Experience is the cornerstone of Epicurean philosophy and nowhere is this more apparent than in the Epicurean views about the nature, formation, and application of concepts. ‘The Epicureans on Preconceptions and Other Concepts’ by Gábor Betegh and Voula Tsouna aims to piece together the approach to concepts suggested by Epicurus and his early associates, trace its historical development over a period of approximately five centuries, compare it with competing views, and highlight the philosophical value of the Epicurean account on that subject. It is not clear whether, properly speaking, the Epicureans can be claimed to have a theory about concepts. However, an in-depth discussion of the relevant questions will show that the Epicureans advance a coherent if elliptical explanation of the nature and formation of concepts and of their epistemological and ethical role. Also, the chapter establishes that, although the core of the Epicurean account remains fundamentally unaffected, there are shifts of emphasis and new developments marking the passage from one generation of Epicureans to another and from one era to the next.

Focusing on the revelation of Epicurean thanatology in the third book of On the Nature of Things, this essay argues that the most vehement strains of Lucretius’ diatribe against the fear of death are a polemic against kitsch. It explicates the pervasively frank, anti-kitsch stance of Epicureanism and explores how Lucretius combats kitsch, even as kitsch was enthusiastically circulated in other Roman contexts in the form of Epicurean objects and clichés. In the vignettes of the departed father and the maudlin drinkers in DRN 3, Lucretius draws our attention to the way that kitsch (the image of the stereotypically sweet children, the trite lamentation, the pseudo-philosophy, the falseness) occludes reality. The denunciation of kitsch is fundamental to Epicurean teaching: to deny that our metaphorical city has penetrable walls and to bemoan the eventuality of one’s own death is to refuse the nature of things.

Catullus’ collection contains several clear echoes of the work of two contemporary Epicurean poets, Lucretius and Philodemus. Indeed, several of the neoteric poet’s central themes (the attractions of otium and disengagement from public life; patronage by members of the high elite and its pitfalls; dissatisfaction with the mos maiorum) bring him potentially into close alignment with Epicurean ideals. In this chapter, however, I argue that, on closer consideration, Catullus’ intertextual engagement with his two contemporaries points rather to a self-consciously antagonistic stance towards Epicurean ethics. Catullus’ attack on ‘Socration’ in Poem 47, combined with parodic echoes of Philodemus’ epigrams in Poems 13 and 43, bears comparison with Cicero’s deployment of anti-Epicurean clichés in the In Pisonem; similarly, Philodemean and Lucretian echoes underline a striking divergence both from Epicurean ideals of friendship and from the rejection of romantic love explicit in Lucretius and arguably implicit in Philodemus’ Xanthippe cycle.

Chapter 9 synthesizes certain leading themes of the book and discusses some opinions of ancient intellectuals who reflected on the purpose and pleasures of music in convivial settings. The topics include musical self-display and public honor, social music as play, and the purpose of a symposion and its music. The chapter examines the philosophical opinions of Aristotle, Xenophon, Diogenes of Babylon, Philodemus, and Plutarch about various aspects of these topics, and concludes with a look at musical figures in the introduction to Athenaeus’ Deipnosophists (Learned Banqueters).

Catullus’ collection contains several clear echoes of the work of two contemporary Epicurean poets, Lucretius and Philodemus. Indeed, several of the neoteric poet’s central themes (the attractions of otium and disengagement from public life; patronage by members of the high elite and its pitfalls; dissatisfaction with the mos maiorum) bring him potentially into close alignment with Epicurean ideals. In this chapter, however, I argue that, on closer consideration, Catullus’ intertextual engagement with his two contemporaries points rather to a self-consciously antagonistic stance towards Epicurean ethics. Catullus’ attack on ‘Socration’ in Poem 47, combined with parodic echoes of Philodemus’ epigrams in Poems 13 and 43, bears comparison with Cicero’s deployment of anti-Epicurean clichés in the In Pisonem; similarly, Philodemean and Lucretian echoes underline a striking divergence both from Epicurean ideals of friendship and from the rejection of romantic love explicit in Lucretius and arguably implicit in Philodemus’ Xanthippe cycle.

Focusing on the revelation of Epicurean thanatology in the third book of On the Nature of Things, this essay argues that the most vehement strains of Lucretius’ diatribe against the fear of death are a polemic against kitsch. It explicates the pervasively frank, anti-kitsch stance of Epicureanism and explores how Lucretius combats kitsch, even as kitsch was enthusiastically circulated in other Roman contexts in the form of Epicurean objects and clichés. In the vignettes of the departed father and the maudlin drinkers in DRN 3, Lucretius draws our attention to the way that kitsch (the image of the stereotypically sweet children, the trite lamentation, the pseudo-philosophy, the falseness) occludes reality. The denunciation of kitsch is fundamental to Epicurean teaching: to deny that our metaphorical city has penetrable walls and to bemoan the eventuality of one’s own death is to refuse the nature of things.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus was a close reader of Plato and his engagement with the Phaedrus occupies an important position in his rhetorical essays and in his treatment of Lysias and Isocrates in particular. Between Plato and Dionysius, however, were three centuries of thinking and writing about rhetoric, compiling and commenting on the works of Attic orators, speechwriters, philosophers. Hence, before looking at Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ rhetorical essays, a brief overview of the reception of Lysias and Isocrates in the centuries between Plato and Dionysius is in order, so as to gain a good insight into the background for Dionysius’ work and to better assess his contributions to ancient rhetorical theory. The following overview will proceed roughly along chronological lines, focusing primarily on more substantial evidence on Lysias and Isocrates that we have from Ps. Demetrius, Philodemus and Cicero.

Lucretius’ choice of addressee has engaged a number of critical responses, both historicizing and literary-critical. This chapter assesses what is distinctive about Lucretius’ approach to C. Memmius (taken to be the praetor of 58 BC and unsuccessful consular candidate of 53 BC) through comparison with the theory and practice of Epicureanism in contemporary sources, chiefly Philodemus. In the context of Memmius’ disgrace and exile to Athens, Lucretius’ invectives against ambition and similar vices take on an especially mordant character – a frank criticism that contrasts with Philodemus’ more deferential treatment of C. Calpurnius Piso, especially in On the Good King According to Homer. This difference suggests that Lucretius chose Memmius as his addressee for the very reason that this corrupt and failed Roman politician was far from being a promising disciple and badly in need of Epicurean teaching.

The first part of this paper looks into the question of Lucretius’ philosophical sources and whether he draws almost exclusively from Epicurus himself or also from later Epicurean texts. I argue that such debates are inconclusive and likely will remain so, even if additional Epicurean texts are discovered, and that even if we were able to ascertain Lucretius’ philosophical sources, doing so would add little to our understanding of the DRN. The second part of the paper turns to a consideration of what Lucretius does with his philosophical sources. The arguments within the DRN are not original. Nonetheless, the way Lucretius presents these arguments establishes him as a distinctive philosopher. Lucretius deploys non-argumentative methods of persuasion such as appealing to emotions, redeploying powerful cultural tropes, and ridicule. These methods of persuasion do not undercut or displace reasoned argumentation. Instead, they complement it. Lucretius’ use of these methods is rooted in his understanding of human psychology, that we have been culturally conditioned to have empty desires, false beliefs and destructive emotions, ones that are often subconscious. Effective persuasion must take into account the biases, stereotypes and other psychological factors that hinder people from accepting Epicurus’ healing gospel.

This chapter takes a metapoetic approach to Lucretian allusion to show that the DRN figures the phenomenon of echo as a metaphor for literary appropriation. Lucretius culminates his discussion of acoustic phenomena and hearing with the example of the echo (DRN 4.549–94). Insofar as echo is introduced as the most prominent effect in the perceptible world of the atomic reverberations that give rise to auditory aisthēsis, I argue that Lucretius' multiple allusions to earlier poetry in this passage also serve to illustrate metapoetically the process itself of hearing. The ideas inherent in this Lucretian passage find parallels in the fragmentary papyri of Philodemus.

Nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars thought Cicero a bad source for Hellenistic philosophy. They thought that the speeches in his dialogues were translated, often badly, from single sources. Thus they read him only to reconstruct his sources by Quellenforschung. I first give a sympathetic account of these scholars’ projects, which is often dismissed too easily today. Second, I give a complete argument that these scholars were wrong, and that today’s more positive, but often incompletely defended, view of Cicero is correct. Third, I argue that Cicero wrote dialogues not only to introduce Hellenistic philosophy to a Latin audience, but also as literary unities to impress a learned Roman audience who already knew philosophy in Greek. His models for the dialogue form were Plato, Aristotle, and Heraclides of Pontus, but he adapted it to to serve his radical Academic skepticism, in which he followed Carneades and Clitomachus. He hoped to be the model for a Latin tradition of good writing about philosophy, that would "illuminate" both philosophy and Latin. Cicero’s creativity as a philosophical author shows why Quellenforschung failed, and that he is a good source for Hellenistic thought.

In Book 1 of Cicero’s On the nature of the gods, Velleius argues for an Epicurean theology and view of religion. Cotta, an Academic skeptic, argues against him. I argue that when we see Cicero’s creative hand adapting Epicurean texts like the On Piety found at Herculaneum and attributed to Philodemus, we find that Velleius’ speech may be understood as proceeding from our allegedly natural concept that the gods are eternal and happy. Velleius’ seemingly intemperate criticism of his opponents, that they are crazy, follows from his position that they have somehow gone against this natural concept. His positive view, which proceeds from the happiness or blessedness (beatitudo, beatitas, eudaimonia) of the gods, is that Roman religion may be reinterpreted as worship of gods who do not care about us at all, and thus are ideals for us of the hedonist life free from pain. Despite Cicero’s habitual contempt for Epicureanism, he paints an attractive picture of Velleius’ spirituality. But Cotta argues that by making the gods not care for us, Epicurus has torn out the heart from religion, since he has made gods who are (so Cotta argues) selfish and not worthy of worship or imitation.