Theoretical models of memory retrieval have focused on processes of recollection and familiarity. Research suggests that there are still other processes involved in memory reconstruction, leading to experiences of knowing and inferring the past. Understanding these experiences, and the cognitive processes that give rise to them, seems likely to further expand our understanding of the neural substrates of memory.

Jussim's critique of social psychology's embrace of error and bias is needed and often persuasive. In opting for perceptual realism over social constructivism, however, he seems to ignore a third choice – a cognitive constructivism which has a long and distinguished history in the study of nonsocial perception, and which enables us to understand both accuracy and error.

By conflating Freudian repression with thought suppression and memory reconstruction, Erdelyi defines repression so broadly that the concept loses its meaning. Worse, perhaps, he fails to provide any evidence that repression actually happens, and ignores evidence that it does not.

Wegner's many examples of illusory involuntariness do not warrant the conclusion that the experience of voluntariness is also an illusion. His arguments appear to be related to the contemporary emphasis on automaticity in social cognition and behavior; both appear to represent a revival of situationism in social psychology.

This commentary notes the emergence of a “People are Stupid” school of thought that describes social behavior as mindless, automatic, and unconscious. I trace the roots of this “school,” particularly in the link between situationism in social psychology and behaviorism in psychology at large, and suggest that social psychology should focus on the role of the mind in social interaction.

Statistical significance testing has its problems, but so do the alternatives that are proposed; and the alternatives may be both more cumbersome and less informative. Significance tests remain legitimate aspects of the rhetoric of scientific persuasion.