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4 results

  • 2 - Fiction, Myth, and Reality
  • Edited by Alan Berger, Brandeis University, Massachusetts
  • Book: Saul Kripke
  • Published online: 05 June 2012
  • Print publication: 06 June 2011, pp 49-77
  • View abstract

    Summary

    Saul Kripke's insightful and penetrating work on names from fiction and myth, though unpublished, has generated a great deal of discussion. Kripke's account illuminates and yet exacerbates the chestnut of negative existentials. On Kripke's account, use of the name 'Sherlock Holmes' to refer to the fictional character is in a certain sense parasitic on a prior, more fundamental use not as a name for the fictional character. The use of 'Sherlock Holmes' represented by 'Holmes', as the name for what is in reality an abstract artifact, is the same use it has according to the Holmes stories, except that according to the stories, that use is one on which it designates a man. The alleged thoroughly nondesignating use of 'Sherlock Holmes' by Conan Doyle, as a pretend name for a man, is a myth.
  • 10 - A Note on Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief
  • Edited by Alan Berger, Brandeis University, Massachusetts
  • Book: Saul Kripke
  • Published online: 05 June 2012
  • Print publication: 06 June 2011, pp 235-252
  • View abstract

    Summary

    Millianism is the belief that the semantic content of a proper name is just the name's designatum. Millianism has it that Pierre has the contradictory beliefs that London is pretty and that London is not pretty Kripke uses his well-known puzzle about belief as a defense of Millianism against the standard objection from apparent failure of substitution. This chapter argues relatively hard results in connection with Saul Kripke's well-known puzzle about belief, and for resulting constraints on a correct solution. A complete solution must acknowledge that Pierre has contradictory beliefs. In presenting the puzzle, Kripke follows a sound methodology championed in Alfred Tarski's classic discussion of the liar paradox. Unlike Tarski, Kripke does not make any official pronouncement concerning which principles are guilty. Instead he considers a variety of possible answers to the puzzle without officially endorsing any of them.
  • Is de re Belief Reducible to de dicto?
  • Nathan Salmon
  • Journal: Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume / Volume 23 / 1997
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020, pp. 85-110
  • Print publication: 1997
  • View extract

    Yes and no. It depends on the meaning of the question. Traditionally, those on the affirmative side — predominantly neo-Fregeans — hold that Ralph's believing about Ortcutt, de re, that he is a spy is identical with, or otherwise reducible to, Ralph's believing some proposition or other of the form The such-and-such is a spy, for some concept the such-and-such that is thoroughly conceptual or qualitative (or perhaps thoroughly qualitative but for the involvement of constituents of Ralph's consciousness or of other mental particulars), and that uniquely determines, or is uniquely a concept of, Ortcutt (in Alonzo Church's sense of ‘determines’ and ‘concept of’). Concerns over Ralph's believing that whoever is shortest among spies is a spy while not suspecting anyone in particular have led some neo-Fregeans (not all) to qualify their affirmative response by requiring that the concept the such-and-such and its object bear some connection that is epistemologically more substantial than that between the shortest spy and the shortest spy.