‘Sentencing is an art and not a science’. This statement of Lord Lane expresses, with all due respect, what sentencing should not be. Although it cannot be denied that the process of determining a sentence is far from being a mathematical exercise, the result of which can be verified or falsified by reference to some unquestionable law of nature, both the legislator and the judiciary must strive for the development of a law of sentencing which is based on a comprehensive set of statutory provisions. The very term ‘law of sentencing’ indicates that the meting out of a sentence is more than the exercise of a skill that only judges are vested with. The use of the term ‘art’, conversely, to describe sentencing gives the impression that the act of sentencing is beyond objective understanding and control. When we speak of art, we acknowledge that while views on the outcome can be manifold, objective criteria for a ‘correct’ assessment are few: there's no accounting for taste. This is unacceptable when looking at the significance of the law of sentencing for the pursuit of various sentencing purposes. To base the determination of the sentence on legal grounds enhances the review possibilities with regard to sentencing judgments. This contributes to an even sentencing practice, which in turn leads to just and comprehensible sentencing judgments. Such a practice is necessary in order to achieve public acceptance of the criminal justice system in general and of sentencing verdicts in particular. Such acceptance is imperative for the achievement of several sentencing purposes, especially that of affirmative (or positive) general prevention.