The Coptic-Ethiopian case is the first dispute between Christian Churches over their rights in the Holy Places to come before the Supreme Court of Israel. It concerns only a small area, but the legal issues involved are far-reaching. They deal with the jurisdiction over Holy Sites, and therefore affect potentially all Christian communities which claim rights in the Sanctuaries.

The history of the jurisdiction over the Holy Places is dramatic and rich in contradictions. For many centuries control over the Sanctuaries was in the hands of Moslem rulers who decided disputes according to their discretion. In view of the widespread impact of these decisions on the Christian world as a whole, the tendency gradually developed to avoid all changes, and in 1878 the Treaty of Berlin suspended every jurisdiction by its Art. LXII which prescribed “that no alteration can be made in the status quo in the Holy Places”.

We shall begin this paper with a few general remarks on the development of advocacy from the time of classical Greece through to Rome. It was the esteemed jurists of these societies who, in their work, provided the basis for the development of European and modern law.

Creativity in Greek humanistic literature reached a peak prior to the Peloponesian war; thereafter, it exhibited a marked decline in all but one field, that of rhetoric, or the school of oratory. In this field, particularly in the context of political-jurisprudential literature, the development was impressive.

Around the middle of the fifth century B.C.E., the Sophists (“Sophist” means “clever” in Greek) appeared in Greece. These were the teachers of wisdom and higher education in all the fields of science and humanities then known in Greece, such as mathematics, astronomy, philosophy and logic, and of course, literature and linguistics. The Sophists wandered from city to city and spread their teachings; they have been described by some as “itinerant universities”.

The question of differentiating between an employee and an independent (self-employed) person has always been of primary importance in Israeli Income Tax law as a result of the various rules that distinguish these two types of assessees. In light of the adoption of the Ben-Shahar Commission's recommendations, this distinction has acquired even greater importance, as shall be explained.

This article discusses the law as it stands at present, which is not to say that in our view the current law is ideal. On the contrary, it is our opinion that the distinctions between the employed assessee—employee— and the independent assessee—self-employed—ought to be abolished. However since Israeli law does draw such distinctions at present, we shall discuss what is, de lege lata, and leave the discussion de lege ferenda for another time.