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Addressing global health is one of the largest challenges facing humanity in the 21st century, however, this task is becoming even more formidable with the accelerated destruction of the planet. Building on the success of the previous edition, the book outlines how progress towards improving global health relies on understanding its core social, economic, political, environmental and ideological aspects. A multi-disciplinary group of authors suggest not only theoretically compelling arguments for what we must do, but also provide practical recommendations as to how we can promote global health despite contemporary constraints. The importance of cross-cultural dialogue and utilisation of ethical tools in tackling global health problems is emphasised. Thoroughly updated, new or expanded topics include: mass displacement of people; novel threats, including new infectious diseases; global justice; and ecological ethics and planetary sustainability. Offering a diverse range of perspectives, this volume is essential for bioethicists, public health practitioners and philosophers.
Chapter 7 focuses on justice for temporary labor migrants. Though the chapter surveys many normative issues concerning temporary labor migration, the focus is on new sources of concern, such as those introduced by private recruitment companies, which are often guilty of serious deception, fraud, abuse, and failures to protect migrants, while destination and home countries fail to take responsibility for oversight. Labor migration is often characterized as beneficial to the migrants, along with both sending and receiving countries. While the logic of mutual advantage has a place in considering labor migration justice, especially considering the scale of global unemployment, there should be important constraints on such programs. These include requirements to ensure robust measures are in place that can offer reasonable human rights protections for migrant workers. The chapter discusses which rights deserve protection. There is scope for migrants to trade off protection of certain rights in exchange for labor market access, if they so choose. The chapter also offers principles to navigate which rights are “tradable” and which deserve rigorous protection.
Chapter 6 covers some new challenges associated with massive refugee populations. How can we help refugees in ways that are effective for all key stakeholders? Key stakeholders here include refugees, internally displaced populations who have not yet crossed a border, those left behind in states of origin, and those states that bear the burden of hosting large refugee populations. The chapter explores options that offer good solutions for host and home countries, for the roughly 10 percent of refugees who typically make it to high-income countries and the 90 percent who do not. Given the scale of refugee problems, we must supplement the three traditional approaches to addressing the plight of refugees (voluntary repatriation, local settlement, and resettlement), with new development-oriented and empowerment approaches. I discuss reforms that would better safeguard the human rights of displaced people or those vulnerable to displacement. In the absence of good faith and credible efforts at making such changes, our current arrangements for assisting refugees cannot be regarded as adequate. A state system that offered these up as the ways for dealing with refugees cannot be legitimate.
Chapter 8 discusses how to deal with alleged new terrorism and security threats posed by migration. Fears concerning terrorism and security seem to have significantly set back the prospects for migration justice recently. While there is some threat level, key issues include deciding what measures would be effective in combating it, while being commensurate with that threat level, and not ignoring the opportunity costs pursuing such policies might entail, especially ones that might better promote the goals of an inclusive society capable of resilience to such threats. The chapter also considers whether some risks can be further reduced without compromising our values, principles, and other important justice goals. There are significant concerns that arise about the measures we should take to protect against the perceived threat when they violate other demands of justice. For instance, excessive public expenditure in one domain when further outcome gains are insignificant and other important basic rights remain unaddressed, is relevant to assessing how well justice is achieved in particular societies.
Chapter 9 addresses two important questions: How open should states be to more migrants? What responsibilities do states and citizens have in connection with reducing migration injustices It also addresses key objections to the account of migration justice and its core recommendations. A legitimate state system must include rights to a fair process for determining migrants’ rights, especially concerning rights to admission and to remain. While this would generally lead to an opening of borders, important constraints on such opening would still remain, e.g., those relevant to respecting, protecting, and fulfilling the human rights of those already residing on the territory. The position offered is a human-rights oriented middle ground between the positions of those who argue for open borders and their critics. The chapter also returns to the issue of whether our state system can currently be regarded as legitimate. As matters stand, the state system cannot yet pass a basic legitimacy test, but Brock highlights what we must do if we aspire to a legitimate state system capable of supporting justice for people on the move.
Chapter 3 seeks a justification for states’ claims to have rights to self-determination that entail the right to control admission to their territory. States assume they have certain rights (such as rights to admit and exclude from their territory) and that agents of the state may act in ways that privilege the interests of their citizens. What justification can be offered for these arrangements? Importantly, what compelling justification can be offered to those who currently find themselves beyond those borders and who wish to cross them? In seeking a justification, we discover that for states to have robust rights to self-determination within a state system, they will also have many responsibilities. A state’s ability to exercise political power legitimately depends on its respecting human rights adequately and cooperating in a host of trans-border activities and institutions that have as their aim securing robust arrangements capable of effective human rights protection. Performance on both these dimensions affects whether we have a legitimate state system, along with whether there are adequate contingency arrangements in place to deal with important shortfalls.
Chapter 2 briefly reviews some salient history concerning human migration, to place new migration challenges in some context. Brock then begins to develop the normative framework that allows us to address contemporary challenges. How can any current occupants of territory justifiably prevent anyone from migrating into their space, given our knowledge of how most settlements came into being? What case can be made that states and the boundaries they vigilantly guard are justified? Brock argues that the state can play a valuable role in delivering on justice, as one kind of permissible administrative unit, among others. For instance, delivering on our lofty justice ambitions requires attention to some quite practical details; competent administration is important for adequate planning associated with meeting needs, protecting basic liberties, along with promoting the relevant conditions necessary to sustain enduring cooperative communities. In our contemporary world, states perform important administrative functions, though various configurations could do what is required, so this is at least a partial defense of our current arrangements. The justification continues in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5 considers the challenge presented by new threats to deport long-settled members of communities who do not formally enjoy the legal status of citizen, but rather are classed as “undocumented” or “illegal” migrants. These include the Dreamers, the Windrush generation, and those with Temporary Protected Status who have had that status revoked under the Trump presidency. I differentiate between five kinds of cases that raise some slightly different issues. I show why deportation for the long-settled involves grave injustices on a par with violating some of our most basic human rights. Evicting long-settled members would undermine legitimacy in several ways. Such actions threaten state’s rights to exercise power legitimately by undermining core internal, system, and contribution requirements. And I show why the arguments used in defense of community members’ alleged rights to continued occupation would be undermined by such evictions. In such cases, states may not claim a justifiable right to continued occupation nor can they claim that such a right entitles them to evict long-settled members of the community residing on that territory.
Our contemporary moment presents significant new justice challenges for people on the move. This chapter outlines some of the core issues and how the author aims to address them, offering an overview of the book’s key arguments. She begins by showing how anti-migrant sentiment has emerged in several ways. By executive order, the US has adopted immigration policy that looks remarkably similar to a Muslim ban. There are new threats to deport long-settled residents, such as the so-called Dreamers. Our defunct refugee system has not dealt adequately with increased refugee flows, forcing desperate people to undertake increasingly risky measures in efforts to reach safe havens. Increased migration flows over recent years appear to have contributed to a rise in right-wing populism, apparently driving phenomena such as Brexit and Trumpism. Brock outlines how to address such migration justice challenges, sketching the comprehensive framework she develops in this book for understanding what justice requires for people on the move.
Chapter 4 spotlights migration policy that seeks to exclude by limiting those who practice certain religions from gaining admission to a territory. We consider: What is wrong with a ban on Muslims? Is a ban on Muslims impermissible because it violates human rights? While some think it is difficult to make such arguments directly, this chapter offers an argument that is grounded in core aspects of the practice of human rights. Drawing on core elements of the argument discussed in Chapter 3 concerning the conditions states must satisfy in order to exercise power legitimately, we see that there are important internal and contribution requirements that enacting a Muslim ban fails to meet. Indeed, a legitimate state cannot embrace a migration policy that bans Muslims from being admitted without such policies undermining the state’s claim to legitimacy.
By executive order, the US has adopted an immigration policy that looks remarkably similar to a Muslim ban, and there are new threats to deport long-settled residents, such as the so-called Dreamers. Our defunct refugee system has not dealt adequately with increased refugee flows, forcing desperate people to undertake increasingly risky measures in efforts to reach safe havens. Meanwhile increased migration flows over recent years appear to have contributed to a rise in right-wing populism, apparently driving phenomena such as Brexit and Trumpism. In this original and insightful book Gillian Brock offers answers and tools that assist us in evaluating current migration policy and in helping to determine which policies may be permissible and which are normatively indefensible. She offers a comprehensive framework for responding to the many challenges which have recently emerged, and for delivering justice for people on the move along with those affected by migration.
Four recent books, taken together, offer a wealth of important insights on how we might effectively tackle corruption. All of the books’ authors agree that there is something akin to a universal understanding of what corruption is, and all dispute the idea that corruption may simply be in the eye of the beholder. However, there are also sharp disagreements—for example over whether corruption is best eliminated from the top down, or whether bottom-up approaches are more effective. If the books share one weakness, it is that they do not sufficiently emphasize the importance of getting people to believe and feel that they have fair opportunities for good lives, even after institutional and legal reforms are made. Tackling corruption involves taking seriously the substantive link between actual fair treatment and the belief that fair treatment prevails. This will require further research examining how to shift and update people’s deeply held sentiments.
What kinds of principles should guide liberal peoples in their international affairs, especially when dealing with people who are not apparently committed to liberal values? If they are true liberals, should they insist, wherever possible and likely to prove effective, that other peoples conform to liberal standards or at least gradually evolve in a liberal direction? Alternatively, should they be tolerant of others who hold non-liberal commitments and not attempt to steer them towards liberal democratic ideals? How are we to identify the limit for any appropriate tolerance that we ought to exercise? What responsibilities do affluent developed societies have to those that are poor and developing? What form should any assistance take when advantaged countries try to help disadvantaged ones?
Clearly, these are important questions worthy of considerable reflection. And these are the sorts of issues that Rawls attempts to address in his highly influential work The Law of Peoples (LP). The original position plays a central role in deriving the principles that should guide liberal foreign policy. In this chapter we discuss Rawls's original position argument in LP. In the next section I outline the argument Rawls offers for the principles that constitute his Law of Peoples, highlighting the role played by the original position in arriving at guidance in international affairs. Section 12.3 covers some critical engagment with those arguments while section 12.4 discusses some ways in which Rawls, or rather those who would defend him, might address key challenges. Section 12.5 takes stock of the debate between the two sides and emphasizes the strengths of both Rawls's peoples-focused and cosmopolitan perspectives in pursuing a global realistic utopia. I show how Rawls's position on duties to address global poverty and his views concerning how to interact with non-liberal societies contain considerable insights that are not adequately acknowledged.
Rawls's Law of Peoples: some highlights featuring the original position
To appreciate the dynamics of the debate surrounding LP we must very briefly highlight several key moves Rawls makes in his earlier ground-breaking work, TJ. There he sets out to derive the principles of justice that should govern liberal societies. He makes use of the innovative original position technique to craft an ingenious thought experiment. The original position is a theoretical device often used to test the fairness of principles that aim at justice.
In the law of peoples Rawls is concerned with the justice and peaceful coexistence of well-ordered societies as members of a society of peoples. Well-ordered peoples, importantly, have institutions of self-government or of consultation in their internal governance. For Rawls, well-ordered peoples include reasonable liberal peoples and decent peoples, which, although they are not liberal, are not aggressive, recognize human rights, and have a legitimate political and legal order. A key part of this project is to argue for the principles which well-ordered peoples can agree on to guide their conduct in the international domain. Rawls argues that the Law of Peoples he endorses is a realistic utopia. It is realistic because it takes account of many real conditions, such as the fact that not all peoples of the world do or can reasonably be made to endorse liberal principles. The eight core principles that constitute the Law of Peoples can, by contrast, be endorsed by all well-ordered peoples, or at least they have no reason to reject them.
Rawls’s argument occurs in several stages. First, he concerns himself only with liberal peoples and the principles they would have reason to endorse. He employs a second original position to derive his Law of Peoples for liberal peoples. In the first original position, the parties select principles to regulate the basic structure of society. After the principles governing domestic society have been derived, Rawls moves to the international level. At this stage, the second original position is employed to derive the foreign policy that liberal peoples would choose. The representatives of peoples are subject to an appropriate veil of ignorance for the situation. For instance, they do not know the size of the territory or population, its relative strength, or its level of economic development.
The notion of a decent people plays a key role in Rawls’s views about international affairs. One central part of Rawls’s project in The Law of Peoples is to determine the appropriate boundaries, extent, and nature of liberal toleration in shaping liberal foreign policy. A decent people or society is a theoretical construct that assists in understanding what liberal tolerance requires in the international sphere.
If we are aiming at peaceful coexistence and cooperation in the international realm, what kinds of societies must liberals tolerate? Are there any kinds of nonliberal societies which can be admitted as societies of good standing in the international community? Under what conditions, if any, may liberals defensibly decide not to tolerate certain regimes? In a world illed with much diversity, what kinds of peoples should we consider as legitimate, indeed perhaps as allies, in securing a peaceful world order? And are there some actions that are so repugnant that they might warrant coercive intervention? In order to answer such questions, Rawls introduces the theoretical construct of a people who are nonliberal and yet sufficiently committed to certain ideals that they can be accorded recognitional legitimacy and equal standing in international affairs. These are decent peoples.