Many of the unified bars—public bodies to which all lawyers must belong and pay dues in order to practice—have been embroiled in legal and political disputes recently. Focusing on the history of the unified bar in Wisconsin, this article accounts for these disputes in terms of contradictions inherent in the very concept of a unified bar. Across a wide range of issues, the author argues, decision makers have been unsure whether to treat a unified bar as a public agency, a compulsory membership organization, or a private voluntary association, and thus unable to determine when public accountability, the protection of dissident members, or associational autonomy should be the dominant policy in unified bar affairs. The author concludes that disputes over questions of unified bar governance are unlikely to subside and that the unified bars should therefore be terminated in favor of a combination of private voluntary state bar associations and administrative agencies independent of the organized bar.

Growth and bureaucratization have begun to transform patterns of recruitment and career development in large law firms. Based on a case study of four large Chicago firms, this article examines these changes and their implications. The findings indicate that the social composition of large firms has become substantially more heterogeneous with respect to the status of law school attended, gender, and ethnoreligious background. However, data on lawyers' careers suggest that associates entering firms today face an increasingly bureaucratic organizational context marked by higher levels of turnover, earlier and more intensive specialization, decreased levels of client responsibility, and more frequent assignment to large-scale litigation. The article also addresses the dynamics of individual choice over type of work performed in firms. Lawyers initially working in litigation fields are far more likely to change fields of practice than are lawyers who begin in office practice fields, reflecting the increased tendency for firms to assign new associates to litigation as well as the alienating propensity of large-firm litigation for many associates. Paradoxically, a greater proportion of lawyers in traditionally organized, general service firms than in bureaucratically organized, specialty firms report that their choice of work was dictated by the firm. Also, somewhat surprisingly, the frequency with which firms explicitly direct lawyers into particular fields has not increased from earlier periods. The article concludes that these anomalies result from the fact that firms control the career choices of lawyers, and always have, but that the way such control is exercised varies across firms and historical periods.

The author concludes that federal judges who want to appoint special masters to perform duties related to civil discovery may not look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for authority to do so. By examining the historical backdrop against which the original rules were written, as well as the minutes of the proceedings of the first Advisory Committee, Brazil demonstrates that neither Rule 53 nor any other rule was designed to grant federal trial courts power to assign pretrial discovery tasks to special masters. In fact, the evidence the author marshalls shows that the original Advisory Committee explicitly rejected the idea that the Federal Rules should authorize even a limited role for special masters in connection with discovery depositions.

Finding no authority for such appointments in the Federal Rules, the author turns to the judiciary's “inherent power.” Drawing principles from the seminal Supreme Court opinion in this area, Brazil infers that in some circumstances the courts' inherent authority is a sufficient premise for delegating discovery tasks to special masters. Noting that the reported cases contain no clear guidelines about when or how federal judges should use this authority in making pretrial appointments, Brazil concludes by calling for a new federal rule covering this important subject.