In the preceding sections, I examined Hegel's thesis that actions are the “expression of the will as subjective or moral” (R §113). The goal of Chapter 1 was to understand the justification that Hegel provides for his thesis, and to test its soundness. As a reminder, I repeat Hegel's formulation of his justification:
Action contains the following determinations: (α) it must be known by me in its externality as mine; (β) its essential relation to the concept is one of obligation; and (γ) it has an essential relation to the will of others.(R §113)
The Meaning of the Three Determinations
The interpretation I have given so far had the goal of making Hegel's claims comprehensible. The thesis underlying this study holds that the Morality chapter of the Philosophy of Right can be understood as Hegel's analysis of intentional action, an analysis that at the same time provides an explication of acting consciousness.
In connection with this thesis, I argued that the “subjective will” should be understood as the conceptual unfolding of the moments of the free decision that accompanies each intentional action. I also linked the demand contained in the acting consciousness – that an intentionally produced event is the realization of the subjective end – with Hegel's depiction of the objectification of the subjective end.
The First Determination. I explicated the distinctiveness that Hegel attributes to this objectification within the standpoint of the subjective will as the individual's perspective on his own act.