We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
In this paper I am interested in Aristotelian essentialism only as it relates to Aristotle's notion of an ordinary object. In particular, I shall concentrate on two main kinds of interpretation that are to be distinguished here. First, there is what I call the standard version. So named because it formulates the preferred view among commentators, the standard version holds that essences are necessary (at least) for the existence of objects. Against this is a recently proposed line of interpretation which I shall call the non-standard version of Aristotelian essentialism. It holds that possessing a given essential property is only sufficient, not necessary, for the existence of a given object and so denies the standard version. While I focus mainly on arguments and evidence that bear on decision between the two versions, I also reflect some on whether Aristotle is best construed a de re or a de dicto essentialist. Part I of the paper spells out the versions in question. Part II contains considerations which show Aristotle's openness to de re essentialism.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.