It must have been early 2000, around the start of the new Millennium. I was working as a junior lecturer/researcher at the then Institute for Health Care Policy and Management at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Still barely familiar with Dutch health care as a policy system, let alone with European health care policy systems I decided that it would be a good idea to attend a seminar of the recently established European Health Policy Group. I had heard good stories about this new multidisciplinary group, founded by Elias Mossialos and Adam Oliver. My PhD thesis supervisor, Tom van der Grinten, also went there, as did some of my colleagues from the Department of Health Economics and Health Insurance, people like Erik Schut and Wynand van de Ven for example. They were close colleagues of me, although our respective disciplines from which we studied health care policy were different.

The Covid-19 pandemic has put policy systems to the test. In this paper, we unmask the institutionalized resilience of the Dutch health care system to pandemic crisis. Building on logics of crisis decision-making and on the notion of ‘tact’, we reveal how the Dutch government initially succeeded in orchestrating collective action through aligning public health purposes and installing socio-economic policies to soften societal impact. However, when the crisis evolved into a more enduring one, a more contested policy arena emerged in which decision-makers had a hard time composing and defending a united decision-making strategy. Measures have become increasingly debated on all policy levels as well as among experts, and conflicts are widely covered in the Dutch media. With the 2021 elections ahead, this means an additional test of the resilience of the Dutch socio-political and health care systems.

Seen from the perspective of health, the global financial crisis (GFC) may be conceived of as an exogenous factor that has undermined the fiscal sustainability of European welfare states and consequently, their (expanding) health systems as well. Being one of the core programs of European welfare states, health care has always belonged to the sovereignty of European Member States. However, in past two decades, European welfare states have in fact become semi-sovereign states and the European Union (EU) no longer is an exogenous actor in European health policy making. Today, the EU not only puts limits to unsustainable growth levels in health care spending, it also acts as an health policy agenda setter. Since the outbreak of the GFC, it does so in an increasingly coercive and persuasive way, claiming authority over health system reforms alongside the responsibilities of its Member States.

In a relatively short time, regulation has become a significant and distinct feature of how modern states wish to govern and steer their economy and society. Whereas the former ‘dirigiste’ state used to be closely related to public ownership (e.g. hospitals), planning (volume and capacity planning) and centralised administration (e.g. fixed prices and budgets), the new regulatory state relies mainly on the instrument of regulation to achieve its objectives. In this paper, we wish to relate the rise of the ‘regulatory state’ to the path-dependent trajectories and institutional legacies of discrete European health-care systems. For this purpose, we compared the Dutch corporatist social health insurance system, the strongly centralised National Health Service (NHS) of England and federal regionalised NHS system of Italy. Comparing these three different health-care systems suggests that it is indeed possible to identify a general trend towards the rise of the regulatory state in health care in the last two decades. However, although the three countries examined in this paper face similar problems of multilevel governance of networks of third-party payers and providers, each system also gives rise to its own distinct regulatory challenges.

Although choice may be seen as an end in itself, the papers included in this special issue of Health Economics, Policy and Law, examine choice policies in European systems of health care, which aim to be effective instruments for ameliorating the systemic pressures from the iron triangle of equity, efficiency, and cost. Three papers consider the nature of differences between and within countries following the Beveridge and Bismarck models of financing and organising the delivery of care, and how choices are changing within different systems. Within countries following the Beveridge model, current policies in England, Denmark and Sweden emphasise increasing patient choice of provider. Within countries following the Bismarck model, current policies in France and Germany seek to restrict choice of specialists by introducing ‘soft’ gatekeeping; and in the Netherlands there is a system of managed competition with choice of insurer that, in principle, allows insurers to contract selectively with providers. A fourth paper considers how government policies that seek to restrict choice within systems of universal coverage have been subject to challenges in the courts. A commentary explores the implications of the fraught and complex nature of choices between insurers and providers of health care for designing effective choice policies.