The military coup of July 1936 against the Republican government of Spain, which rapidly developed into civil war, required an urgent response from the authorities of the United Kingdom. This was as much on account of its effects on British interests in Spain as due to its repercussions on the unstable situation in Europe. During the nearly three years of war, the Conservative-dominated Cabinet adhered to the Non-Intervention pact signed by all European governments in August 1936, which prescribed an arms embargo towards the combatants without a parallel recognition of their rights as belligerents. This peculiar neutrality, which combined respect for the legal status of the recognized government with de facto equal status for the rebels, was defended by British officialdom on the grounds of the over-riding need to restrict the war and avoid its escalation into a general European conflict. The argument served to deflect accusations of hidden antagonism towards the Republic and to justify the continuation of this policy of neutrality despite the support of Italy and Germany for the insurgent forces, so tolerating in practice the sabotage of the policy of non-intervention by the fascist powers. In the face of these official explanations, which have been accepted at face value by many historians, this article will attempt to show that British non-intervention had its origins in antirevolutionary pre-occupations rather than in strictly diplomatic considerations. Furthermore, it will be argued that during the first six months of the war it adhered consistently to a political strategy based on the expectation that the war would be short lived.

The First World War had engendered in 1917 the first communist state and, following this, in 1919, an international communist movement. With the exception of the People's Republic of Mongolia no new communist states emerged between the wars. The Second World War provided European communism with a second chance to establish itself as a significant political force. In its aftermath the Soviet model was extended to much of the eastern part of Europe while, in the West, communism reached, in 1945–6, the zenith of its influence and power. When the dust had settled, Europe, and with it socialism, had become effectively divided. In Eastern, and in parts of Central Europe a form of socialist society was created, only to be bitterly denounced by the (social-democratic) majority of the Western labour movement. It lasted until 1989–90, when, as each of these socialist states collapsed under the weight of internal dissent following the revocation of Soviet control, it became apparent that no novel socialist phoenix would arise from the ashes of over forty years of authoritarian left-wing rule – at least for the foreseeable future.

The Institute for Human Sciences (Institut fur die Wissenschaften vom Menschen) was founded in Vienna in 1982 by a group of scholars from Eastern Europe and the West. The purpose of the Institute was to overcome the cultural and intellectual division of Europe by promoting conferences, seminars and research programmes. The latest report of the Institute stresses that the disappearance of the Iron Curtain has made the work of the Institute all the more important. As the authors of the report explain, ‘…the civil society which is reemerging in Eastern Europe will hardly be viable without living connections to the West and, equally, the Western world will be much poorer without the historical experiences of the East. The Institut fur die Wissenschaften vom Menschen views itself as a place where the experiences and perspectives of Eastern Europeans can be (re-) introduced into the Western discussion as a means of rousing, changing and broadening Western culture. Europe should be seen as a challenge: as a manifold, but also contradictory, intellectual and cultural unity.’

More than 20 years ago, Philip Windsor proposed a succinct explanation of the East–West divide: ‘… the Cold War began with the deliberate Soviet decision to cut Europe in two and in reacting the Western powers took a deliberate decision to cut Germany in two.’ For the following two decades from 1969 to 1989, the formula ‘Peace and stability through partition” (U. Nerlich;J. Joffe) reflected widespread satisfaction with the territorial status quo in Europe. However, substantial disagreements (as L. Freedman observes p. 5) with established security policies, defence doctrines and armed forces' structures both in NATO and the Warsaw Pact (WP) might be taken as evidence that ‘Europe was on the verge of an historic change’. In respect of the state of public opinion, NATO ministers in early March 1988 declared the need gradually to overcome the unnatural division of Europe