In some countries, like Senegal, Ivory Coast, the two Congos, Togo, Madagascar and the Comoro Islands, 30% to 80% of family documents are fraudulent. Dans certains pays, comme le Sénégal, la Côte d’Ivoire, les deux Congo, le Togo, Madagascar ou les Comores, de 30 % à 80% des actes d’états civils sont frauduleux.
– Adrien GouteyronIntroduction
The quote that opens this chapter is from a Senate report published in June 2007. Part of a larger study on the administration of visa applications in French consulates, the report urges consulate agents to focus on the review of visa applications, outsourcing non-essential tasks to the private sector (en externalisant au secteur privé les tâches annexes). It also recommends that a common work culture be promoted across the various agencies in charge of controlling immigration in France. The average processing cost for a visa application is €35, concludes Gouteyron, while the average cost for the deportation of an illegal immigrant can reach €1,800. By suggesting that a streamlined and more efficient processing of visa applications would result in a higher rejection rate and savings in the long term, the report clearly places the management of visa applications within the broad politics of immigration control urged by the Sarkozy administration. Nicolas Sarkozy campaigned on a political platform that called for the tightening of immigration policies and promotion of ‘chosen’ migration (immigration choisie), which favours economic migration over family reunification. The 2007 immigration law made good on both promises.
The passage above was drawn from a section of the report titled ‘Document Fraud: An Endemic Problem’ (La fraude documentaire, un phénomène endémique) and has been widely quoted to justify and legitimise the use of genetic testing in the context of immigration. By documenting that some countries are prone to produce fraudulent and unreliable civil documents – in this case, African countries that were part of France's former colonial empire – Gouteyron provided the argument that would enable French legislators to target certain immigrants and ‘offer’ them differential treatment in the visa application process.
This chapter analyses the 2007 immigration law and its introduction of DNA testing as a move toward the re-inscription of ‘blood’ and ‘bloodlines’ into discussions of national belonging in France. This move is neither new nor exceptional within the French republican tradition.