within a specific neurotype. However, such contributions are hardly ever cited in the most prominent works. In conclusion, the field would benefit from a higher level of citation of autistic-led research and from an epistemological perspective shift within the mostly neurotypical academic community.