The Award on the Merits in the South China Sea Arbitration between the Philippines and China (Award) is the first decision of any tribunalto interpret the provision of the 1982 United Nations Convention on theLaw of the Sea (Convention or UNCLOS) that allows states parties to exclude disputes concerning military activities from the Convention’s compulsory dispute settlement regime. That optional exclusion, embodied in Article 298(1)(b) of the Convention, was a central component of the strenuously-negotiated compromise between states that favored compulsory jurisdiction in principle and those that would have preferred a strictly optional system for third-party legal dispute settlement. Its availability has beencritical in enabling certain states to ratify the Convention and would be an indispensable condition of eventual U.S. ratification. For these reasons, the Award’s treatment of the military activities exception transcends the South China Sea dispute.

The disagreements among states bordering the South China Sea pose extraordinarily complex legal issues. Sovereignty over small islands that lie at some distance from the continental and insular coasts that surround the sea is contested. So are the maritime entitlements generated by these features. Notably, rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own generate no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf beyond a twelve-mile territorial sea, which may be the case for many of the disputed islands. Yet another series of questions relates to the delimitation of overlapping maritime entitlements, including the relative effect to be accorded entitlements generated by these small islands vis-à-vis those generated by the continental and insular coasts that surround the South China Sea.

At the time the United States withdrew from participation in the Nicaragua case at the International Court of Justice, the US government expressed concern that ‘the course on which the Court may now be embarked could do enormous harm to it as an institution and to the cause of international law’. This essay examines whether or to what extent the anticipated negative effects came to pass. It concludes that dire predictions of harm to the Court were overstated. Twenty-five years later, the rate at which states accept the Court's jurisdiction has held steady. Only a few states have added jurisdictional reservations concerning military activities. The mix of cases being brought to the Court has shifted towards a more representative distribution. States are generally complying with the Court's decisions, though some compliance problems remain. The most serious negative impact has been on the willingness of the United States (still the Court's most active litigant) to participate fully in international dispute settlement.

The American Journal of International Law (AJIL) stands in dialectical tension between its American and its international identities. At its founding, and in periodic reassessments on the occasion of anniversaries or changes of leadership, its editors in chief have offered their understandings of the place for this Journal at the intersection of American and international life. One of our predecessors wrote in the Journal’s sixth decade of “a dual function, both that of laying international law material before American readers, and that of placing American viewpoints on international law before the rest of the world.” Poised at the threshold of a new century, we can take this opportunity for reflection in the image of Janus on both our American (internationalist) origins and our increasingly international (yet in some senses still American) future.

Among “jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law” and “most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,” no one in the second half of the twentieth century did more than Oscar Schachter to influence both the theory and the practice of international law, especially the law of the United Nations Charter. When the centennial of the American Society of International Law arrives in two years, we will have occasion to reflect on his contributions to this Journal and many other endeavors of the Society, across a long and vigorous life.

On the docket of the United States Supreme Court in 2004 is a substantial cluster of cases at the intersection of constitutional and international law. In the previous two Supreme Court Terms, the Court had adverted to sources of law and practice outside the United States, in its treatment of constitutional claims involving the death penalty and same-sex relationships. The apparent willingness of the Court to consider international and foreign authorities in reaching its conclusions on contested issues of constitutional law has raised to new promir nence the debate over the relationship between constitutional and international law. It is not yet clear whether the new (or newly rediscovered) interest of the Court in international sources presages a long-term trend toward a more cosmopolitan constitutional jurisprudence. On the assumption that this represents more than a passing fad, advocates before the Court in die current Term—for example, in the cases involving die “enemy combatant” detainees at Guantanamo Bay—have vigorously pressed arguments concerning international and foreign law in connection with the constitutional issues at stake. The Court's acceptance of quite a few cases raising a mixture of international and constitutional questions for decision in 2004 may signal that the Court is preparing for a new era of engagement with legal developments external to the United States, or, alternatively, that it seeks to limit (or in any event to delimit) the relevance of such developments for the U.S. legal system.