To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
It is often assumed that a promise is not legally enforceable unless, as a necessary though not sufficient condition, the promise is morally ‘obligatory’ or ‘binding’. If this assumption is correct, or can be shown to be tenable, highly interesting and important things follow for both legal and contract theory. Promise-keeping emerges as a moral obligation before it is a legal one, the legal duty becoming but a sanctionable extension of the moral obligation, its continuation so to speak by other means. There is thus no fundamental break separating moral from legal promises; for even a legal promise, particularly or most visibly one not covered by existing authority, cannot be fully justified as to why it ought to be kept without support from moral grounds. In the first three sections we therefore consider the moral reasons we may advance in support of an obligation to keep promises. In the last two sections we try to relate these moral considerations more specifically to contract law.
What is it to make a promise? What its conceptual ingredients? How do promises compare with other statements? How exactly do they relate to agreements or basic contract theory? These, broadly, are the major, if not quite the only, questions we shall here try to elucidate.
In English law, as in many of its common law satellites, the tort of privacy is still a curiously problematic one. Unlike Roman or generally civilian law where there is little doubt that an invasion of privacy is actionable, unlike also American law which in the last 80 years or so has fashioned an ample shield around a person's private sphere, English law has been deeply hesitant about admitting privacy as a civil right. Roman law, we may be surprised to learn, accepted from the very start that rules against personal injury include as well as rights to physical security also rights to feelings of human dignity and self-respect.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.