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Emerging neurotechnology offers increasingly individualised brain information, enabling researchers to identify mental states and content. When accurate and valid, these brain-reading technologies also provide data that could be useful in criminal legal procedures, such as memory detection with EEG and the prediction of recidivism with fMRI. Yet, unlike in medicine, individuals involved in criminal cases will often be reluctant to undergo brain-reading procedures. This raises the question of whether coercive brain-reading could be permissible in criminal law. Coercive Brain-Reading in Criminal Justice examines this question in view of European human rights: the prohibition of ill treatment, the right to privacy, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and the privilege against self-incrimination. The book argues that, at present, the established framework of human rights does not exclude coercive brain-reading. It does, however, delimit the permissible use of forensic brain-reading without valid consent. This cautionary, cutting-edge book lays a crucial foundation for understanding the future of criminal legal proceedings in a world of ever-advancing neurotechnology.
This paper discusses the extent to which conscientious objections to vaccination qualify for protection under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Drawing on an examination of the nature of conscience and the ethics of vaccine refusal, it argues that a narrow category of reasons for refusal to be vaccinated can be differentiated from more general ‘vaccine hesitancy’. In relation to conscience objections of this kind, it engages in a systematic analysis of the applicability of the ECHR, both in relation to compulsory vaccination, and so-called ‘vaccine passports’. It concludes that states can – and in some situations must – recognise conscientious objections under the ECHR.
In Malone v. UK (Plenary 1984), the right to an effective domestic remedy in the European Convention on Human Rights Article 13 was famously described as one of the most obscure clauses in the Convention. Since then, the European Court of Human Rights has reinforced the scope and application of the right. Through an analysis of virtually all of the Court's judgments concerning Article 13, the book exhaustively accounts for the development and current scope and content of the right. The book also provides normative recommendations on how the Court could further develop the right, most notably how it could be a tool to regulate the relationship between domestic and international protection of human rights. In doing so, the book situates itself within larger debates on the enforcement of the entire Convention such as the principle of subsidiarity and the procedural turn in the Court's case law.
This contribution considers the case law of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and focuses on the extent to which the Contracting Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) can regulate the tobacco, alcohol, and food industries in a manner compatible with their ECHR obligations. After briefly presenting the two key cases dealing specifically with tobacco advertising, this contribution considers the main factors that the ECtHR takes into account when balancing competing concerns, and in particular freedom of commercial expression and public health protection. It concludes that none of these factors is absolute, as the Court considers the strength of each one of them on the facts of each case. Nevertheless, it is clear from its case law that States have a wide margin of appreciation to regulate marketing practices that are inimical to public health and the prevention of non-communicable diseases more specifically, to the extent that even extensive advertising restrictions can be compatible with Article 10 of the ECHR.
This article discusses the findings of the European Court of Human Rights in the 2021 case of Georgia v Russia (II) in relation to the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights to the conduct of hostilities. The article describes the arguments advanced by the Court to support the idea that the Convention does not apply to extraterritorial hostilities in an international armed conflict. In the light of past decisions, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and the law of the treaties, it is argued that the Court's conclusion is unconvincing and the arguments seem to be based on extralegal considerations, rather than on a sound interpretation of the notion of state jurisdiction under the Convention.
The Republic of Cyprus was founded on bi-communality: it is a unitary state with a single citizenship, but the state is divided on the basis of nationality into two communities, a Greek majority and a Turkish minority. The constitutional breakdown of 1964, the Turkish invasion of 1974, and the subsequent refusal of the Turkish community to participate in the institutions of the state have given rise to a number of unique problems of citizenship and nationality. Turkish Cypriots remain citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, a state that they refuse to recognize, while at the same time residing within a political entity (North Cyprus) that the international community does not recognize. The interplay between citizenship and national descent in the peculiar situation of Cyprus offers an ideal case study for exploring the concept and boundaries of citizenship and its relationship to the concept of nationality.
This chapter primarily considers the way in which the Protocol Article 2 addresses human rights and equality issues in Northern Ireland, but also describes how the TCA supplements the Protocol in several respects, addressing issues that were left unaddressed by the Protocol, in particular issues concerning the protection of labour and social rights (in the ‘level playing field’ provisions) and the status of the European Convention on Human RIghts (ECHR). These will be considered more briefly in order to provide a more complete map of the new architecture of human rights and equality in Northern Ireland currently in place, without attempting to be comprehensive.
Climate litigation has become a permanent fixture in the climate law and policy landscape. Across jurisdictions, climate litigation takes different shapes, with actions based on administrative, civil, or criminal law. An increasing number of cases incorporate human rights, leading to courts inter alia imposing more onerous mitigation obligations on governments and private actors in light of human rights provisions. Several landmark cases in this domain have come from European jurisdictions and have been argued with reference to both the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. An analysis of case law from the European Member States shows that the emerging picture is one of the Charter playing a secondary role to the ECHR. Based on this jurisprudential analysis, this article reflects on the future role of the Charter in climate litigation, and by extension, in shaping environmental human rights.
In this book, Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou argues that, from the legal perspective, the formula 'European public order' is excessively vague and does not have an identifiable meaning; therefore, it should not be used by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in its reasoning. However, European public order can also be understood as an analytical concept which does not require a clearly defined content. In this sense, the ECtHR can impact European public order but cannot strategically shape it. The Court's impact is a by-product of individual cases which create a feedback loop with the contracting states. European public order is influenced as a result of interaction between the Court and the contracting parties. This book uses a wide range of sources and evidence to substantiate its core arguments: from a comprehensive analysis of the Court's case law to research interviews with the judges of the ECtHR.
Leading legal scholar John Witte, Jr. explores the role religion played in the development of rights in the Western legal tradition and traces the complex interplay between human rights and religious freedom norms in modern domestic and international law. He examines how US courts are moving towards greater religious freedom, while recent decisions of the pan-European courts in Strasbourg and Luxembourg have harmed new religious minorities and threatened old religious traditions in Europe. Witte argues that the robust promotion and protection of religious freedom is the best way to protect many other fundamental rights today, even though religious freedom and other fundamental rights sometimes clash and need judicious balancing. He also responds to various modern critics who see human rights as a betrayal of Christianity and religious freedom as a betrayal of human rights.
The chapter introduces the doctrinal data analysis to explore the compatibility of the ECHR with the specific risk principle of the environmental minimum. The specific risk principle is the trigger of the environmental minimum framework, determining whether the minimum standards of review apply to a given environmental harm. The principle requires that an environmental harm is successfully linked to a threat to a specific human right recognised under the invoked protection regime. Compatibility with the ECHR can be determined through the extent the doctrine of the Court subscribes to two key claims: (1) in principle, any environmental harm can give rise to infringements of Convention rights; and (2) environmental harm has been successfully linked to the Convention rights and led to findings of violations in the past. The chapter concludes that, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in earlier cases, the prevailing ECHR doctrine is compatible with the environmental minimum to a significant extent.
The chapter explores the ECHR approach to the minimum standards of the environmental minimum. These standards apply once a specific risk has been established and are derived either from domestic and international legal norms, or in lieu of these, established and emerging scientific evidence. Notably, unclear or contradictory scientific evidence grants states a wide margin of appreciation in formulating a regulatory response. Should a violation of minimum standards be established, individuals have a claim based on the right invoked at the specific risk stage. The question for the ECHR case law is whether it requires the enforcement of legal norms, and mandates subsidiary recourse to established and emerging scientific evidence in their absence. The ECHR generally meets these requirements: a clear majority of cases where domestic environmental regulations were ignored by authorities also resulted in a violation of the ECHR. However, the chapter acknowledges some enduring concerns, notably the failure of the Court to invariabley find violations where states fail to consistently enforce domestic law and its deferential approach in some cases where a state had no legal norms to enforce.
The chapter investigates the claim of the environmental minimum that environmental interests must be balanced with competing considerations, and that neither can be presumed to have priority in the abstract. This becomes particularly relevant when considering cases where states justify infringements of human rights by invoking their duty to prevent environmental harms. Not every conceivable measure in furtherance of environmental protection is porportionate in light of its impact on other rights. The question specifically for the ECHR case law is whether justificaitons for environmental regulations challenged by applicants are balanced with and can be outweighed by competing interests. In principle, the ECtHR accepts that environmental regulations can give rise to infringements of Convention rights and acknowledges that regulations must be proportional to the established threat of environmental harm. The chapter then turns to discusses an enduring area of concern, namely the acceptance of vague economic justifications for environmental harm and the unprincipled application of the margin of appreciation doctrine.
The chapter examines the crucial question whether the ECtHR recognizes that a reasonable hypothesis of harm is sufficient to establish the link between environmental harm and a specific risk to a Convention right required under the specific risk principle. The crucial ECHR rules on this point relate to evidence and the requirements for victim status under Article 34 ECHR. The chapter first sets out the general principles developed with respect to the rules of evidence and victim status before exploring some encouraging developments in more recent cases under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR. The chapter recognises the difficulties and limitations that arise for applicants who seek to obtain relevant evidence and records from reluctant states. Nonetheless, the ECHR case law generally comports well with the requirements of the environmental minimum. The ECtHR does not require applicants to demonstrate an irrefutable scientific link between the environmental harm and an impact on their rights: in many recent decisions the ECtHR is content with evidence of a general population level risk arising from the environmental harm expierienced by the applicant.
Pervasive environmental harm that disproportionately impacts vulnerable members of society is left largely unregulated across the globe despite existing legal commitments to human rights and environmental protection in many states. To address this shortcoming, Stefan Theil proposes a new normative framework for environmental protection through human rights law. In clear and accessible prose, he demonstrates how such a human rights-based approach can strengthen environmental protection without requiring radical departures from established protection regimes and legal principles. The environmental minimum developed in the book translates the general and abstract commitments of states into specific and practical measures that protect the environment. The framework develops the doctrine of international, regional, and domestic courts, analysed through an innovative approach that improves contextual awareness. This book is thus a valuable resource for lawyers, social scientists, political theorists, environmental and human rights advocates.
During the 20th century, society’s view on sexualities has undergone a severe paradigm shift. While moving away from ideas of decency and bawdiness to evaluate legitimate sexuality, concepts of autonomy and consent gained importance. This transformation is also challenging the law.1 With the broad acceptance of various forms of sexual behavior and sexual orientation, legal regulation based on morality and ethics is outdated. Recent debates on law and sexualities focus on sexual autonomy and its conditions. This is shown especially by the legal debate on sexual violence and criminal law.2 But the right to sexual autonomy does not only require adequate protection against sexual violence. As a human right, it obliges State Parties to Human Rights Treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to respect, protect, and fulfill sexual autonomy. This includes the guarantee of freedom from sexual violence, coercion and discrimination, as well as control over one’s own body and over the involvement in sexual interactions with others. In order to ensure the different components of sexual autonomy, sexual education and reliable access to information and medical services are necessary. This paper presents an approach concerning the multifaceted dimensions of sexual autonomy through a human rights lens.
The principle of ne bis in idem is a fundamental right that bars the possibility of a defendant being prosecuted more than once on the basis of the same offence, act or facts. In view of the significance of the ne bis in idem principle for the AFSJ, this chapter offers an account of the sources and elements of that principle. The ne bis in idem principle in the AFSJ has seen spectacular developments over the past two decades. The Van Esbroeck/Zolotukhin line of case law represents a prime example of fruitful substantive judicial dialectics between the two European courts. The case law on the application of the principle to the interaction between administrative, criminal and tax law raises questions, however. The problem encountered here is perhaps not so much one of ne bis in idem, but of the fundamental relationship between criminal and (punitive) administrative law. The developments in the case law suggest that we may not find a clear answer to the question of how the ne bis in idem principle should be applied in the relation between criminal, administrative and tax law until we have a sufficiently clear notion of the precise nature of that relationship.
The coexistence of several layers of fundamental rights with different goals, plus procedures for protecting fundamental rights in the courts that differ in scope, makes for a particularly complex situation. That situation is even more complicated in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, since it raises particularly sensitive issues for fundamental rights. Furthermore, the mutual recognition principle implies that decisions taken in one Member State are recognised and executed in any other Member State based on the presumption that all Members States have a sufficient level of fundamental rights protection. Hence, it is of paramount importance to ascertain whether sufficient protection of fundamental rights is guaranteed in the AFSJ, what are its core elements and what are the problems related to its operation in practice. Within that framework, this chapter discusses whether the CJEU is building a European standard of fundamental rights in the AFSJ. To that end, it examines, first, how the CJEU is relying on general principles and secondary law to strengthen the standard of fundamental rights, and second, how that standard is adapted to horizontal cooperation in a scenario of mutual trust.