International Relations Under Risk: Framing State Choice. By
Jeffrey D. Berejikian. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004.
152p. $40.00.
This book challenges the rational choice assumptions that undergird
much of the extant international relations literature on deterrence,
bargaining, cooperation, economic behavior, and the exercise of power. In
an ambitious extension of his previous work, Jeffrey D. Berejikian
attempts to construct “a new set of theoretical propositions about
international politics securely anchored to empirical research in
cognitive psychology” (p. 2). In the tradition of Graham T.
Allison's (1971) Essence of Decision, Berejikian
meticulously demonstrates the degree to which behavioral expectations
regarding strategic interaction are tied to underlying conceptual models
of decision making. He substitutes prospect theory's empirically
grounded observations regarding framing effects and loss aversion for
rational choice assumptions regarding invariance and net asset valuation.
The result is a comprehensive cognitive model of state interaction that is
capable of explaining preference reversals, risk acceptance, and
nonmaximizing choice. The boldness of this enterprise more than
compensates for minor flaws in execution.